FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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The CIA and Foreign Policy . . . . . *Robert M. Gates* 215
The President and the Secretary of State
Theodore C. Sorensen 231
A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy
Richard G. Lugar 249
A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 263
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution . . . . *Louis Henkin* 284
Struggle for Southern Africa . . . . . *Robert G. Mugabe* 311
Panama: Disaster or Democracy
Ricardo Arias Calderón 328
The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis . . . . . *George R. Packard* 348
Invisible Indonesia . . . . . *Donald K. Emmerson* 368
The Bolshevik Revolution Turns 70
Wolfgang Leonhard 388

DOCUMENT:
The 70th Anniversary Address . *Mikhail S. Gorbachev* 410
Correspondence . . . . . *George P. Shultz* 426
Recent Books on International Relations 429

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Robert M. Gates

THE CIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Over the years, public views of the Central Intelligence Agency and its role in American foreign policy have been shaped primarily by movies, television, novels, newspapers, books by journalists, headlines growing out of congressional inquiries, exposés by former intelligence officers, and essays by "experts" who either have never served in American intelligence, or have served and still not understood its role. The CIA is said to be an "invisible government," yet it is the most visible, most externally scrutinized and most publicized intelligence service in the world. While the CIA sometimes is able to refute publicly allegations and criticism, usually it must remain silent. The result is a contradictory mélange of images of the CIA and very little understanding of its real role in American government.

Because of a general lack of understanding of the CIA's role, a significant controversy such as the Iran-contra affair periodically brings to the surface broad questions of the proper relationship between the intelligence service and policymakers. It raises questions of whether the CIA slants or "cooks" its intelligence analysis to support covert actions or policy, and of the degree to which policymakers (or their staffs) selectively use—and abuse—intelligence to persuade superiors, Congress or the public. Beyond this, recent developments, such as the massive daily flow of intelligence information to Congress, have complicated the CIA's relationships with the rest of the executive branch in ways not at all understood by most observers—including those most directly involved. These questions and issues merit scrutiny.

II

The CIA's role in the foreign policy process is threefold. First, the CIA is responsible for the collection and analysis of intelli-

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gence and its distribution to policymakers—principally to the president, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Departments of State and Defense, although in recent years many other departments and agencies have become major users of intelligence as well. This is a well-known area, and I will address it only summarily.

Second, the CIA is charged with the conduct of covert action, the one area in which it implements policy. This is a subject so complex and so controversial as to require separate treatment elsewhere. Because of the media's focus on covert action, however, it is worth pointing out in passing that over 95 percent of the national intelligence budget is devoted to the collection and analysis of information. Only about three percent of the CIA's people are involved in covert action. By citing those figures, I do not pretend that covert action is not an important aspect of the CIA's activities. It certainly attracts the most attention and controversy. However, it is useful to have some perspective on its relative importance in terms of resources and the overall scope of the agency's activities.

Third, and most significant, the CIA's role is played out in the interaction, primarily in Washington, between the intelligence community and the policymaking community. It is in the dynamics of this relationship that the influence and role of the CIA are determined. The agency's effectiveness depends on whether its assessments are heeded, whether its information is considered relevant and timely enough to be useful, and whether the CIA's relationship with policymakers, from issue to issue and problem to problem, is supportive or adversarial. It is this dynamic interaction of intelligence and policy that is the least well understood, and it is this area that I will examine here.

The director of central intelligence serves both as director of the Central Intelligence Agency and head of the U.S. intelligence community. This community includes the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency, the FBI and the intelligence components of the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy and the four military services. Of these, only the CIA is completely independent of any policy department or agency, and only it accepts requests for intelligence support from throughout the executive branch. The director of central intelligence and the CIA serve as the principal conduits of intelligence to the president and the members of the National Security Council.

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The CIA devotes the overwhelming preponderance of its resources to the collection and analysis of information in order to learn the capabilities and intentions of adversaries of the United States, to forewarn of hostile actions against this country from whatever quarter, and to forecast and monitor political, economic and military developments worldwide that have potential to affect American interests or security. The CIA also endeavors to determine and respond to policymakers' longer-range requirements for information and analysis.

What is intelligence information and how is it used by the policymaker? The CIA's information comes from satellites, from newspapers, periodicals, radio and television worldwide, from diplomats and military attachés overseas and, of course, from secret agents. All of this information, billions of bits and pieces of data on global developments and issues of interest to the United States, flows to Washington, where analysts with expertise in scores of disciplines sift through, examine, collate and try to make sense of it. The CIA then reports its findings to policy officials and to the military services.

What clearly distinguishes information as suitable for intelligence exploitation is its relevance to U.S. policy and interests. It is the comprehensiveness of the CIA's collection and analysis, the agency's focus on the national security interests of the United States and the advantage of its having knowledge before anyone else that make the CIA's intelligence valuable to the policymaker. Furthermore, the CIA often makes a contribution simply by organizing facts in a clear and concise way, by providing the same facts to a range of different organizations, by identifying the important questions—and by trying to answer them.

This information finds its way to the policymaker in several ways. First, intelligence on day-to-day events and developments around the world is provided to senior officials daily or even several times a day. Early each morning a written briefing is delivered to the White House for the president. As directed by President Reagan in 1981, officers of the CIA's analysis directorate also fan out across Washington each morning to share copies of the president's briefing with the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the national security adviser and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During crises, situation reports are provided every few hours.

Second, the CIA contributes analysis to policy papers, by describing both current events and potential opportunities or

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problems for the United States. Nearly all NSC and sub-cabinet meetings begin with a briefing by the director of central intelligence or a subordinate expert.

Third, national intelligence estimates can play an important role in the making of policy. An estimate provides a factual review of a subject and forecasts future developments. Consensus among contributing analysts is welcome where it is genuine, but it is not sought at the expense of clarity or the airing of disagreements. Analytical mush is helpful to no one. In recent years a high premium has been placed on the presentation of diverse points of view and alternative scenarios—the different ways events may play out, and with what likely consequences. But, always, a "best estimate" is offered; the intelligence community owes the policymaker that.

These estimates—more than a hundred were done last year—are prepared by analysts from different intelligence agencies under the supervision of the senior substantive expert in the intelligence community, known as the national intelligence officer. Estimates are the most formal expression of the intelligence community's views. All of the intelligence agencies of the government both contribute to and coordinate what is written in national estimates. The best known of these are the annual estimates on Soviet strategic military forces.

Fourth, policymakers receive specialized assessments by individual agencies. The CIA's assessments and research papers are the products of the largest intelligence analysis organization in the world. The range of issues is breathtaking—from strategic weapons to food supplies, epidemiology to space, water and climate to Third World political instability, mineral and energy resources to international finance, Soviet laser weapons to remote tribal demographics, chemical and biological weapons proliferation to commodity supplies, and many, many more. I should note also that other intelligence agencies, such as the DIA, the military service intelligence organizations and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, prepare an extraordinary array of assessments for their respective departments and organizations.

III

Obviously the preceding review is a textbook description of the role of intelligence. It is neat, unambiguous, clinical, noncontroversial, even commendable—and highly misleading. It does not address central questions such as whether certain

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users of intelligence seek, not data or understanding, but support for decisions already made; whether they selectively use or misstate intelligence to influence public debate over policy; whether they disingenuously label intelligence they dislike as too soft, too hard or "cooked"; whether some intelligence officers are addressing personal agendas or biases. It does not reveal the implications for intelligence and policy of a CIA director who is held at too great a distance from the president, or of one who is too closely associated. It does not treat policymakers' frustration with constantly changing evaluations or with analysis that is just plain wrong, or the use of intelligence as a political football in struggles between government departments or between the executive and legislative branches. The attitudes and actions of CIA officials and policymakers that lie behind these and many similar issues, and the interaction among them, comprise the dynamic of the relationship—what Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem describes as "the intelligence-policymaker tangle."[1]

Sherman Kent, a professor of history at Yale who became a senior analyst in the Office of Strategic Services and was later director of the CIA's Office of National Estimates, wrote in 1949:

> There is no phase of the intelligence business which is more important than the proper relationship between intelligence itself and the people who use its product. Oddly enough, this relationship, which one would expect to establish itself automatically, does not do this.[2]

The fact is that, over the years, the policymaker and the intelligence officer have consistently (and with frighteningly few exceptions) come together hugely ignorant of the realities and complexities of each other's worlds—process, technique, form and culture. CIA officers can describe in excruciating detail how foreign policy is made in every country in the world save one—the United States. By the same token, as suggested by Professor Harkabi, the unhappiness of intelligence people "swells when they compare the sophistication and advanced methods employed in collection of the information and the

[1] Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Intelligence-Policymaker Tangle," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, Winter 1984, pp. 125–131.

[2] Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1965 edition, p. 180.

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production of intelligence against the cavalier fashion or improvisation with which policy decisions are many a time reached."[3]

Bookshelves groan under the literature of proposed rules of engagement to be followed when these two worlds collide. In 1956, for example, Roger Hilsman wrote that intelligence producers must "orient themselves frankly and consciously toward policy and action . . . adapting tools expressly to the needs of policy."[4] A more recent intelligence monograph argued that "the intelligence producer should initiate no direct interaction with his consumers, but rather should respond to requests for data and analysis."[5]

Sherman Kent was perhaps the first of the early intelligence commentators to make the case for a more direct and intensive interaction between policymaker and intelligence officer, even while arguing that a firm line must exist between the roles of each. Warning that overprotecting the objectivity of the intelligence analyst could be likened to piling armor on a medieval knight until he was absolutely safe but completely useless, Kent concluded that too much distance posed the greater danger to effective analysis. Even so, he foresaw a troubled relationship—that intelligence officers' skepticism of the objectivity of policymakers, and the latter group's consequent resentment, would stultify any free give-and-take between them; that policymakers would see the very existence of CIA assessments as an insult to their intellectual capabilities; that the security concerns of each party would encourage wariness and reticence.[6] And, in truth, these and other difficulties still greatly influence the CIA's role in foreign policy process.

IV

The institutional autonomy of the American intelligence service—of the CIA—is unique in the world (with perhaps the single exception of the Soviet KGB). While this confers certain advantages, above all independence, such autonomy also imbues the CIA-policy community relationship with a significant

[3] Harkabi, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[4] Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decision*, Glencoe (Ill.): The Free Press, 1956, p. 182.

[5] Center for the Study of Intelligence, *The Impact of Intelligence on the Policy Review and Decision Process*, part two, Central Intelligence Agency, March 1980, p. 7.

[6] Kent, *op. cit.*, pp. 167, 193–95.

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adversarial as well as supportive content. The policymaker has a long list of grievances, many legitimate, some not.

Policymakers legitimately want intelligence information that will inform and guide their tactical day-to-day decision-making. In some areas, the CIA can and does meet their needs. For example, in 1980, thanks to a very brave man, the agency was able to provide policymakers with knowledge of the step-by-step preparations for the imposition of martial law in Poland. In early 1986 it was able to document, in extraordinary detail, electoral cheating in the Philippines. There are even some areas where CIA intelligence is so good that it reduces policymakers' flexibility and room for maneuver.

Yet I would have to acknowledge that there are countries and issues important to the United States for which tactical intelligence remains sorely deficient, and here the complaints of policymakers are justified. The CIA's capabilities have improved much in recent years, but they are still uneven in quality. And no matter how good CIA intelligence is, there will still be surprises or gaps.

It is no surprise that few policymakers welcome CIA information or analysis that directly or by implication challenges the adequacy of their chosen policies or the accuracy of their pronouncements. Indeed, during the Vietnam War, this was a constant issue. On the other hand, I concede that on more than a few occasions, policymakers have analyzed or forecast developments better than intelligence analysts. And, truth be known, analysts have sometimes gone overboard to prove a policymaker wrong. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig asserted that the Soviets were behind international terrorism, intelligence analysts initially set out, not to address the issue in all its aspects, but rather to prove the secretary wrong—to prove simply that the Soviets do not orchestrate all international terrorism. But in so doing they went too far themselves and failed in early drafts to describe extensive and well-documented indirect Soviet support for terrorist groups and their sponsors. Far from kowtowing to policymakers, there is sometimes a strong impulse on the part of intelligence officers to show that a policy or decision is misguided or wrong, to poke an analytical finger in the policy eye. Policymakers know this and understandably resent it. To protect the independence of the analyst while keeping such impulses in check is one of the toughest jobs of intelligence agency managers.

In this connection the policymaker sometimes has the sense

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that the CIA is attempting, at least by implication, to "grade" his performance. Further, the policymaker is often suspicious that when the CIA's analysis suggests his policy is failing or in difficulty, these conclusions are widely circulated by the agency, with malice, for use as ammunition by critics of the policy in the executive branch, in Congress or among the public. These suspicions are magnified by leaks that pit the policymaker against the CIA in a contest for political advantage. And the policymaker often believes the CIA itself is a source of these leaks.

Often policymakers, facing a situation of extreme delicacy with another country, especially where U.S. law or political sensitivities may be involved, will caution analysts as they write or brief: "Now, you have to be careful what you say about this—let's work it out together beforehand." And the CIA, while protecting its independence, does try to be careful and to take the legitimate concerns of policymakers into account. But that is little solace to a policymaker who is politically at the mercy of any CIA briefer who goes to Capitol Hill.

Many policymakers believe the CIA allows its biases to dominate its reporting. Who would disagree that the CIA officers have views and biases, and that they try to promote them? But the CIA is not monolithic; there is a wide range of views inside on virtually every issue. Indeed, internal debates are fierce and sometimes brutal—after all, the stakes are very high. A classic example was the debate over the validity of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s. A more recent one was the bitter internal disagreement over who was behind the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II. The CIA is not a place for the fainthearted. The agency has elaborate procedures for reviewing assessments to filter out individual bias and make its reporting as objective as possible. And when the CIA sends out a provocative analysis by an individual, it tries always to identify the analysis as a personal view so that a reader will know it has not been through the above-mentioned review process or given a seal of approval by the agency.

More serious is the accusation that an institutional bias affects the CIA's work. I believe there probably is bias in some areas, in a broad sense. Although the agency was severely criticized for underestimating Soviet missile deployments in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is probably regarded today as more skeptical than most observers of Soviet intentions, as more cynical about the public posture of other governments when

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contrasted to their overt and covert actions, as more doubtful about the ease and speed with which the United States can usually affect developments overseas, and, fairly consistently, as tending to see perils and difficulty where others do not. This was the case during the Vietnam War, when it was a source of great bitterness.

Suspicion that the CIA's assessments are biased is especially great in areas where the CIA is involved in covert action. There are several reasons, however, why such suspicion is greatly overdrawn. First, analysis and operations are carried out by two completely separate elements (or directorates) within the CIA. There are long-standing cultural as well as bureaucratic differences between the two branches. There is—unfortunately, in my view—little flow of people serving in one directorate to positions in the other. Thus the analysis of developments in countries where covert activities are under way is done by people with no role or stake in the operations. Contrary to the case in earlier days senior officials in the analysis directorate review and comment on covert action proposals, but few subordinate analysts are involved and no one doing the analysis feels compelled to defend the success of a covert program. A common source of tension is an analysis that is far less optimistic than the director or operations people would wish—but, by policy, the analysis stands. Another safeguard of objectivity where covert action is involved is the recognition inside the CIA that intelligence work in these areas is bound to be scrutinized for signs of bias with special care by readers in the executive branch and especially in the Congress.

The impatience of policymakers with intelligence—with the CIA—is intensified by the fact that analyses and forecasts, often based on incomplete or ambiguous information, are sometimes wrong, and often change or are revised to take account of new information or new analytical techniques. CIA assessments of Warsaw Pact strength have changed on several occasions, complicating the task of U.S. negotiators in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks in Vienna. Similarly, the agency often revises its assessments of Soviet strategic weapons as new information becomes available. The CIA does not acknowledge error gracefully, and often does not forewarn policymakers of revised views before the information is published. A policymaker who has made decisions or developed a negotiating strategy based on one assessment, only to see it change or to

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find that it was wrong, will not think fondly of the CIA or soon wish again to proceed on its assurances or assessments.

As I suggested earlier, a special criticism by policymakers is that the CIA is too frequently a voice of gloom and doom. For policymakers who must try to find solutions to intractable problems or a way out of a no-win situation—for example, various conflicts in the Middle East—the CIA's forebodings and pointing out of perils and dangers are of little help and may be highly irritating.

The CIA's relationship with Congress also is a special problem for policymakers, for several reasons, and it profoundly influences the agency's role. Virtually all CIA assessments go to the two congressional intelligence committees. Most go also to the appropriations, foreign relations and armed services committees. Eight congressional committees get the CIA's daily national intelligence report. In 1986 the CIA sent some 5,000 intelligence reports to Congress and gave many hundreds of briefings. All this is new, having developed over the last decade or so. As a result, and thanks to their staffs, many senators and representatives are often as well if not better informed about the CIA's information and assessments on a given subject than concerned policymakers. Moreover, this intelligence is often used to criticize and challenge policy, to set one executive agency against another, and to expose disagreements within the administration.

Imagine the reaction of the Ford Administration in the mid-1970s when it went to Congress to get additional military aid for Cambodia, only to be confronted by the legislators with a new intelligence assessment that the situation was hopeless. Imagine President Carter seeking a U.S. troop cut in South Korea only to find Congress aware of a new intelligence estimate that concluded that there were more North Korean divisions than was previously estimated. Imagine the reaction of a secretary of defense, seeking funds for a new weapon, only to be told on the Hill of intelligence that the Soviets could neutralize the weapon.

Most specialists writing about the change in recent years in the balance of power between the executive and Congress on national security policy cite Watergate and Vietnam as primary causes. I believe there was a third principal factor: the obtaining, by Congress in the mid-1970s, of access to intelligence information essentially equal to that of the executive branch.

This situation adds extraordinary stress to the relationship

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between the CIA and policy agencies. Policymakers' suspicions that the CIA uses intelligence to sabotage selected administration policies are often barely concealed. And more than a few members of Congress are willing to exploit this situation by their own selective use of intelligence that supports their views. The end result is a strengthening of the congressional hand in policy debates and a great heightening of the tensions between the CIA and the rest of the executive branch.

The oversight process has also given Congress—especially the two intelligence committees—far greater knowledge of and influence over the way the CIA and other intelligence agencies spend their money than anyone in the executive branch would dream of exercising, from expenditures in the billions of dollars to line items in the thousands. Congress has been immensely supportive and steadfast over the past ten years in providing the resources to rebuild American intelligence. But I suspect it causes policymakers considerable heartburn to know that Congress may actually have more influence today over the CIA's priorities and its allocation of resources than the executive branch.

The result of these realities is that the CIA today finds itself in a remarkable position, involuntarily poised nearly equidistant between the executive and legislative branches. The administration knows that the CIA is in no position to withhold much information from Congress and is extremely sensitive to congressional demands; the Congress has enormous influence and information yet remains suspicious and mistrustful. Such a central legislative role with respect to an intelligence service is unique in American history and in the world. And policymakers know it.

V

Now, let me turn to the CIA's role and relationship with the policymaker as seen from the agency's vantage point. In each of the five administrations in which I have served there have been a number of senior policymakers (at the level of assistant secretary and above) who were avid users and readers of intelligence and who aggressively sought CIA analysis and views. These policymakers have dedicated considerable time to discussing substantive and policy problems with CIA officers. The agency has had unprecedented access to the Reagan Administration, from the president on down, especially when presenting analysis, and daily contact with the most senior officials of

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the government, including the vice president and the secretaries of state and defense. Administration officials have often directly tasked the CIA and offered reactions to the intelligence they read—and they have read a great deal. This is true also of their senior subordinates, with whom the CIA is in constant contact. This has contributed enormously to improving the relevance, timing and substance of intelligence analysis and other CIA support. It is a dynamic, healthy relationship, even though it is focused primarily on current issues.

This preoccupation with current reporting is, from the CIA's perspective, a major problem. If, as I have been told, the average tenure of an assistant secretary in government is 21 months, a short-term focus is understandable; but it is nevertheless lamentable, and ultimately very costly to the country. One of the CIA's greatest concerns over the years has been the unwillingness or inability of most policymakers to spend much time on longer-range issues—looking ahead several steps—or in helping to guide or direct the agency's long-term efforts. For many years the CIA has struggled, largely in vain, to get policy officials to devote time to intelligence issues other than those directly related to a crisis. Agency officers work hard to ascertain what is required of them: what policymakers' priorities are, what issues or problems the CIA should address, how the CIA can help the administration.

One reason Congress has assumed a larger role in these areas, in my view, is that policymakers in successive administrations have largely abdicated their intelligence-guidance responsibilities. For many years, trying to get senior policy principals to attend meetings to discuss longer-range intelligence requirements has been an exercise in frustration. Beyond the lack of help on requirements, the CIA gets little feedback on its longer-range work that might help improve its relevance to policymakers' needs. The CIA has been more aggressive in recent years in trying to engage policymakers on these matters, and key figures in the Reagan Administration have shown some interest in selected long-range problems, but such interest remains exceedingly, dangerously rare.

In part because of insufficient familiarity with intelligence work, too many policymakers arrive at their posts with an unrealistic expectation of what the CIA can do. When this expectation is disappointed, it often turns into skepticism that the agency can do much of anything. The apparent lack of CIA access to Soviet Politburo discussions, for example, leads some

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policymakers to question whether anything the agency says about Soviet intentions or politics has value, regardless of its other sources of intelligence. Similarly, the CIA has difficulty forecasting coups (which, of course, usually come as a surprise also to the targeted leader) or the results of difficult decisions not yet made by foreign governments.

It has been my experience over the years that the usual response of a policymaker to intelligence with which he disagrees or which he finds unpalatable is to ignore it; sometimes he will characterize it as incomplete, too narrowly focused or incompetent (and sometimes rightly so); and occasionally he will charge that it is "cooked"—that it reflects a CIA bias. In my 21 years in intelligence, I have never heard a policymaker (or anyone else for that matter) characterize as biased or cooked a CIA assessment with which he agreed. On subjects such as Vietnam, various aspects of Soviet policy and behavior, Angola, Lebanon and the effectiveness of various embargoes or sanctions, as well as on a number of other events and issues, the CIA's analysts have drawn conclusions that have dashed cold water on the hopes and efforts of policymakers. Sometimes the CIA analysts have been wrong, more often they have been right; but on problems both large and small the agency has not flinched from presenting its honest view.

There is no charge to which those in the CIA are more sensitive than that of cooking intelligence—of slanting its reports to support policy. Every director since I joined the CIA has been accused of this at one time or another. Therefore, it is important to understand the distinction between personal and institutional views. National intelligence estimates are reviewed and coordinated by a dozen agencies; CIA assessments are widely reviewed inside the agency but almost never even seen by the director before being published and circulated. As noted earlier, all go to several committees of Congress, where they are scrutinized.

These formal assessments must be distinguished from personal views expressed by individuals at all levels of the agency, from analysts to senior operations officers to the director. More than once, the late Director William Casey (and probably his predecessors) approved an estimate with which he disagreed personally, and separately conveyed his personal view to policymakers. I have no doubt that in policy discussions he expressed his own views, which, on occasion, differed from the agency analysis. Lest this raise eyebrows, it is worth recalling

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that in 1962 Director John McCone disagreed with the entire intelligence community over whether the Soviets might install missiles in Cuba. He told President Kennedy they would, and he alone in the executive branch was right. As long as all points of view are fairly represented and reported, the director of central intelligence—the president's chief intelligence adviser—is entitled (even obligated) to have and to put forward his own views. As Professor Henry Rowen of Stanford University recently wrote: "A CIA director is not supposed to be an intellectual eunuch."[7] Sometimes the director's personal view is insightful and correct—as in McCone's case; sometimes it is not.

I must add also at this point that the views of the director of central intelligence and of the CIA are sometimes overshadowed or set aside by policymakers or their staffs in favor of unanalyzed reporting or the assessments of other sources, or of interpretations of their own that support policy preferences or actions. I believe this played an important role in the Iran arms sales affair, as the CIA's formal assessments were misused or ignored by individuals pursuing their own agenda. For example, no analytical expert in the CIA believed in 1985 that Iran was losing the war, and only one or two believed Iranian support for terrorism was waning. And no CIA publication asserted these things. But this was by no means the first instance of selective use of raw reporting or assessments. I have seen it done routinely in five administrations, on large issues such as Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and on lesser ones as well.

Policymakers have always liked intelligence that supported what they want to do, and they often try to influence the analysis to buttress the conclusions they want to reach. They ask carefully phrased questions; they sometimes withhold information; they broaden or narrow the issue; on rare occasions they even try to intimidate. The pressures can be enormous. This is where the integrity of intelligence officers, bolstered by a natural tendency to resist pressure and an often adversarial bureaucratic relationship, comes into play to protect the independence of the agency's assessment.

But, overall, the dialogue between policymakers and intelligence officers is normal and healthy, and it usually improves the CIA's assessments and makes them more useful to policy-

[7] Henry S. Rowen, letter to the editor, *The New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1987, section 4, p. 34.

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makers—even while objectivity is preserved. CIA officers know that policymakers are often trying to influence an assessment, but that does not render their information and insights irrelevant or off limits.

A final thought: to attempt to slant intelligence would not only transgress the single deepest ethical and cultural principle of the CIA, it would also be foolish—it would presuppose a single point of view in an administration and would ignore the reality of congressional readership. Indeed, in my opinion, the sharing of intelligence with Congress—where members of both parties, with a wide range of views and philosophy all see the information—is one of the surest guarantees of the CIA's independence and objectivity. As Director William Webster has said:

> We intend to "tell it as it is," avoiding bias as much as we can, or the politicization of our product. Policymakers may not like the message they hear from us, especially if they have a different point of view. My position is that in the preparation of intelligence judgments, particularly in national intelligence estimates, we will provide them for the use of policymakers. They can be used in whole or in part. They can be ignored, or torn up, or thrown away, but they may not be changed.

VI

The foregoing describes the realities of the CIA's role in the making of American foreign policy. I have tried to go beyond the mechanics and the headlines to identify the stresses, tensions, rivalries, enduring complaints and relationships—the pulling and hauling, day in and day out—that determine the CIA's role and its impact. Some CIA analyses are better than others; some intelligence experts are better than others; estimates sometimes alleged to be politicized or biased usually are not at all—sometimes they were just not very well done. But unevenness of quality should not be confused with politicization.

The CIA's autonomy is unique in our government, and its relationship with the legislature is unique in the world. The CIA's relationships with other elements of the executive are a dynamic blend of support and rivalry, of cooperation and conflict. The challenge to intelligence managers is to manage these relationships so that all interactions—supportive and adversarial—end up promoting a better understanding of an ever more complex world around us, and hence contribute to better-informed decisions and policies.

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The real intelligence story in recent years is the significant improvement in the quality, relevance and timeliness of intelligence assistance to policymakers—a story that with rare anecdotal exceptions cannot be publicly described, in contrast to the publicity surrounding controversial covert actions, problems between the CIA and the Congress, and spy scandals. The CIA cannot advertise better collection or intelligence analysis. CIA officers understand this political reality, but it is imperative that Americans know that the CIA's primary mission remains the collection and analysis of information. This is the CIA's principal role in the making of American foreign policy. The president, the policy community and the Congress—albeit sometimes with clenched teeth—depend upon the CIA, task it and look to it more each day. The CIA attracts America's most capable young people, who find their work with the agency to be an exceptionally challenging, honorable and consistently fascinating career. As John Ranelagh observes in his recently published history of the CIA, "In its moments of achievement as well as condemnation, the agency was a reminder that it was a faithful instrument of the most decent and perhaps the simplest of the great powers, and certainly the one that even in its darkest passages practiced most consistently the virtue of hope."[8]

The United States has the finest global intelligence service in the world. Faithful to the Constitution and the law, it helps to safeguard our freedom against our adversaries and helps the policymaker understand and deal with the often dangerous world around us. The CIA is America's first line of defense—its eyes and ears. And the agency's deepest commitment, to borrow a phrase used by Eric Larrabee to describe George Marshall, is "to speak truth to power."

[8] John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987, p. 733.

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Theodore C. Sorensen

THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The next president, regardless of party, must restore mutual respect between the White House and Department of State.

Although the Iran-contra hearings focused on the executive-legislative imbalance, they also revealed a pattern of White House disdain for the Department of State so pervasive that Secretary George Shultz's own blunt testimony, while preserving his personal reputation, confirmed his department's emasculation. Never informed by the president of key foreign policy decisions, deliberately deceived by what senators termed a White House "junta" utilizing "rather shady characters" to carry out U.S. foreign policy, the secretary testified to "a sense of estrangement," of not being "in good odor" with the White House staff.

This was no attack of Foggy Bottom paranoia. National Security Adviser John Poindexter had placed the State Department on the list of those "who didn't need to know" certain overseas actions. His assistant, Oliver North, gave the department the code name "Wimp." Poindexter's predecessor Robert McFarlane once said North should be secretary of state. Both McFarlane and Poindexter traveled secretly abroad without informing the department. Still other White House aides vetoed Shultz's trips and suggested anonymously to the press that he resign.

II

Although the House and Senate committees investigating the Iran-contra affair were assured that new personnel and procedures would halt such conflicts, this was neither the first nor the last time Mr. Shultz was shut out or shot down by the

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White House. Nor was he the first secretary of state to encounter this treatment.

Indeed, his appointment followed Reagan's "acceptance" of a resignation frequently threatened, but never tendered, by Alexander Haig. Despite repeated presidential assurances that "you are my foreign policy guy," Secretary Haig found his policy pronouncements publicly disputed by White House assistants (who reciprocated his ill will), his procedural requests unanswered, and his authority over personnel and crisis management—even his place on Air Force One and in presidential receiving lines—downgraded. Like Shultz, Haig at one point felt obliged to acknowledge that he could not speak for the Administration.

Ironically, candidate Reagan had denounced White House-State Department feuding under President Carter, just as candidate Carter four years earlier had pledged that there would be no Kissinger-like "Lone Ranger" in his administration. But Carter's secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, soon found National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski cabling ambassadors, initiating negotiations, briefing the press, pronouncing policy and giving the president inaccurate summaries of their discussions. Carter thought he could balance Vance and Brzezinski and ride both horses simultaneously, even incorporating inconsistent paragraphs from each in a speech. But the ultimate result was delay and ineffectiveness.

Some say perfect harmony between the secretary of state and national security adviser (more accurately, the assistant to the president for national security affairs) prevailed only when Henry Kissinger briefly held both jobs. But when Kissinger wore his White House hat only, he substantially increased the national security adviser's visibility and staff, and sought, in his words, to bypass "as much as possible" Secretary of State William P. Rogers, selected by President Nixon specifically for his "ignorance of foreign policy." One senator remarked that Washington was laughing at Rogers, with Kissinger "secretary of state in everything but title." Another said: "They let Rogers handle Norway and Malagasy, and Kissinger would handle Russia and China and everything else he was interested in."

Kissinger's dominant role—recognized by the press and foreign governments despite White House claims to the contrary—reflected not merely his intragovernmental maneuvering but also the specific preference of a president knowledge-

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able in foreign affairs, who once remarked he "would have to wait 20 years for a new idea from the State Department."

Even as secretary, Kissinger neglected most of the rest of the State Department, relying largely upon a small coterie much as John Foster Dulles had done two decades earlier. Dulles, though he personally enjoyed unchallenged authority as President Eisenhower's secretary of state, not only ignored most of the Foreign Service but also permitted it to be gutted by Senator Joe McCarthy and others.

Paradoxically it was Eisenhower—who would not even send his brother or the vice president abroad without checking with Dulles—who expanded the National Security Council staff and its responsibilities and created the position of special assistant to the president for national security affairs (first filled by Robert Cutler). During the Kennedy Administration Cutler's successor in that office, McGeorge Bundy, assumed an increasingly important role; the NSC staff, described by Cutler as "scrupulously non-policy making" and nonpartisan, became an active part of the president's own staff, with an increased proportion of non-career officers. Secretary of State Dean Rusk—who, unlike Rogers and Haig, had unlimited access to his president—avoided feuding with Bundy and others whom Kennedy involved in foreign policy, including the president's brother, the attorney general; but he did not always welcome their participation. (Kennedy once quipped that, even when they were alone, Rusk would whisper to him that there were still too many present.) For his part, Kennedy both admired the State Department's talent and regarded it as a "bowl of jelly," a vast paperwork machine producing too few innovations and too many delays.

Although Rusk was closer to Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Johnson, and Bundy's successor, Walt Rostow, the concentration of foreign policy authority in the White House escalated along with the Vietnam War. Johnson, more than most presidents, reached outside both State and the White House for emissaries and advice, once tossing a draft U.N. speech onto the White House dinner table and asking assorted guests for revisions.

In the Truman-Marshall-Acheson era, now regarded as the State Department's Golden Age, two successive secretaries enjoyed true preeminence, coordinating policy and strengthening the Foreign Service with no interference from the newly formed NSC's technical staff. Nevertheless, even President Tru-

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man, who had not tolerated James Byrnes' failure as secretary to clear a national radio address, occasionally overrode George Marshall and Dean Acheson, for example, reinserting the "Point Four" program in his 1948 inaugural speech after the department had deleted it and taking the Palestine issue largely out of the department's hands. Long before there was a national security adviser, Secretary Marshall bristled at White House Counsel Clark Clifford's involvement in Palestine policy.

But Truman's overall approach contrasted sharply with that of Franklin Roosevelt. Bored by Secretary Cordell Hull, a political appointee, and distrustful of what he termed a "horse and buggy" State Department, F.D.R. inserted his own men to run the department (Sumner Welles, Raymond Moley, Adolph Berle), refused to take the secretary to wartime Allied summit meetings, did not inform him of key diplomatic decisions (or the atomic bomb), created a host of new wartime agencies, and utilized the devoted Harry Hopkins as his coordinator, emissary and principal adviser. Hull, who retained the title and trappings of office, found himself, in his own words, "relied upon in public and ignored in private."

Hull was not the first secretary to find his turf invaded. Woodrow Wilson typed his own diplomatic messages, induced the resignation of both William Jennings Bryan and Robert Lansing (with whom he did not consult about declaring war on Germany), and conducted foreign relations largely through his personal envoy, Colonel Edward House. Theodore Roosevelt often ignored Secretary John Hay, corresponded directly with other heads of state, and personally made all key decisions on Panama. William McKinley initiated war against Spain without consulting Secretary of State William Day. Even our first secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson, found his jurisdiction challenged by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, who regarded himself as George Washington's prime minister.

III

Must the next secretary of state face similar treatment? Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Reagan all assured their nominees to that office, publicly or privately, that the secretary would be the president's principal adviser, administrator, formulator and spokesman on foreign policy. No doubt most of those statements, like each new president's promise of the cabinet's collective importance (delivered at its only important meeting, when it gathers for its first group

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photograph), were sincerely intended. But each time hope was followed by frustration.

Why? F.D.R. threatened to be not only his own secretary of state but also his own secretary of war and navy. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, secretaries of defense have more successfully resisted White House direction than their colleagues at State. Indeed, the Defense Department's (and the CIA's) increasingly active role in foreign affairs has further aggravated State's decline. Military matters somehow look less intriguing to a president than diplomacy, more complex and expensive to tinker with, less politically promising.

No president would dream, for example, of anointing a campaign contributor or crony as a military theater commander. But making him an ambassador, and permitting him to bypass the secretary of state, is commonplace. A practice harking back to Benjamin Franklin and Charles Francis Adams is not all that new; a practice utilizing Averell Harriman, David Bruce, Ellsworth Bunker and Mike Mansfield is not all that bad. If "political" ambassadors could be kept below 25 percent of the total (as in the Carter Administration) and dispatched largely to countries more scenic than sensitive, the secretary might tolerate the chagrin of senior officers passed over by unprepared and ineffective amateurs. After all a non-career ambassador with the president's ear may more easily control those representing other agencies on the embassy staff and more willingly take on the State Department's critics. But the current postwar peak, with 40 percent of appointees being non-career diplomats, many of them placed in key capitals and even in mid-level Washington posts previously reserved for career specialists, can only accelerate the department's decline.

A more important reason for that decline is the distrust that stems from each new president's determination to make new policy, announce his own "doctrine" (four in the last two decades), and change his predecessor's policies. In the State Department the president all too often encounters an emphasis on caution and continuity from career personnel who served that predecessor. From the Defense Department and CIA, seemingly less bogged down in endless paper, inflexible procedures and multiple clearances, he obtains—sometimes—quicker answers, crisper memoranda and the promise of clearer results.

Thus Kissinger deplored the State Department's "mushy compromises," Poindexter its "fear of failure" and Arthur Schlesinger its "intellectual exhaustion." White House advis-

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ers, Dean Rusk said recently, do not like to hear that the world is too intractable for their proposals "and, not liking the message . . . are inclined to shoot the messenger." But Kennedy, despite his respect for Rusk, occasionally expressed another view of the department: "They never have any ideas over there, never come up with anything new."

In addition to this traditional presidential impatience Kennedy's more populist successors harbored antiestablishment suspicions of all professional bureaucrats, particularly diplomats. Brzezinski thought Vance represented a soft elite. Poindexter (himself a product of the military bureaucracy) dismissed both State and Defense career services as "not willing to take risks." White House aides for decades have briefed the press and public confident that they can represent the president's views better than the State Department.

But the principal reason for the increasing concentration of foreign policy responsibility in the White House is our increasingly dangerous world. Since the days when Dean Acheson could serve as both secretary of state and Truman's personal adviser and coordinator, the overlap between national and international issues, the number and speed of thermonuclear missiles, and the foreign policy pressures from Congress, the press and public, have all mounted to a point where no president can conscientiously delegate to anyone his constitutional responsibilities in foreign affairs.

No president is willing to entrust the nation's security and survival (and his own political effectiveness and survival) wholly to professional diplomats or to a secretary of state necessarily lacking his perspective. No president, as Kennedy observed, is now willing to become as dependent on one man's advice as Truman was on Acheson's.

Alexander Haig, having closely observed Kennedy's hands-on control of the Cuban missile crisis and Johnson's personal direction of Vietnam War tactics, should not have been surprised at President Reagan's insistence that crisis management be based in the White House where greater speed, precision and secrecy are assured. Reagan's counterparts in Moscow and other capitals are increasingly conducting foreign policy out of their offices and paying less attention to their foreign ministries. It is absurd to accuse the White House of "meddling" in the prerogatives of a department established by Congress in 1789 to fulfill such duties as the president should from time to time instruct.

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The modern president's personal foreign policy needs are threefold. First, to assist him in his public and private consideration and discussions of international issues, he needs someone to organize the flow of information inundating his desk from countless sources, and to relate each issue to his overall foreign and domestic priorities and politics. Second, to help *him* resolve (not to resolve without him) conflicting or overlapping recommendations from the State and Defense Departments, the CIA and some 40 other agencies responsible for international finance, trade, transportation, communications and other functions, the president needs someone to identify all the problems, options and issues, to define their respective risks and consequences, to monitor the implementation of his decisions, and to act as a catalyst for government action, a clearinghouse for cabinet statements, and a presidential emissary to foreign and domestic leaders. Finally, a strong president needs independent advice and analysis, alternative evaluations of recommendations from the State Department and elsewhere, and new long-term proposals to supplement those of his departments.

These coordinating and other roles are best handled by the national security adviser (and his staff), who can fulfill the president's need for someone in the White House who, to the maximum extent possible, speaks his language, sees the whole government through his eyes, and understands his political needs. The secretary of state can neither assume that role nor assign one of his people to it (as Reagan's former chief of staff Donald Regan believed Shultz hoped to do). No secretary of defense, treasury, agriculture, commerce or other department will accept as either fair or final the secretary of state's decision on their internationally related matters, just as he would not accept their decision on his. No White House will accept as objective the secretary of state's evaluation of his own department's proposal, or permit a secretary of state to hog whatever acclaim may flow from a foreign policy success. (The Marshall Plan was so dubbed by Truman only when it faced tough sledding in the Republican-controlled Congress as elections neared.)

George Shultz, like Dulles, believed that the secretary could think "presidentially" by occupying an office adjacent to the White House. But this confuses proximity with perspective. Shultz testified that he already had unlimited access to President Reagan but used that privilege sparingly "because he's a

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busy person." (Any secretary of state, with unavoidable administrative, congressional, travel and other commitments, is also a busy person—too busy to fulfill the role of assistant to the president.) An auxiliary office next door to the White House would be convenient for those occasions when his presence is required for a prolonged period; but substituting such an office for his present quarters a few blocks away would not significantly increase the influence in the Oval Office of a secretary highly esteemed by the president, much less one who is not.

More important, Shultz's proposal confuses the president's need for staff support in the performance of specific White House duties with his need for a strong professional department fulfilling a broader institutional role. Separating the secretary from his department, either physically or philosophically, would diminish both. Leaving White House duties to the White House staff serves the secretary's long-run interests as well as the president's.

IV

But the next president would be ill advised to limit the secretary and Department of State to a housekeeping, clerk and messenger role. The caution, continuity and constant consultations for which the department is chided reflect in large part the reality of a dangerous world that does not change merely because we change presidents. The department's institutional memory, in-depth planning and orderly procedures can protect an eager president from his errors as well as his enemies. The experienced eye and pragmatic perspective of career specialists—unlikely to view Iranian weapons buyers as "moderates" to be wooed with a Bible, cake and concessions—are needed to balance White House pressures for quick and dramatic solutions that conform with campaign slogans or popular sentiment.

Many on the McFarlane-Poindexter team at NSC had formerly served at the State Department, where, said a colleague, nine out of ten of their unrealistic proposals had failed; but "now suddenly there was no filter between them and the ability to act." A president's aides, relatively unrestrained by statute and unaccountable to Congress, may please him more often than career officers loyal to the department as well as the presidency. ("Sycophants," wrote Haig, "are knee-deep around the White House.") But they also serve who only stand and say no.

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Thus, despite his complaints about the State Department, J.F.K. recognized its strengths, directly telephoning or summoning assistant secretaries, ambassadors and desk officers (including some sub-cabinet officers he had injudiciously named before selecting and consulting Secretary Rusk). Kennedy's Cuban missile crisis decisions were notably informed by the participation of career experts, particularly Llewellyn Thompson.

In the department described by Brzezinski as the most "turf-conscious" in Washington, productivity is directly proportional to participation. Foreign Service morale was high when Truman looked primarily to his secretary of state to run foreign policy. Its morale is low after years of budget cuts at home and terrorist attacks abroad, investigations from the outside and ideological purges within. The next president, seeking a more supportive department, must offer more support to it.

If he has read recent history as well as the Constitution, he will also know that he needs the support of Congress; and a foreign policy lacking the full participation of the secretary of state is less likely to be trusted and supported by Congress. Unlike the national security adviser and other White House aides governed by the doctrine of executive privilege, the secretary of state is accountable not only to the president but also to the Congress that confirms his appointment (Senate only), provides his funds and statutory authority, and hears his testimony.

A successful secretary of state seeks mutual respect with legislators from both parties, even when resisting their micromanagement or criticism. They do not want him, their primary channel of information and influence on foreign affairs, shut out of key decisions. Kissinger, when national security adviser, occasionally provided private informal briefings to Senate Foreign Relations Committee members, sometimes at the home of the chairman, William Fulbright. But congressmen resented the fact that taking testimony from Secretary Rogers was "a rather empty exercise," and further resented Kissinger's appearing before the press but not the Congress to answer questions. To the extent the secretary of state feels excluded from foreign affairs decisions, Congress feels excluded; and that is ultimately unhealthy for the president.

Moreover, unless the NSC staff becomes as large as the State Department—in which case it would suffer many of the same ills and more—no White House has time to make and imple-

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ment the myriad foreign policy decisions that a superpower makes daily. The president, with the secretary's help, will make the choices that affect his place in the headlines or history books. But every single day more than 1,000 cables are sent from the department over the secretary's signature; the department's representatives are participating in more than a dozen international conferences; and foreign ministers and ambassadors from more than eight score countries, in Washington, the United Nations and their home capitals—to say nothing of Congress and the news media—are seeking the department's position on countless issues.

In Dean Acheson's apt metaphor, the president is head gardener in foreign policy, trying to shape forces he cannot totally control: "If he tries to do it all himself—to be his own secretary of state . . . he will soon become too exhausted and immersed in manure and weed-killer to direct anything wisely." An ancient adage of the legal profession holds that a lawyer trying to represent himself has a fool for a client. A president trying to be his own secretary of state is in much the same position.

Nor can the president be his own chief negotiator. There is glory at the summit. But there is also peril and pressure. A subordinate negotiator from State can better delay a response, risk an offense, repudiate a mistake, provide a buffer and protect the president's prestige. But as Secretary Shultz testified: "When the president hangs out his shingle and says 'you don't have to go through the State Department, just come right into the White House,' he'll get all the business."

Finally, a president who overrules or undercuts his secretary of state risks a resignation potentially harmful to the country or Congress. F.D.R. reportedly took pains to avoid driving Hull to the point of resignation. Although Wilson induced Robert Lansing's resignation, confident that it would be at most "another two-day wonder," he had been less sanguine in 1915 about Bryan's more stormy departure blasting "pro-war" policies. Bryan, however, neither respected nor effective as secretary, found his resignation assailed by some as too tardy to be an expression of conscience and by others as too helpful to the kaiser to be an expression of patriotism. He could not even be chosen delegate to the 1916 Democratic Convention.

Unlike the British cabinet member who can return to Parliament to combat the policy that triggered his exit, the American secretary of state contemplating resignation realizes that, like

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Bryan, he will no longer influence that policy from either inside or outside the government. To resign with a blast stirs debate; but most secretaries will regard that course as disloyal and unprofessional.

Yet resignations in protest are not un-American. "My duty will be to support . . . the President's Administration," John Quincy Adams wrote to his mother when appointed secretary of state. "If I can't, my duty is to withdraw from public service." Cyrus Vance decided "as a matter of principle"—after President Carter approved the Iranian hostage operation over his opposition—that he "could not honorably remain as secretary of state when I so strongly disagreed with a presidential decision that went against my judgment as to what was best for the country."

That sums up the valid grounds for resignation. Not fatigue or frustration, not a fit of pique or prima donna demands, not losing an internal debate or a seat on Air Force One, but the hypocrisy of publicly supporting a major presidential policy that the secretary cannot conscientiously implement. "You can't do the job well if you want it too much," Secretary Shultz wisely observed. "You have to be willing to say 'goodbye'."

Despite being "deliberately deceived" in a "systematic way" by the White House about actions directly contrary to his assurances to other foreign ministers, despite presidential approval of policies he deemed "crazy" and "pathetic," Shultz never said goodbye. His resignation, he believed, would not have reversed the president's course on Iran but merely denied him Shultz's help on other issues.

Although others who have resigned in protest may have drawn a different line, presidents rarely do reverse course as the result of a cabinet resignation. Indeed, the threat of resignation may be more effective than the act, assuming the threat is both infrequent and believed. But presidents grow weary of those constantly threatening to submit their resignation and—as Secretary Haig discovered—may ultimately "accept" it whether or not submitted.

V

Note that Bryan and Vance did not resign because the State Department's "primacy" had been lost to House and Brzezinski (although Acheson, asked later what he would have done had a powerful national security adviser been installed, quickly replied: "I'd resign"). In fact, "primacy"—the focus of so

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many studies on State Department authority—can be a misleading term. Haig may have described his battle to become Reagan's foreign policy "vicar" as a "struggle for primacy between the president's close aides and myself"; but, in terms of actual decision-making, both reality and the Constitution permit only the president, not the secretary or the White House staff, to be "prime" in the executive branch.

Only the president has ultimate power. If he consistently upholds his secretary of state—as Truman and Eisenhower did—he will bestow a de facto primacy among his *advisers.* But controversial foreign policy initiatives will still face interminable bureaucratic infighting at the third and fourth levels of government unless they are known to have been decided personally by the president, whoever may have advised him. The NSC staff can monitor and coordinate the implementation of presidential decisions at those levels without usurping whatever advisory primacy the president may have bestowed upon the secretary of state. Thus Mr. Shultz erred in quarreling with the conclusion of the Tower Commission, appointed by President Reagan to determine whether structural changes were needed in the foreign-policy-making apparatus, that coordination by the NSC staff was necessarily at the heart of a decision-making process that needed no substantive revamping.

Decades of earlier studies by high-level commissions and commentators had similarly focused on structure and process. Some had even proposed new offices: a second vice president for foreign affairs, a super-cabinet secretary of foreign affairs above the secretary of state, a first secretary of the government. Other studies, in the best tradition of the Maginot Line mentality, reflected the perceived shortcomings of the previous administration's machinery. Indeed, the NSC system itself—which has aggravated State's sense of isolation for nearly 20 years—began as an organizational reform reflecting criticism of State's mistreatment under Franklin Roosevelt.

But formal, obligatory structures and procedures are neither the problem nor the solution. Alexander Haig may have blamed his difficulties largely on the White House's refusal to approve the organizational plan he presented to the president on Inauguration Day. But each president will consult whom he wishes to consult. Who gets to write the final options paper, and who gets to read it and when, can influence the president's choice; but he will often make that choice on the basis of unrecorded and uncontrollable conversations, including those

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with his spouse, personal secretary or barber. No table of organization can offset human chemistry, incompetence or excessive zeal. No theoretical model can effectively impose on a president a decision-making system unsuited to his needs, interests and experience.

Kennedy was not comfortable with Eisenhower's approach, and Kennedy's worked less well for Johnson. In the 1961 Berlin crisis Kennedy preferred not to convene the NSC, which included the director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis he convened only the dozen or so individuals whose judgment he valued, later formally titling the group the NSC "Executive Committee." Johnson, Carter and Reagan, contrary to today's recurrent proposal that still more individuals (from Congress or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example) be added to every NSC meeting, all devised smaller groups to make the real decisions. Even Truman looked not to the NSC he founded but to individuals—such as Marshall, Acheson, Lovett and Harriman—in making his decisions.

Thus, what matters most is not whether the foreign policy interagency groups or senior interagency groups are chaired by the national security adviser, as urged by the Tower Commission, or by a State or Defense Department representative, as urged by Shultz. Nor is the test whether an advance assurance of unfiltered access is given by the president to his secretary of state (as it was to Vance) or denied him (as it was to Rogers). What matters is whose advice, written or unwritten, the president ultimately values the most on any given issue. No structure can predetermine that.

Nor can any statute, as the Tower Commission wisely concluded. The passage of new laws is not a remedy for the violation of existing laws, and legislative "reforms"—as those statutes seeking to curb the president's war powers and intelligence activities demonstrate—are not always effective. Congress could no doubt prohibit the national security adviser and his staff from engaging in covert and other operations, or limit the size of that staff. But any attempt to mandate how the NSC should function—in effect, instructing the president whom he must and must not hear—would be both unwise and unworkable. To hear is not to heed. To meet is not to decide. No president should be required to convene a formal body, whose views he does not seek, to reach a decision he prefers to reach elsewhere.

Another legislative proposal—subjecting the national secu-

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rity adviser to Senate confirmation and congressional testimony—would only make matters worse. Either the president would rely on some other foreign policy aide serving under a different title, or the national security adviser and secretary of state would have virtually indistinguishable roles. If his operational functions are returned to the departments where they belong, the national security adviser's principal function is to give the president confidential advice, for which he should not be—and under the Constitution cannot be—accountable to a separate branch of government.

One advocate of change has asserted that confirmation hearings for John Poindexter might have "smoked out" the qualities that led him into trouble. But what are the qualities that foretell trouble in this post, and what qualities guarantee success? In contrast with the highly visible Brzezinski, Admiral Poindexter was all but invisible, rarely speaking to the public or press. That did not help Shultz. Poindexter's predecessors under Reagan—Richard Allen, William Clark and Robert McFarlane—were not of the assertive Kissinger mold; but they still clashed with Shultz and Haig (although, as Allen remarked, "Mother Teresa could have been national security adviser and . . . had conflict with Al Haig"). Unlike Nixon, Carter encouraged his national security adviser and secretary of state to argue out their differences in front of him. State still lost ground.

Over the years, some national security advisers have been academics, lawyers or businessmen, others have had a military background. Some have been strategic thinkers, some coordinators, others presidential confidants. In each case, the State Department's authority receded, usually because the president—not the national security adviser—so ordained, and usually without much resistance from the department.

VI

A foreign policy dominated by a strong national security adviser is not necessarily lacking in initiative and imagination, as Henry Kissinger demonstrated; and a foreign policy dominated by an unchallenged secretary of state is not necessarily one of strength and wisdom, as Secretaries Dulles and Charles Evans Hughes demonstrated. Nor is tension between two Washington officials, a familiar occurrence in a city founded on checks and balances, invariably unhelpful to a president who thrives on competition in creative thinking. Any candidate

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who promises total consistency in his future administration's foreign policy statements is unfamiliar with the real world of Washington.

But the "guerrilla warfare" of which Secretary Shultz spoke need not be the inevitable result of this creative tension. The next president, before he takes office, without shortchanging Defense and other departments outside the scope of this article, should reach an explicit understanding with each of his State Department and White House nominees on certain basic principles and practices.

First, the president should select a strong-minded secretary of state who shares his view of the world but possesses independent stature (not, however, presidential ambitions), and then make clear not merely to the secretary but to his cabinet, NSC staff, the departmental bureaucracies and the public that he genuinely wishes the secretary of state to be not his sole but his principal adviser, spokesman, negotiator and agent in foreign affairs—not his coordinator or decision-maker—until such time as he proves unable to fulfill the president's requirements in that role, at which time his resignation will be accepted. The president should make equally clear that he will respect the following prerogatives: the secretary's authority over all other State Department personnel, including noncareer ambassadors; the department's authority over the separate overseas information, development and arms control agencies; and each ambassador's authority over embassy staff members reporting to Defense, the CIA and other departments.

Second, the president should meet with the secretary, with only the national security adviser present, at least several times a week when they are both in Washington and confer by telephone when they are not. Each such discussion should be a candid and confidential exploration of each other's views (not merely a briefing by the secretary or instructions from the president) on issues large and small, on personalities foreign and domestic. No recommendation from the national security adviser or other presidential aide, and no White House activity in the foreign policy area, should be withheld from the secretary; no recommendation of the secretary should be unheard by the president; and no subsequent rejection of that advice on a major issue should occur without advance notice to the secretary. They need not be chums (Dean Rusk has remarked he thought it appropriate that he was the only cabinet member whom President Kennedy did not address by his first name);

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but between them loyalty, confidence and respect must flow both ways. Each must recognize the other's very different role and responsibilities.

Third, the secretary of state must fully exercise the responsibility thus given him, personally participate (like Acheson) in drafting the president's speeches, deliver the bad news along with the good, and inside the Oval Office question his chief's views, and the national security adviser's, whenever he feels they are wrong. But he must also accept the fact that the modern White House—not only the president—inevitably exercises some of the authority once lodged in his department. (Even Marshall and Acheson succeeded in part by making clear their deference to presidential power.) The secretary cannot accommodate every critic or shy away from every controversy, but he should avoid those battles on which he has not yet checked with the president or knows the president must overrule him (not, however, distancing himself, as Shultz did, from a matter on which he has been overruled). He must understand U.S. domestic politics and its impact on both the president and foreign affairs; take blame for all failures while letting the president take credit for all successes; exercise both diplomacy and salesmanship in representing the president with Congress and the press as well as with foreign leaders; make it a high priority to respond to White House requests for new options in both the time frame and the style preferred by the president; and maintain close and candid relations with his cabinet colleagues and particularly the national security adviser. Should he ever conclude that he cannot in good conscience help implement some major presidential decision, then he should not threaten his resignation, but irrevocably submit it.

Fourth, the secretary must truly lead and manage the department (few do), adopt the president's program and policies as his own, convey them to the department's professionals, win their cooperation and respect for those policies, and utilize their talents in senior policymaking posts without subjecting them to any ideological test, without regard to who served his predecessor, and without confining all major tasks to a small inner circle. But—again like Marshall and Acheson—he must not hesitate to prod and prune the Foreign Service, reduce its paperwork and procedural delays, and broaden its base.

Fifth, the president—spurning those who insist that he look for strength in either his secretary of state or his national security adviser but not both—should fill the latter post with a

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skilled and trusted deputy possessing a personal style and outlook compatible with both his own and the secretary's. In performing the advisory and coordinating functions summarized above, within the limitations prescribed by the president, drawing upon the useful model contained in the Tower Commission report, and mindful of the secretary's primary role as outlined above, the national security adviser should present his own views to the president without concealing them from the secretary, and convey the views of the secretary and others accurately, taking pains not to permit his own advocacy to diminish theirs, not to forfeit their trust and respect, and not to represent his own thinking as the president's without knowing his chief's express wishes. Coordination of process must not again become control of policy. On whatever issues the president wants the national security adviser to cover, he should review, but not duplicate, the cable flow and other work of the State Department as an adviser outside the line of command between the president and secretary. No important matter should be decided at his desk. The "buck" does not stop there.

Sixth, the national security adviser should maintain low visibility, if not the unrealistic standard of "a passion for anonymity": few speeches, still fewer on-the-record press conferences, and even fewer public missions abroad. His meetings with foreign officials should be reported to the secretary. The presidential instructions he relays to U.S. ambassadors should be cleared and transmitted through the secretary. His confidential foreign travels should be coordinated with the secretary. He should appreciate congressional and domestic politics and the talents of a Foreign Service that has, in McGeorge Bundy's words, an "almost instinctive desire to turn toward the sunlight of presidential leadership." His professional staff should be substantially smaller than the present one (Kennedy and Bundy successfully relied on only a dozen), and selected—without political clearance—from among both specialists outside the government and career servants within. Whether or not the president has a chief of staff or other senior policy adviser, the assistant for national security affairs should report directly to the president as often each day as necessary. He should keep the chief of staff and presidential press secretary informed, but also urge the president to keep the number of White House aides involved in foreign policy meetings and missions to a minimum.

Finally, the president himself must be in command of his

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own forces, attentive and decisive on international issues, permitting no policy vacuum or power struggle, melding diverse views into one voice, building an atmosphere of team loyalty that minimizes leaks and backbiting, stimulating the thinking of others without suppressing his own. He will not strengthen the Department of State by stifling its creativity. He will not win the confidence of Congress by transferring power to his own unaccountable staff. He must dismiss any White House aides overstepping their bounds. He must devise a suitable system for making decisions but, more importantly, he must make them.

None of these recommendations should be imposed by Congress or adopted wholesale by the president. He must personally tailor the cloth to fit his own frame. Indeed, all of the above boils down to the strength and judgment of our next president. Ultimately he will determine the quality of his principal foreign policy advisers and their advice. We—all of us—will determine the quality of that next president.

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Richard G. Lugar

A REPUBLICAN LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY

Recently it was suggested that presidential primaries drive Republican and Democratic hopefuls into making a mess of foreign policy: Republicans emphasize their suspicions about arms control agreements with the Soviets; Democrats rail against new weapons systems and any resort to the use of force to back up diplomacy. This commentary—an editorial in *The Washington Post*—concluded that the process of the primaries exacts a high cost in American foreign policy, and that it will not be easy for the next president to reclaim a middle ground laid waste by excessive partisan rhetoric.

But the middle can be variously defined. What will matter is how a new administration deals with the core issues of American security policy: arms control and national defense, the use of force, including U.S. military forces, abroad. Even these issues must first be addressed in the broad historical context of those enduring postwar commitments and responsibilities that both Republicans and Democrats have subscribed to since 1945.

If the new administration is to develop a cohesive and coherent foreign policy, it cannot escape the changes in our nation's strategic position. It must recognize three fundamental new conditions. First, there is a potentially dangerous disparity developing between those vital security interests that the American people are prepared to support with force, and the degree and kind of force we are willing and able to employ to protect these interests. In short, our aims may exceed our resources.

The extent of American commitments abroad has not declined; in some parts of the world our obligations have even increased. This new reality has led some to argue once again that we must reduce our commitments and thereby decrease the risks our country must face. But it is far easier to demand a reduction in commitments than to define with clarity those commitments that can, in fact, be safely reduced. In practice,

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we must decide whether the loss of prestige from abdicating responsibilities will reduce the effective use of American power more than the reduced claims on our resources might enhance our standing.

Our current commitments are likely to continue even if our military power remains more limited, when measured against those commitments, than it has in the past. This situation implies an increased degree of risk. Both Republicans and Democrats will have to acknowledge this change in our global position, for there is not likely to be any acceptable way to escape from either responsibilities or risks.

This security dilemma, the growing gap between our objectives and our capabilities—sometimes described as a decline of relative American power—has been recognized in both parties, but the diversity of proposed remedies has accelerated the breakdown of the national consensus. The simultaneous end of any semblance of a national or bipartisan consensus in the country on foreign policy is the second new factor that the next administration must face.

Republicans, led by Arthur Vandenberg and Henry Stimson in the 1940s, promoted bipartisanship in foreign policy that was sustained until its demise over Vietnam. Efforts to restore a consensus on security issues under the Reagan Administration have run afoul of deep differences over U.S. policy toward Nicaragua and an appropriate U.S. role in the Persian Gulf. It has thus become increasingly difficult to maintain a national consensus in support of the employment of U.S. force and forces abroad. And, of course, no administration is eager to incur the domestic political penalties and divisions inherent in engaging U.S. military forces in combat situations.

It is clear that, as some of our strategic advantages have declined, a national consensus is all the more necessary in order to maximize the effective use of our residual power. But such a consensus cannot simply be wished into being. It can be restored only gradually over time, through the development of mutual trust and sustained credibility on the part of both the president and the Congress.

Reestablishing such trust, however, is all the more difficult in light of the third new factor: the revival of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches over foreign policy. This tension is inherent in the constitutional separation of powers but it has been exacerbated by new concerns over both the formulation as well as the implementation of poli-

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cies—again, evident most recently in the debates over aid to the contras as well as the War Powers Act and its applicability in the Persian Gulf crisis.

Our nation must guarantee our essential interests at a reasonable risk through a judicious balancing of commitments and power: this means maintaining a credible deterrence and national defense as well as an ability and a willingness to use armed force, directly and indirectly. If we cannot achieve this, then a more restrictive interpretation of vital security interests must necessarily follow, at a cost to our national security that cannot be predicted. I believe that the Reagan Administration has succeeded in bringing our interests and power more into line, to the point that the inherent risks are approaching an acceptable level. The next Republican administration can build on this achievement.

II

The issue of military security has confronted every administration since the bombing of Pearl Harbor. How much is enough, and at what price, have been perennial questions. All presidential aspirants claim to favor a strong defense. Little agreement exists on the price of such a posture. It is already clear that opinions are divided on matters such as cutting the defense budget, spending levels for strategic defense, the timing of new conventional weapons programs and the pace of naval modernization. Consequently, much of the foreign policy debate leading up to the next national election will likely revolve around the role that arms control, and perhaps superpower cooperation in limiting regional conflicts, might play in the balancing of America's foreign interests and commitments with appropriate power, resources and the political will to support them.

The Reagan Administration focused its attention on enhancing the military strength of the country, as a central priority. Mr. Reagan's promise to do just that certainly contributed to his election in 1980, and his success in realizing this objective surely contributed to his reelection four years later. Critics may argue about the effectiveness of the allocation of funds to one or another specific defense program, and they may even debate the utility of the military strength achieved in the past years. But the perception of restored American military strength made it possible to negotiate with Moscow, and has given the

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Soviet Union an incentive to negotiate over outstanding issues in the Soviet-American relationship.

The new Soviet leader apparently recognized the new situation confronting the U.S.S.R. The Reagan Administration's enhancement of our country's military posture threatened not only Soviet gains in relative strategic offensive strength acquired in an earlier period but promised to mobilize our technological advantages in the furtherance of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This presented General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev with a choice. He recognized that the Soviet industrial-technological base could not be used both to reform a stagnant and backward economy and, simultaneously, to sustain an arms competition with the United States. Thus he resumed arms control negotiations, met with President Reagan at the Geneva summit and, finally, accepted the American position on eliminating medium-range missiles.

The Administration was attacked for its strategy of building strength in part as one means of achieving a more advantageous negotiating position. That strategy has paid off. It has revived genuine arms control negotiations; indeed, it established arms control as a centerpiece of East-West relations and very likely West-West relations for some time to come. It is not at all clear whether strategic arms agreements, comprehensive or otherwise, will actually enable the United States to safeguard deterrence at less cost and risk. But we seem to be entering a more or less continuous round of negotiations on controlling strategic and nuclear arms—and doing so from a stronger position than when the talks began in 1981–82.

Some critics, Democrats and Republicans, contend that an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces creates a slippery slope toward the "denuclearization" of Europe. It is prudent to look into the risks and opportunities of a post-INF environment. But this long-term concern should not paralyze our consideration of the immediate unfinished business. An INF agreement along the lines presently contemplated should and is likely to be ratified in early to mid-1988.

Some people have genuine doubts about the political or military efficacy of such a treaty, but I suspect that much of the debate surrounding ratification will have little to do with the actual contents of such a treaty. On the one hand, any major controversy in the Senate's review of an INF treaty and the larger public debate could transform the consideration of the treaty into a referendum on nuclear and conventional force

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modernization, or the value of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, or even the future of SDI. On the other hand, concerns that an INF treaty might weaken our position in Europe could lead to demands or promises of undiminished or increased spending on various defense programs relative to NATO Europe.

The next stage may well be crucial. A general agreement exists between the Soviet Union and the United States to seek to negotiate a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive forces. An agreement significantly reducing strategic nuclear offensive forces might be achievable even before the end of the Reagan Administration. But relating strategic offense and strategic defense, and most particularly dealing with the Soviet insistence on linking SDI to any START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) accord militates against optimism, both in the negotiations and in the Congress. Unfortunately, it is not at the negotiating table in Geneva but in the Congress that the most significant arguments could take place regarding the START-SDI linkage, as well as the link between arms control and strategic modernization programs.

A major issue in the Congress is the proper legal interpretation of the ABM treaty. The debate is between a "narrow" or a "broad" interpretation of that treaty. Unfortunately, the players in the debate are all on the American side of the table. The Soviet Union, by adopting a position at Reykjavik that can only be described as "super-narrow," has little incentive to deal with the issue seriously as long as it believes that it may be decided in its favor by American legislators. The Soviets are eager to maintain selected portions of the ABM treaty in order to constrain the SDI program.

In this light, I believe that a consensus on the nature of the country's commitments under the ABM treaty and a parallel commitment to a strong SDI program are essential. If there is no bipartisan consensus on these issues, we may never know whether areas of compromise are possible between the general Soviet determination to kill SDI and the Reagan Administration's commitment to advance it. Thus far, the Administration has successfully resisted crippling restrictions on SDI research permitted by the ABM treaty. Moreover, I think that the Soviets may settle for an outcome that provides a degree of predictability in the strategic defense area, while the United States moves forward with a robust program that includes research, testing and development.

Many Democrats, however, regard SDI only as a "bargaining

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chip," to be traded away for substantial Soviet reductions of offensive nuclear forces. On the other hand, some Republicans advocate the near-term deployment of a basic defensive system. While abandonment of research, testing and development would be dangerous, no favors would be done to the SDI program by rushing to a deployment based primarily on political calculations rather than technical feasibility.

Despite much Democratic opposition to it, the notion of strategic defense has become a permanent feature of the American strategic landscape. Strategic defense programs will outlast the SDI acronym, even though no administration can commit its successor to its policies and programs. But the next president will have to go back to the drawing board, not so much with respect to SDI research and testing programs, but because he will have to develop sustained domestic political support for the program. And to do so the next administration will have to put its case forward in a larger national security context.

The Strategic Defense Initiative stems from both a dissatisfaction with our existing nuclear strategy and a belief that changes in strategy might be technically feasible for us and the Soviets. The next administration will have to recast the SDI issue. The issue of what is technologically possible must be embedded in a debate over what is strategically desirable and practical. I hope that the next president and a majority of the Congress will permit full exploration of the contribution that strategic defense might make to our overall national security. It is to those security interests that SDI funding levels ought to be linked, not to transient arms control strategies.

Arms control cannot serve as a substitute for an adequate defense posture, any more than it can exist separately from national security policy. Too often, Western negotiating strategies have assumed it can. But it will be too easy to blame arms control alone for the problems the next administration will encounter in adjusting to a changing strategic environment. If arms control is to serve as a flexible instrument of military strategy and further the prospect of achieving greater compatibility between negotiating policies and military strategy, then military and foreign policy objectives will need to be spelled out with greater clarity.

III

Managing the Soviet-American relationship is the core issue. But it is integrally related to a second major issue: redistributing

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military and nonmilitary burdens around the world. Both the U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf and the prospect of an INF agreement have stimulated congressional demands for greater burden-sharing by our allies. The demands have, in turn, generated reluctance and skepticism within the alliance regarding American motives and the wisdom of American policies.

The task of strengthening conventional forces in NATO Europe has always been urgent, expensive and politically sensitive. Despite the important link between Europe's security and our own, and despite concern in the Congress that an INF agreement will highlight the conventional force imbalance in Europe, political sentiment in the United States has been running in the direction of reducing our NATO expenditures. Such sentiments will be all the more difficult to resist if the Congress cannot be convinced that the NATO allies are assuming a larger share of the burden in strengthening the alliance's conventional forces in a post-INF environment. But even assuming a political willingness on the part of the European allies to do more, there will continue to exist some sentiment in the United States to reallocate military resources away from NATO and in the direction of the Middle East and the Third World in general, where American commitments outpace capabilities.

In the early 1970s, Democratic leaders in the Senate demanded a unilateral reduction in American forces. This was resisted by a Republican White House. Now the pattern is reemerging. I believe the national interest dictates that it should not be a partisan issue, and I hope that a viable consensus can be created in order to meet our obligations and responsibilities.

Any debate over a redistribution of responsibilities around the world will not be limited to defense budgets and commitments alone. A third major issue is also related: how to deal, in an explicit and comprehensive fashion, with the enormous changes in our relative economic strength. During the last four decades our nation has countered the Soviet military threat and provided a strategic safety net for the free world, but at staggering costs. Previous administrations have demanded persistently that wealthy friends in Europe and Japan do their duty in the furtherance of common aspirations of mutual defense and maintenance of world economic prosperity. But our friends have acted on the assumption that the United States remains the world's greatest power and that it will continue to act

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responsibly whether or not others follow suit and pay their share.

One of the most crucial tasks for the next president will be to negotiate much more successfully a redefinition of the roles that we and our allies must play and the accompanying allocation of resources to pay for those roles. Without such negotiation, the United States will fall victim to a piecemeal reordering of domestic spending priorities among legitimate demands for defense, for investment to modernize our competitive industries and social infrastructure, and for expenditures vital to the health, education, safety and economic security of American citizens. The gap between missions and means will become larger and the risks to collective Western security will increase substantially.

Similar budget and resource debates occur in every vital democracy, and the larger industrialized democracies are becoming more adept in advising each other on desired outcomes. Moreover, it is important to understand that greater burden-sharing is not confined to the defense sector. Failure to end disastrous agricultural subsidization and dumping policies, for example, can affect the political will of one ally to defend another. There is a subtle relationship between nuclear arms control and a commercial trade tax proposal on soybean exports and farmer subsidies in the European Community. Agricultural subsidies and dumping conflicts undermine not only our economic efficiency but the grass-roots sentiments in the United States that are so vital to our defense commitments. To the extent that American exporters believe they are being treated unfairly while European allies run large balance-of-payments surpluses with the United States, a sense of alienation will erode popular support for meeting defense commitments in Europe.

Over the next several years, during the implementation of an INF agreement, the priority task in NATO Europe will be to strengthen our mutual conventional force posture. This will require expenditures to correct critical deficiencies and integration of new conventional technologies with tactical military innovations. It is also likely that alliance members will insist that such efforts be supplemented by arms control negotiations to reduce conventional force disparities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In short, another "dual-track" approach.

But this time around, it may not work. It will certainly be argued, once again, that the time is not propitious for the

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United States to seek a major redistribution of security burdens with its allies, at least in Europe. But given that a reduction in our national budget deficit is so critical to America's economic well-being, it is unlikely that our global defense burdens can be maintained solely on the promise of anticipated arms control outcomes.

IV

The Reagan Administration will leave to its successor several innovations in Third World policy. The Vietnam experience not only still influences our willingness to intervene in any Third World conflict; it still inhibits the prospect of any direct U.S. military intervention. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, lessened popular opposition to indirect military involvement, and the Reagan Administration has been able to regain some freedom of action to permit assistance, or military advice and training, or covert aid, for groups like the Afghan freedom fighters, Jonas Savimbi's rebel forces in Angola, and, of course, the Nicaraguan contras. One reason is unaltered national opposition to the establishment of Soviet bases and/or Cuban dependencies, especially in the western hemisphere. Yet there remain strong inhibitions against intervention and the use of force, directly or indirectly, to accomplish such aims, not only in Latin America but in the Third World at large.

Reinforcing inhibitions against either the direct or indirect use of military force to promote America's interests in the Third World is congressional reassertion of its role in the war-making process, as vividly demonstrated in connection with events in the Persian Gulf. The jury is still out on the impact of U.S. involvement in that region. At issue is the gap between a commitment to an objective and the political will to support it in practice. The next administration will discover that there is no logical solution to the disparity.

With regard to our Latin American policy, for the moment, both the Administration and the Democratic leadership in Congress provide verbal support for the Arias "peace" plan while continuing their guerrilla warfare over aid to the contras. To be sure, the Administration is rightly skeptical about Sandinista willingness to comply with the terms of the plan, and seeks to use that as leverage to gain renewed military aid to the contras. For its part, the Democratic leadership, which applauded the Arias plan as a pretext for cutting off such aid, grows concerned as Latin leaders themselves insist on full

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Sandinista compliance and denounce cosmetic or half-measures. The Democratic leadership in the Congress at times seems more interested in halting aid to the contras than in promoting democracy through full implementation of the Arias plan.

Debate continues over the direction of American policy in the Third World. Under the so-called Reagan Doctrine, we have supported anti-communist forces in countries currently dominated by Marxist regimes or clients of the Soviet Union. Viewed as the conscious promotion of such Western values as individual freedom and democracy in places where these values are denied (and where such a pursuit is not deemed dangerously explosive or excessively expensive in military terms), the Reagan Doctrine appears to fit comfortably into the objective of containing Soviet influence and power. But much of the political attractiveness of the doctrine flows from the effort to go beyond the defensive terms of limiting Soviet expansionism to the offensive in positively promoting liberation and seeking to reverse communist or Marxist control over various countries and their internal institutions.

There is a relationship between the Reagan Doctrine and the objective of improved superpower cooperation in nuclear arms control. In the 1970s efforts to reconcile conflicting objectives in these two areas involved codes of conduct or rules of the game. These efforts foundered when the Soviets sought to take advantage of new targets of opportunity in the Third World (e.g., Angola).

Some will counsel the next president to resume that effort with the argument that the wide-ranging reassessment, under Gorbachev, of Soviet involvement in the Third World has led to a decision in Moscow to reduce sharply Soviet "interests" and material support for marginal Marxist-Leninist states. I am skeptical. There are no indications that the Soviet leadership will countenance a retreat from established positions in the Third World. Moscow may be engaged in a "breathing period," a reassessment of the risks it is willing to run on behalf of prospective clients and the military and economic resources it will or can devote to such commitments. Mr. Gorbachev may even be disinclined to take on costly new commitments while simultaneously seeking to lessen the costs of existing ones over the long haul. But there are few signs of a conscious policy decision to diminish support for *existing* clients in the near term.

The next administration can adapt the Reagan Doctrine to

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the changing relationships between the superpowers and their respective policies toward the Third World. Thus far the Reagan Doctrine has emphasized military pressure as a means of raising the costs of Soviet involvement in the Third World. That emphasis alone is unlikely to achieve a major reduction in Soviet influence. It is time to ask what the American strategy ought to be during any Soviet "breathing period." If the Soviet Union should feel more vulnerable in the Third World, this will present new opportunities for American policy. What can American strategy build on the successes of the Reagan Doctrine? To the extent that an American policy of supporting struggles against tyranny of the left or the right is successful, what then?

We should move beyond the current version of the Reagan Doctrine by combining military and economic inducements in a political framework reflecting our estimates of the optimum possibilities in each region. The President and Congress must find a new consensus on appropriate funding of an imaginative and comprehensive economic and political program.

Currently, funds are virtually nonexistent for ongoing efforts in most countries and for new initiatives. We must enlist the vast economic resources of Japan and our NATO allies to work with us in encouraging the foundation of market-oriented democracies. Our collective plans to do so must be bold and broad. The Reagan Doctrine ought not to be viewed only in the context of Soviet-American competition; it provides policy guidance as well to U.S. bilateral relations with a number of Third World countries. Aid to anti-communist forces must be taken beyond the notion of a proper and not necessarily proportionate response to Soviet assistance to Marxist regimes or insurgencies: the commitment flowing from the doctrine should not cease abruptly because of successes earned through various pressures.

The defensive-deterrent shield provided by the United States for the promotion of its national security interests and those of its allies is also the shield that makes possible the promotion and maintenance by the United States and its allies of democratic ideals and institutions throughout the world. As we promote the building of democratic institutions abroad we may find that this policy is sometimes at odds with our commitment to provide for a common defense, in which case security measures often are given precedence over democratic aspirations.

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But consider our recent experience with the Philippines. Events in 1986 suggest how American ideals of promoting legitimate security interests are mutually reinforcing. Former President Ferdinand Marcos won the support of successive American administrations because our officials were confident that he would ensure continued joint use of Subic Bay and Clark military facilities. Eventually, his position eroded because of his incompetence in prosecuting resistance against an internal Marxist insurgency and in protecting our base facilities, quite apart from growing perceptions of his political corruption. The Administration came to the view that the survival of the U.S. bases in the Philippines was "ancillary" to the issue of encouraging democratic reform in the government, and that the failure to undertake such reforms would inevitably result in the loss of the bases in the intermediate future. In the process of noting the growing failure of Marcos, the United States rediscovered that only by focusing on the policy objective of restoring democracy in the Philippines could we hope to retain a stable alliance and preserve mutual use of valuable military facilities on the soil of that sovereign country over the longer term.

There is a valuable lesson in this experience. Support for democratic progress can be compatible with maintenance of our security interests. We must seek to make this the rule rather than the exception.

V

Since 1940, when the Republican statesman Henry Stimson joined President Roosevelt's cabinet, Republicans have considered bipartisanship an essential feature of our party's approach to foreign affairs. Republicans, for the most part, supported the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO and the Korean War. The Truman foreign policy could not have succeeded without the initiatives and cooperation of Senator Arthur Vandenberg in forging bipartisan support in Congress. In those years, Republicans took long steps to move away from a heritage of isolationism.

In doing so, however, Republicans preserved some ideas and attitudes—principles if you will—that have evolved over time even while differentiating them from many Democrats in foreign policy.

The Democratic Party has had great difficulty in reconciling its recent noninterventionist goal—"no more Vietnams"—

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with the need for a strong, confident and globally engaged United States. The Republican Party has sought to combine the twin imperatives of strength and prudence. A globally engaged great power is unlikely to be able to avoid involvements in peripheral conflicts.

Some Democrats continue to revert to moralistic arguments with a human rights content to criticize the foreign policy initiatives of the Reagan Administration. Still others adopt the language of "national interests" and "political realism" as a short-term political tactic to attack the Reagan Doctrine. For example, many Democrats continue to make largely moralistic arguments against the Administration's policy toward Nicaragua. Instead of directly addressing the Sandinista threat to U.S. interests in Central America, many Democrats concentrate on the Administration's tactics while simultaneously seeking to rebut the ideological rationale underlying the current policy.

Too many Democrats have focused their attention and criticisms on how the Administration has involved the country in Central American politics, and eschewed debate on how U.S. interests in effectively promoting peace and security in the region can be furthered. Too often, Democratic inputs to the debate on contra aid are confined to references to "slippery slopes," alleging that such aid constitutes the first step toward another Vietnam. While such dire warnings may carry some emotional appeal, they also reveal paucity in thinking about credible alternative policy directions.

Many Democrats attack the Reagan Doctrine for allegedly twisting anti-communist ideological objectives into the primary rationale for U.S. support of freedom fighters in Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia and Afghanistan. Yet many of their calls for a change in emphasis in the direction of realistic self-interest betray an overriding concern for tactical expediency rather than strategic necessity. Oftentimes, there is less a calculation of national interest than an obvious political desire to avoid any intervention in situations where success may entail costs. But U.S. interests cannot be determined exclusively or in major part by assessed degrees of difficulty of U.S. involvement and/or tactical alternatives. Efforts to reduce national interests to simplify the task of maximizing gains while cutting costs merely avoid the difficult issue of defining U.S. interests in Third World countries. Calls for noninterventionism seldom reflect a clear appreciation of interests and power.

Regardless of party, however, the next president will have a

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unique opportunity. America's global position has changed radically since 1945, but a new administration can translate the rebuilding of the 1980s into a period of major and positive accomplishments. I would stress the following objectives.

We will need a general strategy that outlines clear-cut criteria for measuring Soviet actions against our legitimate security concerns. The test of our next president's policy will be his ability to define precise criteria for progress toward peace and stability, and to test Soviet intentions against those criteria. The test of Gorbachev's intentions must be his actions, not the growing sophistication of his public diplomacy.

Effective arms control will be an important element of that testing. It will remain both a necessary price of our continuing security, and a potential danger to it. It must not become a diversion from strategy or a substitute for defense planning, or be allowed to obscure the realities of the military balance, and the actions necessary to correct it.

Our alliance system must be sustained and strengthened as the basis for a coalition strategy; a new and more equitable distribution of burdens must be worked out. And we must obtain allied cooperation in attempting to relate concerns about arms control and the settlement of regional threats to our mutual security.

Both political parties have an obligation to participate in a continuous assessment of America's strategic interests. While no one can dispute the necessity of tactical caution, it alone cannot answer the policy dilemma as to the appropriate balance between strength and prudence. Many efforts to redefine or constrict our strategic interests merely mask a reluctance or unwillingness to contemplate the use of military power. A redefinition of or retreat from military commitments should not be confused with a policy designed to protect and promote U.S. national interests.

The administration that is sworn in on January 20, 1989, will inherit a far stronger, safer and more durable position in the world than Mr. Reagan did in January 1981, with the frustration of Iran and the shock of Afghanistan. Not only is our foreign policy sound and our international position greatly improved, but we are also pursuing an active dialogue with our adversary, on the basis of the strength necessary to defend our interests—and all without the agony of a foreign war.

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Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

A DEMOCRAT LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY

This brace of articles revives a venerable custom. Sixty years ago *Foreign Affairs* published a similar exchange in which Ogden Mills, later Herbert Hoover's secretary of the treasury, spoke for the Republicans and Franklin D. Roosevelt for the Democrats. Such eminent precedent should establish the proposition that foreign policy is a legitimate party issue—though this proposition hardly needs legitimation in a republic where foreign relations have been a subject of vehement debate ever since Hamilton and Madison disagreed over George Washington's neutrality program. Still the old saw "politics stops at the water's edge" expresses a familiar misconception. The impression occasionally arises—and is always encouraged by whatever administration is in office—that debating the conduct of foreign policy is indecent or unpatriotic. Yet clearly nothing in a democracy is more entitled to uninhibited discussion than decisions of peace and war.

What follows is not a party statement. "I belong to no organized party," as Will Rogers said. "I am Democrat." No one can speak for the Democratic Party until a candidate is nominated and a platform adopted in the summer of 1988; the consequent mandate runs to the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, and the ticket will be good for that journey only.

II

In the judgment of this free-lance Democrat, the foreign policy of the United States has been on a radically misconceived course since President Reagan took office in January 1981. This is not to lay all blame for foreign policy failure on the Reagan Administration nor to reject everything that Administration has done in its conduct of foreign relations. The continuities of U.S. foreign policy are greater than European critics

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of the United States (and American critics of democracy) understand. Geopolitical imperatives fall impartially on Republican and Democrat alike. All American administrations, no matter how much they differ, will act to preserve a balance of power in Europe and to prevent extracontinental annexations in the Americas.

Even in the shorter run, the roots of Reagan's national security policy (misdirected, in this writer's view) as well as of his human rights policy (steadily improving) lie in the Carter Administration. It was Carter who, for better or for worse, advanced the movement away from the concept of mutual assured destruction toward a war-prevailing strategy, who approved the MX missile, who expanded American security commitments in the Third World and whose Carter Doctrine defined the Persian Gulf as within the zone of U.S. vital interests. And it was Carter too who placed human rights on the world's conscience and agenda—for which Reagan roundly condemned him in the 1980 campaign, holding Carter's human rights preoccupation responsible for the "loss" of Iran and Nicaragua. In abandoning the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos and Haiti's Jean-Claude Duvalier half a dozen years later, Reagan unabashedly adopted the policy for which he had so righteously denounced Carter in the cases of the shah and the Somozas.

Within this broad framework of bipartisan continuity, however, the Reagan Administration has carried forward historic differences between the Republican and Democratic parties, differences delineated by Ogden Mills and Franklin D. Roosevelt sixty years ago.

The salient difference is that the Republican Party has been in recent times the vehicle of unilateral action in world affairs and the Democratic Party the vehicle of international cooperation. Ogden Mills, an eastern, Wall Street Republican, had little sympathy for the defiantly isolationist William E. Borah-Hiram Johnson wing of his party. Yet even Mills emphasized the unshakable Republican commitment to the nation's "traditional policy of independence in foreign affairs" and dismissed the legacy of Woodrow Wilson as one "under which our independence of action might be subordinated to the decision of other nations." F.D.R.'s 1928 article, on the other hand, saluted the League of Nations as "the first great agency for the maintenance of peace and for the solution of common problems ever known to civilization."

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The Reagan Administration has now given the G.O.P.'s unilateralist tradition a global application. No administration in recent times has paid less heed to the views and interests of allies, has more systematically scorned multilateral forums or has taken greater pleasure in being able to say, as Reagan said after an American plane forced down Palestinian hijackers over Italy in 1985, that we did it "all by our little selves."

Reaganite unilateralism, moreover, is inspired by a messianic conviction that the American destiny is to redeem a fallen world. It is inspired by a crusading anti-communism of a sort not seen in the United States since the high noon of John Foster Dulles. Where presidents from Truman to Carter saw the cold war as a power struggle, Reagan saw it as a holy war. He regarded the Soviet Union as unchanged, unchanging and unchangeable and found communist deviltry at the root of most of the world's troubles.

The presidential tone, it is true, has moderated as the years have passed. We hear less these days about the "evil empire," nor has the president recently repeated the remarks of his first press conference in 1981 ("The only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat") —perhaps because people might think he was talking about his own National Security Council staff.

Crusades generally exaggerate the menace of the enemy, and this one is no exception. Most of the world sees communism today as a burnt-out faith and the Soviet Union as a weary, dreary land filled with cynicism and corruption, beset by insuperable problems at home and abroad, finally (and sullenly) accepting reform as the only hope of assuring survival as a great power. The Soviet Union can trust neither communist China to the east nor communist satellites to the west, and the Red Army, which the Pentagon tediously tries to scare us about, cannot after eight years defeat ragged tribesmen fighting in the hills of Afghanistan. Yet for Reaganites the Soviet Union remains a fanatic state carrying out with implacable zeal, cunning and efficiency a master plan of world domination— except when they see it as so frail that a couple of small pushes will shove its ramshackle economy into collapse.

Global unilateralism driven by an anti-communist crusade wobbles the Administration's sense of reality. Local conflicts become tests of global resolve. Stakes are raised in situations that cannot be easily controlled, threatening to transmute

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limited into unlimited conflict. We are encouraged in the fallacy, one we share with the rival superpower, that we know the interests of other nations better than those nations know their own interests—that we understand remote and exotic problems more clearly than the countries most directly involved, most directly threatened and most familiar with the territory. Unilateralism breeds the arrogance of ignorance, and ignorance breeds bad policy.

III

Reagan's Nicaragua policy is a spectacular example of unilateralism in action. From the start, the Administration took little interest in Latin American assessments of the situation. Yet Latin American countries are a good deal more endangered than the United States is by a Marxist Nicaragua; they are a good deal closer to the scene and a good deal more knowledgeable about it, and their leaders are just as determined as the United States is on their behalf to resist their own overthrow. Most Latin American governments feel that Reagan's military remedy is far more likely to promote than to impede the progress of Marxist revolution. But Reagan, in his determination to make the Sandinistas cry uncle, has methodically disparaged and sabotaged the Latin American search for a political solution—first the Contadora effort, then the peace plan presented by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica.

Lebanon, another example, should have proved to us forever the dangers of random meddling in the Middle East, a part of the world in which we have had far less experience than we have had in Latin America and of which we have far less knowledge—a part of the world, moreover, so bedeviled by ancient religious and tribal hatreds that it defies not only Western management but Western comprehension. We did not have the slightest understanding of the historical tangle we were getting into when we sent the marines to Beirut and claimed that their mission was to save the Middle East. Nor has the Reagan Administration appeared to learn much from the massacre of the marines. Raising once again the standard of invincible ignorance, it then plunged unilaterally and mindlessly ahead into a larger mess in the Persian Gulf.

Let us recall the Reagan roller-coaster policy in the Gulf. Iraq initiated the war against Iran in 1980. The Reagan Administration first followed a policy of neutrality; then veered toward Iraq, a policy culminating in the restoration of diplo-

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matic relations in 1984; then courted Iran with arms shipments on the grounds of Iran's supreme geopolitical importance to American security; then, in order to recover Arab confidence and to preempt the Soviet Union, veered toward Iraq again, despite the Iraqi assault on the U.S.S. *Stark* and the death of 37 American sailors.

Then Reagan decided to raise the military stakes in the Gulf against Iran—the very country he had been secretly arming a short time before. This was a decision taken without consultation with America's allies and with only sketchy notification to Congress. There was no evident effort to think through next steps, and the U.S. Navy did not even have the capacity to protect itself against Iranian mines. The reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers—again no consultation with allies—goes far to place the United States in the hands of two countries, Kuwait and Iraq, that have an obvious interest in drawing us into the war against Iran. "American naval forces in the Gulf," as a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report put it in October 1987, "are now, in effect, hostage to Iraqi war policy." An Iranian victory over Iraq would plainly be against the interests of the West, but the United States cannot do much by its little self to prevent it. Only as a last resort has the Administration turned to the international instrument it should have used from the start—the United Nations.

Sometimes the American government is wiser than other governments. Sometimes it is not. In any event there is no harm in taking other governments into account, especially when they are more intimately involved in the problem than we are. The realists who wrote *The Federalist Papers* understood this obvious fact of international life, which is why the 63rd Federalist called on the newly established American government to pay "attention to the judgment of other nations. . . . Particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed."

Unilateralism breeds something more than ignorance: it breeds illegality. Consider Central America again. President Reagan has pursued his policy of overthrowing the Sandinista regime in Managua in violation not only of congressional prohibitions but of nonintervention pledges repeatedly made to the Organization of American States ever since the Montevideo Conference of 1933, when the United States first sub-

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scribed to the declaration that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another"; in violation too of the U.N. Charter and of customary international law. After Nicaragua appealed to the World Court, the Reagan Administration, having failed in challenging the court's jurisdiction, walked out of the courtroom and refused to argue the case on its merits.

In 1983 Reagan despatched an expeditionary force against the island of Grenada, an action undertaken without warning, without congressional authorization and in presumptive violation of the charters of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States. Though he was invading a member of the British Commonwealth, he did not bother to consult or even to alert his most loyal supporter among world leaders, the British prime minister. The pretext—the rescue of American citizens—had ample standing under international law, but the real and unconcealed purpose was to destroy an obnoxious regime. The people of Grenada and neighboring islands welcomed the invasion, but the legal fig leaves notably failed to impress the British prime minister or the U.N. General Assembly.

> The net result of these instances, and recently of the far less justified intervention in Nicaragua, is that never before in our history have we had fewer friends in the Western Hemisphere than we have today. . . . We are exceedingly jealous of our own sovereignty and it is only right that we should respect a similar feeling among other nations.

So F.D.R. wrote in *Foreign Affairs* sixty years ago; *plus ça change*. . . . If a real crisis arises, Roosevelt added,

> it is not the right or the duty of the United States to intervene alone. It is rather the duty of the United States to associate with itself other American Republics. . . . Single-handed intervention by us in the affairs of other nations must end; with the cooperation of others we shall have more order in this hemisphere and less dislike.

IV

The climax of the present Administration's self-arrogated right to intervene single-handedly everywhere in the world is the famous Reagan Doctrine. Once again unilateralism breeds bad policy. The Reagan Doctrine exhorts people to take up arms in order to overthrow communist regimes. "We must not

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break faith," Reagan said in 1985, "with those who are risking their lives on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, to defy Soviet-supported aggression." Reagan's cry recalls the prizefight manager in the old cartoon urging his battered and bleeding pug into the ring for one more round: "Go on in there. They can't hurt us."

Obviously it is one thing to help people who, on their own, are resisting a foreign invasion, as in Afghanistan. Indeed, a Democratic administration initiated this policy. It is something quite different to create an insurgency in order to overthrow a government, such as Nicaragua's, recognized by most of the world, including ourselves. The contras are a wholly owned CIA subsidiary. When we organize a rebellion *ab initio*, does this not imply a moral obligation to those whom *we* spur on to risk *their* lives? Suppose their efforts are inadequate to the task. Having urged them into the breach, have we not incurred a responsibility to make sure that they succeed? If the "freedom fighters" we have invented fail on their own, are they not entitled to expect that we will send in our own troops to win what we have told them is our fight too? Or are we to "break faith" and ignobly abandon them? In the end the Reagan Administration will probably abandon the contras rather than send in the marines, as the Nixon-Ford Administration abandoned the South Vietnamese and the Kurds. Here, as elsewhere, the Reagan Administration takes the first step without having thought through the last step or calculated the consequences, political and moral, of failure. We Democrats, I trust, have learned these grim lessons the hard way—in the Bay of Pigs and in Vietnam.

Reagan claims sympathy for those fighting for freedom as a cherished American tradition. "Time and again," he has said, "we've aided those around the world struggling for freedom, democracy, independence and liberation from tyranny." But the men of the old republic drew a bright line between sympathy and intervention. As John Quincy Adams put it:

> Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will [America's] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. . . . She has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings, as to the last vital drop that visits the heart.

President Reagan, on the contrary, seeks monsters, and, in

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stalking them, he risks what J. Q. Adams predicted—the involvement of the United States "beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxim of [America's] policy would insensibly change from *liberty* to *force*. . . . She might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit." Given the existing balance of forces, the dictatorship of the world is not a likely outcome. Corruption of our own spirit is.

The Reagan Doctrine has made covert action its chosen instrument and has thereby made secrecy, deceit and mendacity the foundation of American foreign policy. The very adjective "covert" is a misnomer. Covert action is often easy to detect, always hard to control and in its nature illegal and immune to normal procedures of accountability. Covert action, moreover, is a weapon of marginal consequence in the scale of things. Its importance in the conduct of foreign affairs is greatly overrated. It appeals, as John Le Carré observes, to declining powers, who place "ever greater trust in the magic formulae and hocus-pocus of the spy world. When the king is dying, the charlatans rush in."

In January 1961 President Eisenhower's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, a group of eminent citizens with Robert A. Lovett taking the lead on this question, told the president after a review of the CIA record: "We have been unable to conclude that, on balance, all of the covert action programs undertaken by the CIA up to this time have been worth the risk or the great expenditure of manpower, money and other resources involved." Nothing the CIA has done in the quarter-century since gives reason to alter this considered verdict.

Covert action should never become, as it became in the Reagan Administration, a routine instrument of foreign policy. One is interested to note that this thought belatedly dawned on Robert C. McFarlane, the former national security adviser, as he prepared for the Iran-contra hearings. "It was clearly unwise," McFarlane told the joint congressional committee, "to rely on covert activity as the core of our policy. . . . You must have the American people and the U.S. Congress solidly behind you. Yet it is virtually impossible, almost as a matter of definition, to rally public support behind a policy that you can't even talk about."

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Once again, unilateralism breeds illegality. "Support for freedom fighters," Reagan opines, "is self-defense, and totally consistent with the O.A.S. and U.N. Charters." This is a perilously elastic interpretation of self-defense and not one that legal scholars or allies are inclined to endorse. The Soviet Union asserted a similar right of global intervention in support of "wars of national liberation." Americans did not hail the principle when Khrushchev announced it a quarter of a century ago. Does it really sound better on the lips of an American president?

Under Reagan the United States now vies with the Soviet Union in proclaiming its right to act as a law unto itself around the planet. An especially obnoxious example is the Administration's effort to reinterpret the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972—a unilateral interpretation contrary to the "original intent" (so heartily acclaimed by Reagan in other contexts) of the officials, both American and Soviet, who negotiated the treaty and of the senators who ratified it; a reinterpretation contemptuous both of international law and of American constitutional practice; a reinterpretation, moreover, that undermines the principal superpower arms control agreement and the foundation-stone for future arms control. "What is missing from all this," as Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) has commented, "is the sense we once had that it is in our *interest* to advance the cause of law in world affairs." Does the American interest really lie in imitating the Soviet Union—or does it lie in opposing the Soviet model with the idea of a world of law?

To deny that the United States has a profound stake in the operation of law in international affairs is more than a rejection of American tradition and a disservice to longer-term American interests. It is also to embark on a course that in harder cases than Grenada (i.e., involving more American casualties), Congress and public opinion will not long accept. "A policy is bound to fail which deliberately violates our pledges and our principles, our treaties and our laws," Walter Lippmann wrote after the Bay of Pigs. "The American conscience is a reality. It will make hesitant and ineffectual, even if it does not prevent, an un-American policy."

Still worse, the Reagan Doctrine carries illegality from foreign relations into the domestic polity. Founded as it is on lawbreaking, deception and lies, covert action imports very bad habits into a constitutional democracy. There is no need here

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to rehearse the squalid story revealed in the Iran-contra hearings. One has only to note that the Reagan Doctrine led on to actions that violated both the Constitution President Reagan swore a solemn oath to uphold and the laws he was pledged to execute. Of course the "neat idea" advanced by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North was a dumb policy. But the issue is not the Rube Goldberg scheme to get the ayatollah to subsidize the contras, nor even its mode of execution, which seems to have been devised by Inspector Clouseau. The issue is whether the president of the United States is above the Constitution and the laws.

"When the president does it," as Richard Nixon inimitably put it, "that means that it is not illegal." Ronald Reagan's White House seems to share this view. Throbbing through the testimony of Colonel North and Rear Admiral John Poindexter is ill-concealed envy at the Kremlin's capacity to act as it wills without obstruction, restraint or disclosure. But the theory of the divine right of presidents finds little sustenance in the American Constitution.

When pressed, defenders of the Imperial Presidency *redivivus*, like Colonel North, invoke the case of *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* in 1936. Those who do so could not have read the decision. For what the Supreme Court did in *Curtiss-Wright* was to affirm the power of Congress to impose an arms embargo and further to affirm the right of Congress to delegate to the president the power to institute such an embargo. As Justice Robert H. Jackson later put it, *Curtiss-Wright* "involved, not the question of the president's right to act without congressional authority, but the question of his right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress." The decision sanctioned presidential action within a framework ordained by Congress. It did not sanction independent presidential action.

It is true that Justice George Sutherland, who wrote the opinion, indulged in imaginative historical asides in order to distinguish the delegation of power in foreign affairs the Court was approving in 1936 from the delegation in domestic affairs it had struck down when it invalidated the National Recovery Administration in 1935. Sutherland's asides were *dicta*, bad history and not part of the Court's holding. The Court has never sustained the proposition that the president has an extraconstitutional source of power in international relations.

The Reagan endorsement of unilateral presidential power in

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foreign affairs comes oddly from an Administration whose attorney general lectures us so often about "the jurisprudence of original intention." For the framers of the Constitution explicitly rejected the idea that foreign policy was the private property of the president. The foremost proponent of executive energy in the Constitutional Convention was Alexander Hamilton, and Hamilton himself wrote in the 75th Federalist: "The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human nature which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of . . . a President of the United States."

The Reagan version of unilateralism gives the Republican tradition a novel and ominous twist. The Reagan policies have been characterized—far more than those of the Nixon Administration, for example—by a studied subordination of diplomatic to military methods and remedies. The National Security Council staff has been effectively taken over by men whose experience has been in the Pentagon and in the armed services. The Foreign Service has been purged and humiliated. Professional diplomats occupy today a smaller proportion of ambassadorial posts than at any time in recent history. Reagan's budget reflects his priorities: spoiling the Department of Defense, starving the Department of State. The budgetary stringencies created by the defense budget have led to the cutback of State's budget by $185 million in 1986–87, with another $84 million scheduled to go this year. The result is the closing of consulates and even embassies around the world, the retirement of experienced diplomats and the weakening of America's diplomatic resources—all for the cost of a B-1 bomber.

The Reaganite assumption is that, in the words of the *Financial Times* of London, "military might would provide answers to political questions." Military action becomes a first, not last, recourse.

V

Reagan rode to power determined to rescue the United States from what he had peculiarly called Carter's policy of unilateral disarmament. In fact the arms buildup began with Carter, whose last Five-Year Defense Plan called for nearly as much spending as Reagan actually accomplished. Citing inflated Defense Department estimates of Soviet defense spending (estimates later refuted by the more scrupulous CIA), Rea-

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gan periodically proclaimed that the United States had fallen behind the Soviet Union—which, if true, represented a stirring presidential tribute to the superior efficiency and productivity of a collectivized economy. The Soviet generals engaged in comparable lamentations, each side announcing that the other was ahead in order to get bigger budgets for itself. As President Kennedy once put it, "The hard-liners in the Soviet Union and the United States feed on one another." It is difficult to figure how anyone could take these self-serving wails from the Pentagon seriously, especially around budget time.

But Congress did. It will have lavished nearly two trillion dollars on the Pentagon during the Reagan years. For much of this period Pentagon spending was deemed sacrosanct, and Pentagon megalomania was unbridled. Recall, for example, the award of 8,612 medals after the glorious American victory over Grenada, a small island without army, navy or air force, though we never had more than 7,000 troops on the island. This prodigality did not deeply impress veterans who had earned medals in the Second World War or Korea or Vietnam. But it was typical of an army that had more generals in peacetime than it had in 1945, when it was six times larger and fighting a world war.

In these years, the military budget was annually presented by our secretary of defense as a sacred text, not a line of which could be altered without incalculable harm. It finally took the minor outrages of overpriced coffee pots and toilet seats to awaken a complaisant Congress. But the major waste came in the enormous outlays for weapon systems so complex and delicate that they rarely worked in tests and are most unlikely to work in combat. The much vaunted MX cannot reliably land in the target zone. The much vaunted B-1 bomber turns out to have a befuddled electronic brain. The armed forces, *The New York Times* reported this summer, were "so short of spare parts that they must cannibalize some airplanes to keep others flying."

As for the $485 billion spent on the wonderful 600-ship navy, much went for aircraft carriers, fine for movies like *Top Gun* but sitting ducks in case of serious war, while the Persian Gulf intervention found the United States with only three operational minesweepers, all of Korean War vintage, and reduced American destroyers to the humiliation of being convoyed by the unarmed tankers they were charged to protect. There has been, I gather, real improvement in the quality and

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morale of the armed forces. But too much of the taxpayers' money has disappeared down a black hole, leaving a military establishment rich in glamorous but brittle high-tech gadgetry and poor in such mundane matters as combat readiness, stockpiles of munitions and equipment, depot maintenance, sea and air transport, not to mention minesweeping. The abiding Reagan theme has been overemphasis on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional capabilities.

The culmination of the science-fiction approach is President Reagan's dream of "Star Wars"—an impenetrable defense shield to be erected over the United States like an astrodome. Star Wars has been presented in a succession of models, some designed to replace, others to reinforce, deterrence. All require the solution of problems of extraordinarily technical complexity by means scientists have yet to discover. Ultimate effectiveness depends on inordinately complicated systems working together in perfect unison under conditions of ultimate stress. Does no one remember the *Challenger*?

Most Democrats agree with former Under Secretary of State George W. Ball that Star Wars is not only a fantasy but a fraud. Few scientists think it likely to work in the long run. Its short-run effect will inevitably be to prevent agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons and, more than that, to rekindle the nuclear arms race. For the Soviet military establishment will seize upon it as an excuse to demand from Gorbachev more intercontinental ballistic missiles to overwhelm the space shield and more cruise missiles, bombers and other low-flying weapons to rush in under the shield. Since countermeasures are technically simpler than construction of the shield and cost far less, they will be relatively easy to sustain. And the arms race will roar on.

Reaganites defend Star Wars, or the Strategic Defense Initiative, precisely as a means of bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. Maybe so, though this contention has been denied by no less an authority than Andrei D. Sakharov, who adds: "To the contrary, the SDI program impedes negotiations." Surely the deeper reason that inclines Gorbachev to cut back the arms race—and would have so inclined him whether or not Reagan had ever dreamed of Star Wars—is his need to transfer capital, materials, scientists and engineers from military tasks to the modernization of the Soviet economy.

The militarization of foreign relations has had further effects. From the start the Reagan Administration has regarded

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arms transfers as a major tool of diplomacy if not as a substitute for it. The result has been to pour American weapons into the most explosive parts of the world—Central America, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia. Given chronic instability and an unpredictable future, a good many of these weapons may be turned against the United States before the century is over—as has already happened with arms sent to China in the 1940s, Vietnam in the 1960s and Iran in the 1970s.

The ultimate premise of Reagan's foreign policy is that military power creates political and diplomatic power. It seems more likely, however, that the subordination of diplomatic to military interests has diminished American influence around the world. A foreign policy dominated by military men and ideological zealots degrades the role and narrows the scope of negotiation. Thus 13 South Pacific nations, led by Australia, recently proposed in the Treaty of Raratonga to make their part of the world a nuclear-free zone. Australia made a particular effort to ensure that the treaty did not compromise American interests. But the Pentagon objected and the United States refused to sign, causing vast irritation throughout the area over what the Australian foreign minister called the "clumsy" way Washington handled the matter.

The obsession with military buildup and military remedy has exacted a damaging price. The vain quest for American military leadership has resulted in the loss of American political and economic leadership. The combination of colossal defense spending with a major tax cut produced unprecedented peacetime budget deficits, an overvalued dollar and the transformation of the United States on Reagan's watch from a creditor nation to the world's number-one debtor. The concentration of America's science and technology on military research has held back American productivity and further endangered America's competitive position in world markets. "American scientists," *The Economist* observes, "are in a bind. Their research must aim either to deter the Russians, or to compete with the Japanese. No longer can they expect a single contract from the Pentagon to achieve both goals." Reagan's military priorities have accentuated America's financial and industrial vulnerabilities.

We have seen in recent months—well before the Iran-contra scandals—an ebbing of faith, first in American skills, latterly in American intentions. Ian Davidson, the foreign affairs columnist of the *Financial Times*, summing up the situation in a

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valedictory column in the summer of 1987, concluded that Reagan "has probably caused more damage to the European-American relationship in the Atlantic Alliance than any of his predecessors. What is more, he probably does not even realise it." Reagan's unilateralism is Gorbachev's most potent weapon. A recent Gallup poll showed that 56 percent of European respondents thought that Gorbachev was contributing to world peace; only 12 percent thought Reagan was. "The outside world almost unanimously views us with less good will today than at any previous period." This was F.D.R. in 1928 during another time of Republican unilateralism.

The infirmities of the Reagan foreign policy are not redeemed by the belated prospect of the treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles. This would unquestionably be a useful, if limited, step forward; nor can one be much impressed by the claim, urged by Democratic as well as Republican conservatives, that the agreement would leave Western Europe naked before Soviet conventional force. Unless one dismisses the three-to-one superiority that offense is required to have over defense, assumes the loyalty and efficiency of the Soviet satellites, forgets the deterrent power carried by American submarines and bombers and believes that the invasion of Europe is on Gorbachev's agenda, Western Europe is safe enough. It could be rendered safer by negotiated limitations on conventional forces and by parallel reduction in Western nuclear artillery and Soviet tanks. But the supreme question—stopping the strategic arms race—is still ahead. Nor can any progress be expected here so long as the American government regards Star Wars as nonnegotiable.

VI

It remains a tough world filled with intractable problems, and it is reasonable to inquire what the Democrats would do differently. There is, at least in advance of the convention, no party line. George McGovern and Jesse Jackson on the party's left and Senators Bill Bradley of New Jersey and Sam Nunn of Georgia on the right have very different views on such issues as aid to the contras and Star Wars. Yet these four able men might agree on a broad reaffirmation of the Democratic Party as the party of responsible internationalism.

This does not mean, as Ogden Mills affected to fear, subordination of our independence of action to the decision of other nations. Neither Wilson nor Roosevelt, Truman nor Kennedy

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nor Johnson, was notably averse to asserting the national interest. But it does mean a recognition of interdependence as a prime fact of international life. It means a sensitivity to the interests of other nations, a readiness to consult with allies and to negotiate with adversaries. It would mean U.S. support for Latin American peace initiatives in Central America. It would mean reinvigorated American use of the United Nations and other multilateral agencies. It would end the unlovely spectacle of the United States careening around the world as a law unto itself and restore the historical American conviction that a world of law is in the national interest.

If Gorbachev and his reforms survive, a Democratic administration will believe—as most Democrats who have visited Moscow already believe—that the time has come to take Gorbachev seriously. A Democratic president will not dismiss the new Soviet look as propaganda or disinformation or, in the Reaganite cliché, "cosmetic." The changes under way in the Soviet Union hold out the hope of tranquilization in world affairs. Gorbachev needs an international respite to carry forward his program of domestic modernization.

His speech of September 17, 1987, printed in *Pravda*, apparently signals an extraordinary departure in Soviet policy, a dramatic shift in direction from unilateralism toward collaboration. Still, the Soviet record since 1917 justifies skepticism when a Soviet leader starts talking about strengthening the United Nation's peacekeeping responsibility, establishing a U.N. force to protect Persian Gulf shipping, accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court, giving the United Nations new authority in human rights and disclaiming the pristine Soviet commitment to world revolution. The Democratic response to these overtures will not be to spurn them but to test them. The world faces a historic opportunity to bring the cold war to an end, or at least to reduce it to considerably less dangerous dimensions. The American task is to seize the Gorbachev challenge and to translate his words into constructive and enduring agreements.

In particular, the possibility now exists to end the nuclear arms race. The bargain is there; if we renounce the Star Wars fantasy/fraud, we could complete a deal tomorrow. How long will the door remain open? A Democratic president, if he keeps his faith with Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, will not miss the chance. He will have, I hope, a bold and generous vision of the world's possibilities when humanity begins to

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devote its energy and ingenuity to cooperation rather than to conflict. In this spirit the 21st century may yet see the realization of F.D.R.'s world of the Four Freedoms.

To move the republic in this direction, a Democratic president would aim at the resurrection of diplomacy, the revitalization of the State Department and the restoration of competence and coherence to the management of foreign relations. The process by which the government made foreign policy under Reagan could hardly have been worse. "Is it not your view," Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.) asked the secretary of defense about the Iran-contra decisions, "that it's an inexcusable and deplorable way to conduct the policymaking process of the government?" Even the indefatigably loyal Caspar Weinberger responded, "Yes."

The Reagan method has been to treat foreign policy as the president's personal property, to be conducted without undue regard for the laws and the Constitution and to be concealed, if necessary, not only from Congress and the American people but even, on occasion, from his own secretaries of state and defense. A Democratic president would recognize the futility of trying to run foreign policy in a democracy on any other basis than consent. He would especially recognize the necessity of restoring Congress to its constitutional partnership in the making of foreign policy. As a great American—and Democratic—diplomat, Averell Harriman, once put it: "No foreign policy will stick unless the American people are behind it. And unless Congress understands it the American people aren't going to understand it."

In a properly organized administration the national security adviser should see his duty as the coordination and clarification of choices presented to the president. He would have a small, crack staff and would not try to replicate the State Department in the basement of the White House. A Democratic president would be well advised to choose a secretary of state who has served in Congress as a way of strengthening the executive-legislative relationship. He would send out as ambassadors both Foreign Service officers and non-professionals qualified by knowledge, experience and stature to represent the United States abroad. He would place the CIA under vigilant oversight, executive as well as legislative, and direct it to concentrate on what its founders saw as its essential job: the collection and analysis of intelligence. He would regard diplomacy as the

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weapon of first resort, put covert action well down the list and use military force as the weapon of last resort.

In the field of national security a Democratic president would, I hope, appoint a strong secretary of defense equipped to regard Pentagon budget submissions with due and informed skepticism. He would shift priority from the elaboration of nuclear systems to the modernization of conventional capabilities and to the application of high technology to conventional warfare. In the nuclear field he would certainly not pursue costly busts like the B-1 bomber and the MX, but would go ahead with small missile-launching submarines, the Stealth bomber and, more cautiously, with the single-warhead, silo-based Midgetman. I suppose he would accept a research program for Star Wars; astute subcontracting, at home and abroad, has created a vigorous lobby, and Star Wars remains a bargaining chip for arms control. But he would respect and extend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, negotiate limits on testing in space and stop babbling about early deployment (deployment of what?). Nor would he permit Star Wars to block a comprehensive test ban—a high priority—or the sharp reduction of nuclear weapons. He would reorganize the system of defense contracts and procurement. He would do his damnedest to reduce the defense budget.

Lack of total reverence for defense strikes some members of my party as, even if sound on the merits, politically hazardous. They fear, especially in the south, that the Democratic Party has acquired a reputation for keeping the United States weak, and they do not want to be taken for unpatriotic wimps. Reagan's flag-waving act, they fear, has cast a spell on the nation. Emphasis on the limits of American wisdom and power, they think, might offend the deluded electorate.

Possibly there is something in this, though polls show that most voters are skeptical about the military, prefer peace to war and arms reductions to arms races. The bloodthirstiness of our countrymen can be exaggerated, and their intelligence can be underestimated. I think most Americans take the point President Kennedy made more than a quarter-century ago:

> We must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient—that we are only 6 percent of the world's population—that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent—that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity—and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.

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VII

The day of the messianic foreign policy, the United States as the redeemer nation commissioned by the Almighty to rescue fallen humanity, is coming to an end, for a while at least. A modesty more akin to the mood of the Founding Fathers may be taking over: "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Reaganism is running its course, the cycle is turning, and the time impends for a sharp change in the national direction.

Democrats will continue to stand, as they always have, for national strength. They will never hesitate to use force when force is required to defend the national interest. But they will remind the nation that strength in the modern world has economic as well as military dimensions. The impending crisis for the United States is rather more likely to be in the banks than on the battlefield. We are instructed incessantly about the deadly threat of Marxist Nicaragua (population 2.8 million). But the damage Nicaragua can do to U.S. interests is nothing compared to the devastation that a large-scale repudiation of the Latin American external debt—now approaching $400 billion—can wreak on the already shaky U.S. banking system.

Our great international vulnerability today is economic rather than military. Should a Democrat be elected president in 1988, he would be prudent to devote his first State of the Union message to a sober inventory of the national condition. He would recall America after the Second World War: a nation with a capital surplus, an export surplus, 40 percent of the gross world product, 22 percent of world trade, and every indication of continuing technological and financial supremacy. He would draw the dread contrast 40 years later: the huge budget deficit; the huge trade deficit; the huge bubbles of public debt, private debt, external debt; the decline in America's ability to compete in world markets; the stagnation in America's productivity; the shrinkage of America's industrial base; the decay of America's infrastructure; the dissipation of capital in mindless speculation, mergers and leveraged buy-outs; the increasing dependence on capital flows from abroad; the transformation of the United States into the largest debtor known to history. America, the new president could properly say, is at the mercy of international economic forces as never before. To avert disaster, America must work out modes of international collaboration as never before.

In the age ahead, economic power will be quite as significant

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as military power—a fact Gorbachev has recognized, though Reagan has not. Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker 3d has done his best to call this Administration's attention to the Latin American debt, overhanging American banks like the sword of Damocles; but the president prefers to fume about the Sandinistas. The debt question would be high priority for a Democratic administration. Its containment would require debt relief for the Third World in exchange for the promotion of growth, conversion of debt into equity investment and an increase in international capital flows through wholehearted support of international institutions—the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, regional development banks.

No issue has more perplexed Democrats than the classical argument between free trade and protection. Opening U.S. markets to Latin American exports, for example, would help considerably to alleviate the debt problem. But such a policy encounters understandable resistance at home from those whose livelihoods and communities are wasted by imports from abroad. Protection is a bad answer, but it signifies a real problem.

Free-trade purism at the expense of jobs and lives is irrelevant to a world already cluttered with obstacles to free trading. The Reagan Administration has done some good things, like this year's agreement with Canada. But it has undercut free-trade sermons by protectionist actions. And its deeper failure has been its refusal to support its aspirations toward an open trading world with the domestic measures necessary to make the policy work. It is inhuman to place the burden of transition on the workers and communities least able to pay the price.

A Democratic administration would take active responsibility for the domestic consequences of an open trading world. It would provide assistance to communities and retraining for workers during the ordeal of transition. It would increase national investment in the modes of education essential for a high-technology future. It would establish standards for plant closings. There is, I believe, a case for emergency tariffs during the lifetime of existing workers. There is a case for preserving industries vital to national security and technological growth, like the automotive, space, steel and machine tools industries, if protection is accompanied by tough standards for modernization. There is a case for government-to-government negotiations on trade matters. There is a case for tools in our kit to facilitate retaliation against closed foreign markets. There is

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no case for general long-run protection. No country can afford a beggar-thy-neighbor world. Because the Democratic Party has earned the trust of workers and their unions, it is in a far stronger position than the Republican Party to negotiate the tricky currents and shoals of trade policy.

Whether the question is diplomatic, military, political or economic, the choice today is not all that different from the choice of 1928: Republican unilateralism or Democratic internationalism. We have had seven years of a unilateralist, militarized, ideological, messianic foreign policy, and look where it has got us.

As Franklin D. Roosevelt concluded his *Foreign Affairs* piece sixty years ago:

> In the simplest terms, this is the argument for a policy different from that of the past nine years. Up until then most of our history shows us to have been a nation leading others in the slow upward steps to better international understanding and the peaceful settlement of disagreements. During these nine years we have stood still, with the unfortunate effect of earning greater or less ill will on the part of other civilized peoples. . . . The time is ripe to start another chapter.
>
> On that new page there is much that should be written in the spirit of our forebears. If the leadership is right—or, more truly, if the spirit behind it is great—the United States can regain the world's trust and friendship and become again of service. We can point the way once more to the reducing of armaments; we can cooperate officially and whole-heartedly with every agency that studies and works to relieve the common ills of mankind; and we can for all time renounce the practice of arbitrary intervention in the home affairs of our neighbors.

A free-lance Democrat, remembering America in glory and in shame from the 1930s to the 1980s, can only say: Right on, F.D.R.! Let the Democratic Party keep sailing ahead on its historic course.

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Louis Henkin

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

Americans have been celebrating the bicentennial of their Constitution with visible pride and audible satisfaction. The national mood is one of appreciation of the wisdom and prescience of the framers.

Students of foreign affairs will have noted, however, that the bicentennial is the year in which Americans have breathed the Iran-contra miasma; followed with pained incomprehension the circlings of president and Congress over Nicaragua and its neighbors; heard the president and the Senate shouting disagreement over the meaning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; watched the United States slip into the Persian Gulf and the Iran-Iraq war, wondering who in Washington was in charge. If we have not verged on constitutional crisis, few have been moved to declare that the constitutional arrangements for conducting the foreign affairs of the United States are worthy of celebration.

"Foreign affairs" is not a term found in the Constitution, and what we characterize as foreign affairs is not a discrete constitutional category. Still, many of the provisions of the Constitution apply equally, and have had equal success, in foreign as in domestic affairs. Some particular constitutional dispositions for foreign affairs—for example, the grant to the federal government of virtually full authority, to the exclusion of the states—have surely proved their wisdom.

After 200 years the difficult constitutional issues of foreign affairs arise from the so-called separation of powers and the various checks and balances between Congress and the president. Some of the divisions of authority between the two political branches that apply generally have evoked special dissatisfaction as they operate in foreign affairs. Some of the allocations of authority that relate to foreign affairs in partic-

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ular have at times left either the president or the Congress—or both—unhappy. Above all, the constitutional blueprint has proved to be unclear and incomplete as regards foreign affairs, and there is no agreed guiding principle to help make its provisions clear, or to fill the lacunae. National experience has provided some answers, but Congress and president continue to tug for more of the foreign policy blanket. In 1954, in a famous essay on the distribution of political authority under the Constitution, Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote:

> There is a zone of twilight in which [the president] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.[1]

Important foreign affairs powers lie in that twilight zone. Indeed, in few other respects is our constitutional system as troubled by uncertainty in principle and by conflict in practice between Congress and the president. The effect is to raise intractable issues of constitutional jurisprudence and constitutional politics.

Issues of power between Congress and the president in foreign affairs have not been resolved and are not soon likely to be.[2] The courts, to which we look for constitutional resolution, promise little help. The Supreme Court has developed an armory of reasons for not hearing issues: a federal court will hear only a "case or controversy" (technically defined) at the behest of a petitioner with "standing" (technically defined) when the issue is "ripe" and not moot. These requirements are particularly difficult to meet in foreign affairs. In addition the courts have declared certain issues to be political questions (not meaningfully defined by the courts) and therefore not justiciable, and foreign affairs issues have been particularly vulnerable to being declared non-justiciable.

If our constitutional system for allocating authority to conduct foreign affairs gives little cause for celebration, the bicentennial nevertheless invites our taking stock and seeking understanding, if not answers. What did the framers dispose?

[1] See *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.* v. *Sawyer* (1952).

[2] In this essay, I address principally challenges to presidential action. Constitutional issues of separation of powers have been raised also by actions of Congress which presidents have challenged. The principal instances—"legislative veto" and alleged invasions of the president's power to appoint officials—may also arise in relation to foreign affairs. The Supreme Court has invalidated the legislative veto in principle and Congress has recently lost on several appointments issues.

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What happened along the way? Where are we today? Where do we go from here?

II

As in the past, the end of the twentieth century witnesses voices calling for a return to constitutional text and the intent of the framers. Few have raised that call to resolve controversies of foreign affairs, but constitutional text and even original intent surely have their claims in this as in other areas of governance.

For the framers of the Constitution, the "separation of powers" was an article of faith. The principle that different and separate branches of government should exercise different and separate functions provided the outline which they followed in drafting the Constitution, though powers they separated in principle emerged substantially mixed in fact. During the subsequent 200 years, both the presidency and the Congress have been transformed. The founding fathers would not readily recognize the Congress they prescribed—now a body of over 500 members, with both houses directly elected, its business transacted by a complex of committees and powerful staffers. The framers would be incredulous at what has become of their original creation, the presidency, an office conceived in doubt and controversy, its powers seemingly strictly limited, yet commonly described today as the most powerful in the world. (It would, President Truman once said, make Genghis Khan green with envy.) "The president" has become "the presidency," a branch of government consisting of many departments, with a bureaucracy of millions. The president's constitutional assignment to recommend to the consideration of Congress "from time to time . . . such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient" has made him the principal author of the national legislative program and of a trillion-dollar budget. But the constitutional blueprint of 200 years ago has not been amended, and it continues to define the powers of Congress and the president and relations between them.

For the framers, Congress came first. In Congress they vested "all legislative powers herein granted"; the president was to exercise "the executive power." That division of authority and function applied generally, without distinction or exception for what we have come to call foreign affairs. In regard to foreign, as to domestic, affairs (our characterizations, not the Consti-

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tution's), Congress was to legislate and the president was to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Revenue would be raised and expenditures determined by Congress, and "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." The president would appoint officials, but only with the advice and consent of the Senate. Both the power of the president to appoint and the requirement that the Senate consent applied equally to a secretary of state for foreign affairs or an ambassador to a foreign nation as to an attorney general or other officials in charge of domestic matters.

In its outlines the constitutional division of authority between Congress and president is reasonably clear, indisputable and therefore not often disputed, though presidents have chafed at the distribution, and both Congress and the president have sometimes tried to move or blur the line that divides their estates. After 200 years of the Constitution, although Congress and the presidency are transformed, their parts in our governance are recognizably those projected by the constitutional blueprint: Congress makes laws and the president executes them; Congress levies taxes to provide for the common defense and the general welfare, and the president spends as Congress directs. As regards domestic affairs, that constitutional division is established, and continues to provide the framework and context of government. Magnified presidential importance in domestic affairs today derives not from any new powers or functions granted to (or assumed by) him, but from the enlarged significance of the powers, privileges and duties originally conferred upon him, as well as from extraconstitutional factors, notably his political dominance—party leadership, patronage, popular appeal—and his consequent ability to persuade, move and sometimes compel Congress.

The division between recommending legislation and enacting it, between passing laws and executing them, between appropriating money and spending it, applies in foreign as in domestic affairs. In foreign affairs, however, that division does not exhaust constitutional authority: there is more to foreign relations than laws and expenditures. The Constitution itself confers and allocates important powers that do not conform to the division between making and executing law, notably the president's treaty power. Moreover, the constitutional blueprint for the governance of our foreign affairs has proved to be starkly incomplete, indeed skimpy.

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The relevant prescriptions are few. Congress has the power to tax and spend for the common defense and the general welfare (including, no doubt, foreign affairs purposes), to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to define offenses against the law of nations, to declare war. The president has the power to appoint ambassadors and to make treaties (with the consent of the Senate). The Constitution provides that the president shall be the commander in chief.

The Constitution says nothing, surely nothing explicit and clear, about much else that has stirred controversy in our day: Does the president have the power, without congressional authorization or approval, to terminate a defense treaty with Taiwan, as President Carter did in the face of substantial congressional opposition? To send troops to Lebanon or Grenada, as President Reagan did, evoking significant criticism from Congress on constitutional grounds and some suits filed by citizens? To conclude military base agreements with various countries, as several presidents have done? Is there an "executive privilege" to withhold information from Congress, or a presidential right to impound and not spend funds appropriated by Congress? Could the president, some unthinkable day, on his own authority convert conventional war to nuclear war by "first use," retaliate against an enemy that had dropped nuclear bombs on an ally, or initiate a nuclear "first strike" to preempt an anticipated attack or for other reasons of perceived national interest?

III

If constitutional text is insufficient, the intent of the framers (however one defines the term, and whomever one includes among them) is also less than determinative. The record of the deliberations at various stages of the process is spare. Even the classic annotation, *The Federalist Papers*, adds and clarifies little for our purposes. In large measure what the framers intended can be inferred only from what they did; in some measure one might guess what they had in mind on the basis of what we know of their political ideas and commitments, insofar as there was a single or dominant cast to their thought.

The purpose of the Constitution was "to form a more perfect Union," and for the framers that meant, *inter alia*, a union better able to conduct relations with other nations. They hoped to achieve that purpose by giving the new federal government, to the exclusion of the states, the control of foreign relations.

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They divided the powers of the new government-to-be between Congress, a body they had known under the Articles of Confederation but which they transformed, and a new office they created, the presidency. That office had no model. It was to be like, yet unlike, the English Crown. Its powers were to be significant yet circumscribed; in the end details were determined not by principle but by compromise.

In general, for foreign as for domestic affairs, the text reflected the general conceptions and inclinations of the framers about the different functions of government and their allocation. In principle they divided legislative from executive power. But for them the conduct of foreign relations was "executive altogether." The presidency was to have some foreign affairs powers that under the Articles of Confederation had been exercised by Congress. But the framers were determined not to make the president a republican, elected facsimile of the king of England, with republican-royal powers and republican-royal prerogatives. Above all, the president was not to have the king's power to go to war; that power was given to Congress. The president was entrusted with the "royal" power to make treaties, but subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Indeed, approval of a treaty required the consent of an extraordinary majority, two-thirds of the senators present. Another presidential foreign affairs function was not designated a power, but seems rather an assignment: that the president "shall receive foreign ambassadors."

During the ensuing 200 years presidents have prominently and frequently invoked powers as commander in chief. Strictly, the designation that "the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy" is not a grant of power (though some powers are necessarily implied in the function). Having learned a lesson in the Revolutionary War, the framers determined that there should be a single, civilian commander in chief, rather than command by Congress or congressional committee. The evidence is that in the contemplation of the framers the armed forces would be under the command of the president but at the disposition of Congress. Principally, the president would command the forces in wars declared by Congress. As an exception, the framers agreed to leave to "the executive the power to repel sudden attacks":[3] authorization

[3] Motion by James Madison and Elbridge Gerry. See *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, ed. Max Farrand, vol. 2, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937, p. 318.

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by Congress might not be possible to obtain promptly, or at all, and could be assumed. There is no evidence that the framers contemplated any significant independent role—or authority—for the president as commander in chief when there was no war. Congress would decide whether "to raise and support Armies," or "to provide and maintain a Navy," and would "make rules for the Government and Regulation" of such forces; it was Congress that would even "provide for calling forth the Militia." There was to be no standing army for the president to command in time of peace, and no army or navy at all unless Congress wished it. The president's designation as commander in chief, then, appears to have implied no substantive authority to use the armed forces, whether for war (unless the United States were suddenly attacked) or for peacetime purposes, except as Congress directed.

Such, I think, was the framers' original conception. No doubt, there was more which they did not articulate, and much they did not anticipate, perhaps some things they purposely did not provide for. The framers, I am persuaded, had a reasonably clear idea of the powers they were conferring upon Congress: in general, they saw Congress as the principal "policymaking" (our term, not theirs) organ in foreign as in domestic affairs, and in their conception Congress was to dominate the political process. They had a much less clear view about the presidency. They allocated to the president particular functions, but these did not add up to a comprehensive, coherent conception of the office, or of the division of authority between Congress and president, in the mind of any of the framers; surely there was no consensus about it. Except as they expressly provided, many of the framers were content, I suspect, to leave the office undefined in the good hands of the man all expected would be the first president. George Washington would shape the office.

IV

Constitutional history has supplied answers to some of the questions that constitutional text and "original intent" left unanswered. George Washington did indeed begin to shape the office, not in accordance with principle or plan but in response to events. The major developments in the conception and scope of the presidential office concerned matters that were not on the face of the Constitution. The president's place in the configuration of government combined with the char-

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acter of foreign relations to shape the presidency, as well as to launch it on the paths of uncertainty and controversy. The president appointed ambassadors; they were his ambassadors, and they received instructions from him and reported to him. They did so in secret, the way of diplomacy even in the eighteenth century. Through his ambassadors the president communicated with other governments as seemed appropriate to him. The president told Congress what his judgment and his sense of diplomatic and constitutional propriety required.

Foreign policy, then as now, consisted of much more than making treaties or legislating tariffs. The conduct of foreign relations was a day-to-day process, continuous and informal. Unlike Congress, dispersed during most of our history in the distances of the country, the presidency was always "in session." Unlike Congress, which can act only formally, by statute or resolution (and in effect only publicly and sometimes dramatically), the president can act quickly and informally, often discreetly or secretly: only President Washington could decide to send Citizen Genêt home when he abused his post as minister of France; only Washington could effectively pursue the deliberations and negotiations that led to a decision to proclaim neutrality in the wars between England and France. In many circumstances, unless the president acted, the United States could not act at all. Major agreements were made as treaties with the consent of the Senate, but the practice of the president acting alone to make informal agreements was inevitable and began early.

From the start the president was the eyes and ears and voice of the United States; slowly he became also its sturdy arms. Congress maintained a small navy and occasionally raised and supported a modest army; as the Constitution provided, the president was their commander. In response to events, presidents asserted authority to use those forces: early on, as all know, Jefferson ordered the navy to defend U.S. vessels against the Barbary pirates. As their "foreign relations power" took root and grew, presidents found themselves wearing two hats. In limited, uncertain steps the president as commander in chief began to carry out what the president as foreign affairs executive determined. In time, precedents accumulated and presidents gained confidence and claimed more authority. Beginning early and continuing to this day, in several hundred instances of varying scope and significance, presidents have deployed the armed forces of the United States for foreign

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policy purposes determined by the president on his own authority.

Congress contributed to the steady growth of presidential power. Congress early recognized and confirmed the president's control of day-to-day foreign intercourse, and the resulting monopoly of information and experience promoted presidential claims of expertise and a congressional sense of inadequacy. Congress generally acquiesced in the president's deployments of forces and in his executive agreements. Later, a growing practice of informal consultations between the president and congressional leaders disarmed them as well as members of Congress generally, and helped confirm presidential authority to act without formal congressional participation. Often, Congress quickly ratified or confirmed what the president had already done, such as, in our day, the decision in 1950 to fight in Korea. And repeatedly Congress delegated its own huge powers to the president in broad terms so that he could later claim to have acted under Congress' authority as well as his own, as in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964, which in effect legitimated the Vietnam War.

In our legalist-constitutionalist political culture, practice was early undergirded by doctrine. In support of his argument that President Washington had authority to declare the United States neutral in the war between England and France, Alexander Hamilton (writing as "Pacificus") read the clause in the Constitution, "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President," as a grant to him of all the executive power of the United States—which for Hamilton included all foreign affairs power—except as otherwise expressly provided. James Madison ("Helvidius") reacted sharply, with Thomas Jefferson's encouragement. Power was in Congress, he wrote, except as the Constitution expressly and specifically granted modest amounts of it to the president. Madison, I think, had the better of the argument from text and intent; history has tilted toward Hamilton.

Other constitutional principles developed. In addition to his famous imprints on constitutional jurisprudence made as chief justice, John Marshall, in an insufficiently heralded contribution while he was still a member of the House of Representatives, declared that the president was the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." That characterization was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export*

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Corp. (1936), which referred to the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the president as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations."

Others have blended Hamilton's "executive power" and Marshall's "sole organ" and built on them. In our century Theodore Roosevelt claimed to be the "steward of the people," and insisted that his "executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional powers." Franklin Roosevelt in time of war also claimed authority from "the people" and even threatened to repeal an act of Congress (or to treat it as repealed). More recent presidents have avoided having to justify, and inviting reaction to, extravagant conceptions of the presidential office by simply asserting far-reaching authority "under the Constitution and the laws of the United States." The constitutional pretensions of the Roosevelts have not been invoked or imitated recently, but it has sometimes been asserted, and often assumed, that the president himself can determine the foreign policy of the United States, communicate that policy as "sole organ," implement it as "the executive," and enforce it as commander in chief.

V

What I have described developed slowly and not without resistance and occasional retreat. Congress has never formally adopted or approved the large conception of the presidential office as it developed, though it generally acquiesced in that conception. Early presidents did not press their claims too far and, even with growing partisanship, Congress did not feel a need to challenge many presidential assertions. To cite a familiar early example, Congress did not feel obliged to challenge President Monroe's authority to proclaim his doctrine or to make the decisions and the threats it implied; for long, Congress was content to treat the Monroe Doctrine with cautious, even skeptical, neglect, surely not as a promise binding the United States to go to war or to spend money.

As presidents claimed more, congressmen—and not only those of an opposing political party—sometimes objected. Our constitutional-political history is punctuated by exchanges between Congress and the executive, and between spokesmen for their respective claims. Against Hamilton, members of Congress and its supporters have cited Madison (and Jefferson),

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insisting that the president has only the few specific powers expressly granted him, narrowly construed, and that in foreign as in domestic affairs Congress is primary and supreme. The president, they were prepared to agree, is the sole organ of communication, but it is Congress that largely decides the policies to be communicated. The president's authority to make agreements without the consent of the Senate or the approval of Congress is limited. The president is the commander in chief of the armed forces, but it is Congress that decides what forces he shall command, whether the United States shall go to war, whether the arms and armies of the United States shall otherwise be deployed, and, if so, where and for what purpose.

Sometimes congressional spokesmen have claimed that constitutional uncertainties were intended to be resolved, and omissions supplied, by applying the principle of division between legislative and executive power expressed in the Constitution: Congress makes foreign policy, and the president executes congressional policy and conducts foreign relations in accordance with that policy. But clearly that is not an accurate description, either of the constitutional blueprint or of our government during the past 200 years. In foreign affairs the president does not merely execute what Congress prescribes. The president makes foreign policy—and legislates, makes law—when he makes a treaty (with the consent of the Senate). He makes foreign policy (and sometimes law) by executive agreements concluded on his own authority (without the consent of the Senate). The president makes foreign policy when he establishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and terminates such relations with Taiwan. There is inevitably some policymaking authority in the constitutional designation of the president as commander in chief. What is more, the distinction between making foreign policy and conducting foreign relations is essentially empty: the president makes foreign policy by conducting foreign relations, by the way he conducts them and the content and tone he gives them.

Congress has been more successful when it has argued, not constitutional limits on the president's initiatives, but rather the breadth of its own powers, and their supremacy. Congress has insisted that, whatever the president may do on his own initiative when Congress is silent, he may not act contrary to the wishes of Congress when they are expressed by law in the exercise of the legislature's broad powers over war and commerce with foreign nations and its power to spend for the

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common defense and general welfare. Both Hamilton and Marshall, it has been stressed, made only limited claims for presidential power. Marshall asserted only that the president was the sole organ of communication with foreign nations; he did not claim for the president authority to determine the substance of what was to be communicated. Hamilton asserted power for the president to initiate foreign policy in some areas not within the express powers of Congress, when Congress was silent; he did not claim any authority for the president to exclude Congress, or to act contrary to direction by Congress.

And so Congress has sometimes directed the president to do something, or not to do something, or to do something else, or to do something differently; sometimes Congress has undone what the president had done. Congress has not attempted to define or to regulate the content of executive agreements, but, in the Case Act of 1972, Congress insisted that it be informed of all such agreements. (The executive branch has apparently complied.) In the principal continuing controversy, the War Powers Resolution adopted by Congress in 1973 declared that the president has constitutional power to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated, only in the case of an attack on the United States or its armed forces. After declaring the president's own constitutional authority to be narrow, Congress asserted authority to regulate strictly the president's use of force in hostilities.

VI

Where has this debate left us today? Emphasis on unresolved issues should not obscure the fact that large dispositions in the Constitution are not disputed in principle (though presidents, and occasionally Congress, sometimes resent and resist them). Presidents have not made and do not make laws relating to foreign affairs. They do not appropriate money or spend funds without congressional appropriation. They do not make treaties without Senate consent. They have not asserted the power to declare war or to go into full-scale war without congressional authorization.

For its part, Congress has not presumed to make treaties or appoint ambassadors. And by extrapolation from the presidency's express powers, supported by references to Hamilton and Marshall, presidents have established beyond dispute an additional area of exclusive authority: Congress cannot tell the

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president to recognize or not to recognize, or to maintain or not to maintain diplomatic relations with, a foreign government; whom to appoint as ambassador; whether to negotiate a treaty, or whether to make or not to make a treaty or an executive agreement intimately related to the diplomatic function; or how to conduct a campaign in a war that Congress has authorized.

For the rest, we are in Justice Jackson's twilight zone, in which president and Congress "may have concurrent authority or in which its distribution is uncertain." Short of formal treaties, presidents make important executive agreements on their own authority on an undefined variety of subjects; occasionally the Senate, or a portion of its members, asserts limits on the president's power to make executive agreements or challenges his power to conclude a particular agreement.[4] "Short of war," a president may use the armed forces for foreign policy purposes determined by him; Congress, or some congressmen, frequently challenge particular presidential deployments. Presidents have continued to assert executive privilege to deny Congress documents or information, and Congress has continued to object and threaten; frequently the executive will provide such material subject to an injunction of secrecy. Until recently presidents asserted the right to impound and not to spend funds appropriated by Congress, including spending for defense or foreign policy purposes.

In the twilight zone, then, whether because authority is uncertain or concurrent, both Congress and the president have sometimes claimed authority to act when the other is silent. Congress and president sometimes race for the initiative, though in general the initiative is with the president, and presidents have pressed their claims far. But even when the president has acted Congress has sometimes asserted authority to regulate what he has done or might do. When Congress acts, its claims for supremacy are strong. Following his identification of the twilight zone, Justice Jackson wrote, in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.* v. *Sawyer*:

> When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely

[4] In the National Commitments Resolution of 1969, the Senate declared that the president cannot commit the resources or the armed forces of the United States other than by treaty (with the consent of the Senate) or by authorization by act of Congress.

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only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.

It is commonly accepted by students of the Constitution, if not always by presidents, that except in the small zone of exclusive presidential authority, Congress acting under its broad powers can prohibit or regulate what the president does, and the president (and all the president's men) may not flout congressional directives. Presidents, in fact, have rarely asserted power to act when Congress has directed them not to, or to disregard conditions imposed by Congress on their actions. If the president presses his resistance, Congress can usually prevail, in constitutional principle and in governmental practice, if only because it holds the purse strings—provided it has the will to pull them.

The significance of Congress' power of the purse should not be misconceived. Under the Constitution the president cannot spend a dollar unless Congress has authorized and appropriated the money. But where the president has independent constitutional authority to act, Congress, I believe, is constitutionally bound to implement his actions, notably by appropriating the necessary funds: for example, Congress may not properly refuse to appropriate funds, as reasonably necessary, to pay for an embassy to a government the president has recognized. But when Congress is of the view that a presidential act is outside his constitutional authority, it may challenge his action and may refuse to appropriate funds to implement it. Similarly, when Congress reasonably believes that the president's authority to act is not exclusive, but is subject to regulation by Congress, it may prohibit or limit the president's activity directly by legislation or indirectly by denying him funds. The president has no constitutional power, in any circumstances, to expend funds or transfer U.S. property contrary to congressional instructions.

VII

Consider the consequences of these constitutional developments in our day. The president has firmly established exclusive control of diplomacy and the diplomatic process: President Carter determined, over significant congressional opposition, to recognize the mainland Chinese regime and to terminate recognition, diplomatic relations and the defense treaty with the regime in Taiwan. He settled the Iran hostage crisis by

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executive agreement.[5] The president determines the intelligence-gathering activities of the intelligence agencies. For much else, the executive has been dependent on Congress (or on the Senate). Congress makes all laws and decides all expenditures. Congress determines foreign assistance—to which countries, in what amounts. The president sometimes promises financial or military aid, but he—and the proposed recipients—are aware that Congress will determine whether that promise will be kept, within what limits and on what terms and conditions. Congress has exercised authority to regulate and oversee "covert activities" (for purposes other than gathering intelligence); in the Iran-contra mess, there apparently were gross violations of the law, but no serious challenge has been raised to the constitutionality of those laws. Some presidents have not liked congressional human rights policies, whether sanctions against South Africa on account of apartheid, or restrictions on aid to other gross violators of human rights, but no president has seriously questioned the constitutional authority of Congress to determine that policy.

The president plans military policy and strategy, but only Congress can appropriate funds for research and development of weapons, and for the acquisition of weapons and their deployment. When Congress appropriates funds for particular weapons, it approves or acquiesces in the strategy which those weapons imply. Congress has not yet worked out the proper balance between its responsibility to legislate and to provide for the common defense, and its need to delegate and its desire to maintain "oversight," but under the Constitution it is for Congress to decide.

The power to make treaties is the president's, but he cannot dispense with the Senate. Forty years ago the president negotiated the U.N. Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, but he had to involve the Senate intimately in those negotiations and he was able to conclude those treaties only when the Senate consented. Later other presidents concluded an ABM treaty, the Panama Canal Treaties and a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, but they were only ratified after Senate scrutiny and consent, and only subject to conditions which the Senate imposed.

Important matters, however, remain in the twilight zone.

[5] The Supreme Court upheld this agreement, finding that Congress had long acquiesced in and accepted the president's authority to settle international claims by executive agreement.

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Members of Congress continue to question every new presidential deployment of armed forces and to assert the applicability of the War Powers Resolution; presidents continue to challenge the constitutionality of this resolution and to circumvent it in fact. There are recurrent demands that Congress examine untested assumptions about the president's authority to act in unthinkable ways in unthinkable circumstances—if nuclear deterrence fails. The Senate periodically questions the president's power to conclude an international agreement without Senate consent. In the twilight zone, too, are general issues between president and Congress that have important applications in foreign affairs, notably claims of executive privilege which Congress challenges, and congressional strings attached to laws or appropriations which presidents resent and sometimes resist.

VIII

I have emphasized what the Constitution makes explicit, and adumbrated powers whose allocation as between Congress and president is uncertain, or perhaps jointly held. Students of constitutional law and politics might add that the foreign affairs issues that agitate congressional-presidential relations in the bicentennial year reflect more than the uncertainties of the twilight zone. There are issues of constitutional interpretation as to the scope of the powers that are explicitly allocated to one branch or the other. Some tensions between Congress and the president are not strictly constitutional issues but are the inevitable (and perhaps desirable) consequences of the separation of powers—frictions and inefficiencies which separation engenders, failures in the cooperation which separation demands but which is not easy to achieve.[6] Acute tensions in constitutional politics, including those reflected in the Iran-contra shame, derive not from constitutional uncertainties but from unhappiness with, even resistance to, what the Constitution prescribes. Presidents in particular, I think, often see the constitutional blueprint as being out of date for the country we have become, in the world in which we live.

In the wake of Watergate and Vietnam there were stray

[6] Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting in *Myers* v. *United States* (1926), wrote that "the doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."

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suggestions that we consider abandoning or radically modifying the separation of powers, and even that we replace our "presidential system" with some variation of the "Westminster model." But there have been no serious moves in this direction, and even less radical constitutional amendments are not likely. (And I, for my part, would not favor any that have been suggested.) Short of constitutional amendments we can only hope to clarify and improve the interpretation of the Constitution we have. Some of the issues and tensions can be alleviated, I think, by the paying of greater attention, principally by Congress, to the use of the powers intended for the legislature by the framers.

The war power. In the War Powers Resolution, Congress declared its view that the constitutional authority of the president to use the armed forces in "hostilities" is strictly limited: he can do so only when there is an attack on the United States or its armed forces. In addition, Congress commanded advance consultation and prompt reporting of any engagement of U.S. forces, and automatic termination after 60 (or 90) days, or at any time when Congress so directs by resolution (not subject to presidential veto).[7] Presidents have challenged the resolution in principle, have sometimes made gestures of acquiescence, and have generally disregarded it.

I think that the War Powers Resolution is sound in constitutional principle but that it demands rethinking and rewriting. The resolution does not make clear whether the regulatory provisions apply when the president is acting within his sole constitutional authority (as Congress sees it), or only when the president has exceeded his constitutional authority. The resolution seems to require advance formal consultation with both houses of Congress, not merely with leaders, committee chairmen or specially designated agents of Congress. It requires such consultation "in every possible instance," but there is no indication as to what is meant by "possible."

Above all, the resolution suffers gravely from a lack of any definition of "hostilities"; yet the accuracy of Congress' statement of presidential power and the constitutionality of the regulatory provisions and their practical application may hang

[7] Some commentators have suggested that the use of such a congressional veto to control the president's use of armed force may be distinguishable from the "legislative veto" which the Supreme Court has invalidated. But Congress has to reconsider that section of the resolution.

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on how that term is defined. It is late in the day for Congress to challenge any deployment of troops whatsoever by the commander in chief, and in today's world any unit of U.S. armed forces anywhere may be an object of hostility and become involved in "hostilities." On the other hand, in invading Grenada, in putting the navy into the Persian Gulf, perhaps even in sending advisers to El Salvador and Honduras (to give some contemporary examples), the president has engaged in or risked war and placed himself, I think, within the purview of the war powers of Congress. If the resolution is to survive and flourish, Congress will have to redefine its scope as well as some of its regulations, and establish institutions and procedures to make it work.

Nuclear strategy. It seems to be commonly assumed that under the Constitution the issues of deterrence and of what to do if deterrence fails are "executive altogether." Congress has not challenged that assumption; a few citizens have, making claims on Congress' behalf. There has been little discussion of these issues in constitutional terms either in Congress, in scholarly circles or in the public domain.

The framers gave the powers over war and peace to Congress. It may seem hopelessly anachronistic to attempt to squeeze the issue of response to a first strike, or of the possibility of an anticipatory strike by the United States, into a constitutional framework designed for eighteenth-century wars. But the original framework and its allocations of authority are all we have to work with and live by.

If we take the Constitution seriously, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the original reasons for leaving the powers of war to Congress apply, *a fortiori*, to nuclear exchange. Assumptions of presidential authority (other than by delegation by Congress), then, must derive from the accepted "exception," in which the framers contemplated that the president could act to "repel sudden attacks" on the United States. A first strike or a strike in response to action other than an attack on the United States (or its armed forces) is not within the authority of the president under the framers' exception, and not within Congress' statement of the president's constitutional authority in the War Powers Resolution. Moreover, the framers' acceptance of such exceptional presidential authority, I am satisfied, assumed the need to act promptly, took congressional consent for granted and thought of presidential action as an emergency measure providing Congress the opportunity to act. But the

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assumption that Congress necessarily approves of a nuclear strike to defend an ally, or even in retaliation for an attack on the United States (as distinguished from "defense" of the United States), may not be obvious to all—not, say, to the Catholic bishops who reluctantly accepted deterrence but not the use of nuclear weapons if deterrence fails. In any event, that question, as an issue of principle, is not an emergency issue, but one that Congress could address in advance.

The assumption of the need for instant response, moreover, may apply to certain scenarios but not to some others. One can readily suggest situations in which there would be no need to respond instantly, and which are therefore not subject to the assumptions that might justify response by the executive without congressional authorization. In some circumstances, surely, there is both opportunity and justification for the operation of the original constitutional conception: consideration and decision by Congress. Should not Congress be exploring and planning for different contingencies, distinguishing those in which decision must be left to the president from those in which doing so contradicts the constitutional conception, and provide for congressional decision in some form wherever possible?

A constitutional issue of different dimension is raised by scenarios in which there would be no presidential finger available to press "the button." As applied in such circumstances, the authority contemplated by the framers for emergency response by the president would become authority not for presidential judgment but for virtually automatic response, and not by the president but by lower-ranking levels of civilian or military authority, unnamed and unknown even to the president. Such dispositions raise grave constitutional issues of delegation of power and of presidential succession. Again, if there is to be a process of automatic response in a particular contingency, if there are to be dispositions as to delegation, or as to presidential succession (other than those contemplated by the 25th Amendment), should they not be designed by Congress?

Congress has not explicitly made such dispositions. There is perhaps some level of congressional involvement in strategic planning when the Senate consents to treaty arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty, including the institutions for strategic planning implied in NATO. When Congress approves and appropriates funds for development of particular weapons, there is some degree of congressional involvement in determining the strategies which different weapons systems

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might imply. Perhaps it is assumed that by providing the weapons Congress in effect approves the different strategies they make possible, and delegates to the president the authority to implement them. But there is an important—and constitutionally critical—difference between congressional authorization of weapons systems and of their deployment, and decisions as to their use. It is far from obvious that the power to make war can be delegated, especially without guidelines, especially to unknown persons.

Reluctance to consider and discuss issues of nuclear strategy may be due in part to unwillingness to alarm the people, and in part to a fear that public discussion of the issue might weaken deterrence, but even the question whether those consequences are inevitable has not been responsibly discussed or considered. And is it clear that Congress could not discharge its constitutional responsibility without publicity?

Have nuclear weapons effectively eliminated any meaningful role for Congress in decisions as to nuclear strategy? If so, our celebrated Constitution is no longer relevant for our most compelling concerns.

The spending power. Issues of defense spending and foreign aid are essentially not differences as to what the Constitution provides, but unhappinesses with what is provided. The Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to tax and provide for the common defense and the general welfare. The president can only "recommend" to the Congress "such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient"; the president can propose, Congress disposes (subject to presidential veto, which it can override). Spending for the common defense, for "raising and supporting" the armed forces, allows the president's experts, military and civilian, to develop weapons and plan deployments and strategies—but Congress has to be persuaded to enact and implement them. Congress, for its part, is unhappy being a mere rubber stamp, particularly for spending huge sums requiring high taxes and competing with other societal demands. To provide itself some minimal role, Congress has had to develop its own experts and expertise. Inevitably, however, the role of Congress is often marginal, hardly what the framers contemplated. Presidents resent even that marginal restraint.

Similar, though less acute, is presidential impatience with the power of Congress to spend for the general welfare. In foreign relations, it is accepted that providing for the general welfare

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includes the appropriation of large sums for foreign aid. Again, presidents plan and promise, but Congress has to be persuaded, in general or in particular cases. Again, the roles are substantially reversed from what I think the framers intended.

Tensions as to the applications of the spending power are the inevitable consequences of the separation of powers, as it impinges on complex government in today's world. The tensions may even be desirable. I see no "remedy" other than more authentic consultation by improved procedures, at earlier as well as later stages.

Covert activities. The framers recognized the need to seek intelligence information, and doubtless saw it as an aspect of maintaining diplomatic relations. They may even have understood and contemplated other "covert activities," even some kinds of "dirty tricks," but these would have been questions of policy to be determined by Congress, then to be executed by the president.

The distinction between intelligence-gathering activities and "covert actions" having other purposes is recognized by Congress, which has regulated the latter only. Presidents have been less willing to accept the distinction. As regards covert activities for purposes other than intelligence-gathering, presidents have resisted even the requirement to inform Congress, in part from the principle of executive privilege, but even more because presidents know that knowledge is power, that the need to report and inform deters and circumscribes, that requests for information are a form of congressional regulation, and that information will engender further regulation. The executive branch has acquiesced in requirements to report to Congress or congressional committees, especially if Congress provides loopholes for special circumstances. In practice, we have learned, the president has been less acquiescent when Congress regulates his power by forbidding the use of funds for certain kinds of covert activities or the sale of weapons to certain governments, such as states supporting terrorism.

From a constitutional perspective, it is difficult to make a persuasive argument that Congress cannot regulate these covert activities, whether under its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to deal with the issues of war and peace, or to define offenses against the law of nations—or under the unarticulated "foreign affairs power" which the Supreme Court found implied for Congress in the notion of the national

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sovereignty of the United States.[8] In my view, the president has not made a case for "liberating" the intelligence agencies from restraints such as those Congress has imposed.

The treaty power. The president cannot make a treaty without Senate consent; the Senate has sometimes sold that consent dear. Increasingly—since the disasters of the Versailles Treaty and other interwar agreements—the executive branch has learned to attempt to determine in advance what the Senate will buy, to consult particular senators, to involve them in negotiations. But the Senate's perspectives on world affairs and the national interest are often different from those of the executive. The constitutional bifurcation of the treaty power is inefficient, and often frustrating to presidents and to the foreign governments with which we deal. That is not an issue of the interpretation of the Constitution, but a complaint against it. More, better, earlier consultation with the Senate will surely improve the treaty-making process. I do not see an answer to these tensions in an expansion of the use of executive agreements.

The Senate's consent to a treaty is constitutionally necessary, and for that purpose the Senate is entitled to know what the treaty means; often it will insist on articulating explicit understandings as to what it means. When, as has recently happened in respect of the ABM treaty, the executive branch later seeks to interpret a treaty to an effect different from what it had told the Senate in seeking its consent, the executive would seem to be violating the constitutional conception. Surely such attempts by the executive invite the Senate in the future to probe ambiguities and to express understandings with nearly paranoid scrupulousness, from fear not only of what other states may make of a treaty but of what a future executive branch will make of it. The president must be candid; the Senate must restrain itself.

Fear of circumvention of the Senate by presidential resort to executive agreements on his own authority is currently quiescent. The president has not challenged the demand of Congress to be fully informed of executive agreements after they are made, and there has been no recent challenge by the Senate to the constitutional propriety of any particular agreement that has been made. But the issue is always in the wings. The Senate has resolved that the president cannot agree to

[8] See *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* (1936) and *Perez* v. *Brownell* (1958).

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commit the forces or the financial resources of the United States on his own authority; presidents have purported to make such commitments only when Congress had delegated to them large authority, or only by nonbinding promises. But Congress can terminate or restrict its delegation of these powers, and there is always the possibility that Congress may deem a presidential promise to have been beyond his authority to make.

Thirty-five years ago Senator John W. Bricker (R-Ohio) led a campaign to amend the Constitution so as to limit the treaty power as well as the president's power to make agreements on his own authority. As regards executive agreements, that attempt, and others before and since, evoked sympathetic response; they foundered, I believe, because it proved impossible to draw the line between those agreements that require Senate consent and those the president ought to be able to make on his own authority. A new attempt at such definition is not likely to be more successful. Moreover, the need for formal regulation by Congress has not been obvious. Congress now has information about executive agreements and can arrange to scrutinize them to determine whether the president has gone too far. If he does, the Senate (and Congress as a whole) have the political weapons to frustrate presidential usurpation and reaffirm the Senate's constitutional claims.

IX

We have come a long way under the constitutional blueprint which the framers ordained and established. As they intended, Congress possesses, and exercises, the power to make law and to tax and spend for the common defense and the general welfare. The president was granted the power of a strong executive but has acquired much more. The framers did not anticipate, I think, how much legislation and spending would be determined by the fact that the president recommended them; that the president would become the many-headed executive branch, knowledgeable, expert and difficult for Congress to resist or to overrule; how much power Congress would be "compelled" or disposed to delegate to the president with only vague guidelines for its exercise; how much of the power that the president exercised originally by delegation or by acquiescence would be claimed as powers of the president "under the Constitution and the Laws." The framers did not foresee the dangers inherent in leaving general policies to be executed by a president who also had the command of the

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armed forces. I doubt they foresaw the number and variety of agreements presidents would claim authority to make without advice and consent of the Senate. I do not think they foresaw the president's claim to use the armed forces for broad foreign policy purposes determined by him. Surely they did not foresee a nuclear world and nuclear strategy that induced Congress to delegate—or abandon—its constitutional authority over the life of the nation to the president and even to unspecified persons in his command.

This, I believe, is where we are after 200 years, under an eighteenth-century blueprint which has never been replaced, or formally amended in respects here relevant. The explicit constitutional allocations continue to govern. A large twilight zone continues to generate both uncertainty and competition. Congress can often prevail if it organizes, educates and mobilizes itself, but there are formidable obstacles to its doing so. Major issues of separation of power remain unresolved and without prospect of judicial resolution. Resort to the Constitution, to text and context, to history and purpose, to intent of the framers, is often not fruitful, and special theories of constitutional construction (such as Hamilton's) are not always helpful, surely not determinative. We come down, I think, to deciding—if we can—what kind of country we are and wish to be. I am disposed to state the question as: How should foreign affairs be run in a republic that has become a democracy?

The framers of the Constitution were republicans, not democrats. After 200 years we are finally a democracy, limited by commitment to individual rights. (Some 20 years ago the Supreme Court made universal suffrage constitutional dogma.) It may be time, then, to begin to inject into our constitutional jurisprudence our conception of democracy, our dual democracy, a presidential democracy and a congressional democracy, giving each its due.

In foreign affairs the president represents the United States, and the people of the United States, to the world. Congress represents the people at home, the sum of different groups, constituencies, interests (general and special). The president leads; Congress legislates. The president represents needs for expertise, secrecy, speed, efficiency. Congress provides wider, soberer, more deliberate, more cautious, longer-term values and judgments.

For me, seeing the president and Congress under the aspect of democracy—an aspect quite different from the framers'

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perspective—nevertheless confirms their judgment, and the national experience over 200 years, in surprising measure. In respect of the government's authority to use force—the perennial and paramount constitutional issue—in my view, our dual democracy tends to confirm the original division. The Constitution gave the decision as to whether to put the country into war to Congress; the framers intended for the president only the power to defend the United States if this country were suddenly attacked. That division still seems wise, and responsive to popular wishes—the basis of authentic democracy. A decision to go to war in circumstances other than an attack on the United States—even to defend allies, or vital U.S. interests, or the lives of its citizens—was not intended to be within the president's sole constitutional power; the power, the decision, the responsibility belong to Congress. It is not a power which Congress should delegate. If Congress were to decide now that in given circumstances (say, an attack on U.S. forces in Berlin) the United States should go to war without awaiting a formal decision by Congress, it might so provide now, while requiring appropriate if less-than-formal participation in the decision by congressional agents. (Congress might also consider rewriting the War Powers Resolution accordingly.)

The original allocation of war powers resists too-ready application to the decisions of nuclear defense policy and the implications of deterrence, but its underlying sense, I think, is not irrelevant there. Should the president have authority to decide, alone, to escalate to nuclear war, to launch a first strike? Should he decide, alone, how to respond to nuclear attack? Granting such power is not what the framers intended, or would have intended; it is not, I think, what our kind of democracy requires. Commitment to total war should require the consent of the governed, not only for the general policy but for its every cost, and for all those decisions that implicate the lives—and the soul—of the people. Such decisions, I think, should be for Congress to make; surely, Congress must be involved in some important way. If, in some scenarios, there can be no formal role for Congress in a situation calling for instant retaliation or urgent preemptive action, it is all the more important that Congress be involved in advance planning, in contingent policy, as well as in the ultimate decision, by the best procedures Congress can devise.

The exercise of force in situations other than war is another, more complicated matter. In the conduct of foreign relations

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the president has acquired authority to use the forces that Congress puts at his command. But the Constitution explicitly denies him the power to initiate war, and therefore must deny him authority to do what is likely to bring us into war. A line between foreign affairs and war is not easily drawn. (Clausewitz, we recall, identified war as the conduct of foreign relations by particular means.) But it is a line drawn by the framers and redrawn by our history; I think it corresponds to the intimations of our dual democracy.

I am suggesting a distinction akin to but different from that which Congress adopted in the War Powers Resolution. The president must eschew involvement, or serious danger of involvement, in undertakings that have the character of war or threaten to involve us in the costs of war. President Carter's attempt to rescue hostages held in Iran, for example, was not designed to fight a war and was not likely to engage Iranian forces or threaten the independence or territorial integrity of Iran—the relevant test under international law. The invasion of Grenada, by contrast, whatever motivated it, sought to topple a government and occupy a territory. It was widely seen as an act of war for international purposes, and it would seem to have had the character of war for constitutional purposes. Good fortune kept deaths few on both sides, and as a result the action won popular acclaim. But would the people have supported it had it proved costly? It is not, I think, the kind of action the Constitution and our dual democracy intend to be undertaken by the president on his own authority. Again, the War Powers Resolution might be rewritten to reflect the distinctions I suggest.

Between rescue of hostages and invasion are other cases, some of them hard cases. It would be difficult to decide them by adjudication even if the courts were willing to try; it is surely a subject inappropriate for confrontation between president and Congress. The stakes are too high for a democratic society to tolerate either a presidential fait accompli or a congressional fiat delivered to an unwilling president. We need processes that will bring to bear wisdom as well as expertise, and the authentic consent of the governed. The original constitutional plan, the lessons of our intervening history, and our kind of democracy all call for congressional involvement, with a determining voice, in making foreign policy decisions that relate to the war power.

The tensions of human rights policy also implicate the theory

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of our democracy; it confirms, I think, the soundness of the instincts of the framers and their prescriptions. The president conducts foreign relations and is entitled to determine the quality of our relationship with each particular country. But the power to spend the people's wealth is a subject primarily for internal democracy, for the people and their representatives to decide what is in the general welfare, and how much to spend for it. It is the people, through their domestic representatives, who should be entitled to decide whether they wish to give their largesse to, or be associated with, a government guilty of torture or apartheid. The people of the United States, committed to the inalienable rights of all men and women everywhere, are entitled to identify with people who are victims of their own government, whether the identification is with blacks, Poles, Jews or any other human beings.

For the incredible excesses of the secret arms sales to Iran, and the flouting of the laws of Congress as regards Nicaragua, I see no constitutional excuse. Covert activities that stir issues of war and peace, or that spend the country's resources, are—and ought to be—subject to control by Congress. I believe the Constitution entrusts them to Congress properly, wisely. If the president cannot persuade Congress, he must bow to its will. The Constitution is clear: "He shall take care that the laws [of Congress] be faithfully executed."

The Constitution was not a perfect realization of ideals, principles and plans but "a mosaic of everyone's second choices." As a result, ours is a strange system, the strangest in the world. It was strange when it was conceived; it is stranger in the nuclear age. It blends different notions of democracy; a democracy represented to the world by the president; an internal democracy represented by Congress, closer to the people, to constituents, to individuals, to issues. It also blends respect for representation with concern for effectiveness, for different kinds of effectiveness. The president provides leadership, commands information, expertise, speed, efficiency. Congress represents the people, its wider, soberer (more cautious) long-term values and judgments. Two hundred years have given us separation of powers *cum* democracy or, perhaps more accurately, differentiation of function mixed for democracy. Ideally, the representatives of our different kinds of democracy work together. Good government as well as democracy demand fewer decisions by one representative alone, for war or in peace.

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Robert G. Mugabe

STRUGGLE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

As the prime minister of a young and developing nation, I observe with sadness that several developing countries are locked in devastating conflicts. In most cases such countries are mere theaters of wars that have nothing to do with their people or their interests. More often than not, such conflicts occur in areas regarded as "spheres of influence" of stronger and wealthier nations. Indeed, most of the wars that have been fought in the last 40 years have been in Third World countries, but involved the limited participation of the superpowers and some of the great powers. Korea, Vietnam and the Middle Eastern wars are some of the conflicts that brought the world close to the brink of a generalized war.

One such area of conflict now is southern Africa. I use the example of my own region because it presents a clear illustration of wanton destruction of lives and property, and of the danger posed to international peace and security.

Zimbabwe and the United States have mutual interests in bringing an end to the problem of apartheid in South Africa. Time has indeed run out, and South Africa now poses a threat to international peace and security that has implications far beyond the borders of the southern African region.

II

The Republic of South Africa is in the middle of a vicious and ugly civil war. The root cause of this crisis is the obnoxious system of apartheid which the majority of black people of South Africa do not want, as well as their own desire for freedom and independence in the land of their birth.

In the run-up to the general elections of May 6, 1987, we heard a lot of rhetoric about reform of apartheid from the ruling National Party, led by President P. W. Botha. But that was soon proven to mean only cosmetic changes affecting pass laws, freehold title, trade unionism and aspects of social segregation. President Botha's regime is determined to maintain the

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two pieces of legislation that form the cornerstone of apartheid—the Population Registration Act, which color-codes people according to their race, and the Group Areas Act, which color-codes the places where they live. The structure of political power in the hands of a white minority remains intact, reinforced by the military.

Following the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in 1974, the South African Ministry of Defense reviewed the political situation in the region and evolved a long-term strategy. In 1977 the ministry issued a White Paper on what was described as the "Total Strategy." This strategy simply meant mobilizing all available resources for national defense purposes. It advocated the need to maintain "a solid military balance relative to neighboring states." It also advocated economic and other "action" in relation to transport services, distribution and telecommunications, with the objective of promoting or enforcing "political and economic collaboration" in the southern African region.

P. W. Botha was then minister of defense; in September 1978 he became the prime minister, and later president. From the day he took over the reins of power, the military has assumed a dominant position in South African politics. Some people even say a military coup d'état has taken place. Real power and decision-making authority has been shifted from the Parliament in Cape Town to the State Security Council, in which all the branches of the military, the intelligence services and the police are represented. This council has more than 500 Joint Military Committees throughout the country, and members who sit on every village committee or town board. In other words, the entire governmental apparatus is run in order to prosecute the civil war in defense of the interests and privileges of five million white South Africans. About half of the white population consists of Afrikaners, most of whom support the ruling National Party and its racist ideology of apartheid and discrimination, and half are descendants of British settlers. The May election saw an alliance of Afrikaners and English-speaking whites voting together for the security promised by P. W. Botha's National Party.

The representative organizations of the black majority, which numbers some 22 million indigenous people, are determined to overthrow the apartheid regime and establish a democratic government by a combination of internal armed struggle supported by economic sanctions and the material

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assistance that Africa and the international community are able to give. The balance of forces is shifting in favor of these organizations as more people get involved in the anti-apartheid struggle and the confrontation between black and white sharpens.

The African National Congress of South Africa was formed in 1912 and tried for almost half a century to negotiate the sort of society which we now have in Zimbabwe and are continuing to build. It was not until some 50 years later that the ANC decided that all peaceful options had been exhausted and there was no recourse but armed struggle. ANC leader Nelson Mandela, who has now been in jail for 25 years, explained in testimony during his trial on charges of subversion in 1964:

> All lawful modes of expressing opposition to [the principle of white supremacy] had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against, and when the government resorted to a show of force to crush its opponents, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence.

The decision to fight for independence is not a phenomenon peculiar to southern Africa. Nor is the decision to fight for a nonracial society. Americans, more than most, must be aware of this, and also Europeans, who fought only 45 years ago to free their countries from Nazi occupation. Independence and the democratic right of the majority to decide their destiny is, or should be, a sacred principle to all of us.

Unfortunately, in South Africa the stage is set for a protracted and bloody conflict. It is one into which African states, the middle powers and the superpowers will be drawn, possibly on opposing sides, thereby setting the stage for a generalized war.

III

Soon after taking power Botha proposed a "constellation" of southern African states dominated militarily, economically and technologically by Pretoria. It was to include the Bantustans or "homelands" (thus giving them de facto, if not de jure, recognition), other members of the South African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) as well as Malawi

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and Zimbabwe, and possibly others in the region which could be co-opted.

To this end South Africa poured large sums of money into the 1980 pre-independence election in Zimbabwe. The objective was to bring to power a malleable client in our country which, for geographical reasons, held the key to the "constellation" concept. Zimbabwe, as a client state, and the other countries of the region caught up in South Africa's plans for regional hegemony would have been under considerable pressure to recognize the Bantustans. And, in Pretoria's view, once they had done so, other countries would follow.

Our independence in Zimbabwe, on April 18, 1980, was an important watershed for the region. The people of Zimbabwe thwarted the Botha "constellation" project by giving my party an overwhelming majority in the elections held at the end of February under the auspices of a British governor and his administration. As a result, I was able to join my colleagues from the other Frontline States in the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, our instrument for closer regional economic cooperation and for reducing dependence on South Africa. To South Africa's surprise, SADCC also incorporated Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho, and was initiated with the support of the European Economic Community.

The creation of SADCC was a recognition of our regional and economic reality. Six of the majority-ruled states to which I have referred are landlocked: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For our trade and our survival we have these alternatives: to use the railways and ports through Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania, or to use the South African transport system and its ports. Our stated intention of reducing dependence on South Africa by upgrading routes through Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania threatened Pretoria's regional supremacy. The creation of SADCC also threatened to reduce South Africa's trade surplus with the region, then estimated at $2.5 billion a year, at a time when its own economy was stretched. Much of this surplus derives from rail and port revenues.

Over 40 percent of Zaïre's mineral exports transit South Africa to its ports when logically they should go along the Benguela line through Angola. Zimbabwe, forced to use the long routes through South Africa, pays an additional $38 million in freight bills each year. Malawi and Zambia also pay

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vastly increased freight bills to send their trade south because of South Africa's destruction of our shorter and cheaper trade routes through Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique.

The government of Mozambique had closed its borders with Rhodesia in early 1976, in compliance with U.N. sanctions. It paid a considerable price for doing so ($556 million over the next four years in lost rail and port tariffs, according to U.N. estimates). Mozambique had served as an outlet for the landlocked hinterland in Portuguese colonial times; the end of the Rhodesian impasse offered the opportunity for it to resume that role, which had accounted for a large percentage of its foreign currency revenue. My country's independence in 1980 offered the possibility of using these non-South African routes. An early decision of my government was to maximize Zimbabwe's usage of our most convenient trade routes through Mozambique.

At the time of our independence no Zimbabwean trade passed through the Mozambican rail and port system, but by the end of 1983 almost half of our trade was transiting Mozambique. Today South African-instigated sabotage has cut that figure back to less than 20 percent. We are increasing it again as we rebuild the Beira Corridor and rehabilitate the Chiqualaquala line to Maputo. We need to utilize the full capacity of the two ports of Beira and Maputo to handle about nine million tons of goods from Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi.

We commend those friendly Western countries that have come to the aid of Mozambique and assisted with the rehabilitation of the port of Beira and reconstruction of parts of the Beira Corridor. South Africa has set out to destroy systematically our alternative communication routes to the sea and ensure our continued dependence on their ports and railways. Our dependence on South Africa has not come about by accident. It has been a strategy carefully worked out over many years.

The landlocked countries of the region can be serviced by five rail-to-port systems other than the South African routes. One is the Tazara railway linking Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. To the west is the Benguela railway to the Angolan port of Lobito. That has been out of action virtually for a decade as a result of sabotage by the Angolan rebel group UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), an instrument which is supported by South Africa and the United States. To our east, through Mozam-

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bique, we have three routes to the ports of Beira, Maputo and Nacala. These three ports could easily handle all the trade of Malawi, Swaziland, Zaïre, Zambia and Zimbabwe. But the routes to Maputo and Nacala have been out of operation for three years as a result of sabotage. And the Beira route is kept open only at huge military cost. Soldiers from the national armies of Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are now stationed in Mozambique to secure our communications routes and help rid that country of the terrorist menace South Africa has unleashed.

Documents captured from South Africa's surrogates in Mozambique clearly show their South African military masters ordering them to destroy our trade routes and our power lines, and to begin urban terrorism in our cities. The minutes of a meeting on February 23, 1984, between the South African military and their Mozambican surrogates define the following targets: "Railways, Cabbora Bassa [a large hydroelectric dam in Mozambique], *cooperantes* and other targets of an economic nature such as the ones belonging to SADCC." This is the type of state terrorism we have to contend with in this region.

Why does South Africa do this to its neighbors? It is certainly not because we are a military threat. South Africa's motivation is in part economic, in part due to the acquiescence of the international community, and in part due to the deep-seated knowledge of apartheid's rulers that their system of racial segregation and minority rule is doomed.

We are not militarily at war with apartheid, but apartheid is at war with us. And militarily, economically and socially we are paying an enormous price. Since 1980 the direct and indirect cost of South Africa's destructive actions against its neighbors has been well over $20 billion. In the case of Mozambique alone the cost from 1980 through 1985 is estimated at between $5.5 billion and $6.5 billion. And even these figures do not give a true picture, for they exclude the vast amounts of money we are forced to divert from development to defense to protect our hard-won sovereignty.

IV

South Africa, while at war with its own people, is waging an undeclared war against its neighbors. The combination of tactics varies from state to state, depending on the political, economic and military vulnerabilities of each, but at the heart of this policy of "destabilization" is the regular sabotage of the

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regional transportation system to ensure that all trade flows south through South Africa. In order to maintain this regional dependence Pretoria pursues a policy of aggression and destruction that has devastated neighboring economies and caused widespread suffering.

All of South Africa's neighbors have been subjected to direct incursions by the South African Defense Forces—attacks ostensibly aimed at members of the ANC, but whose victims have almost always been innocent citizens of the target state. Pretoria also relies extensively on the use of the surrogate forces inherited from anticolonial struggles to its north, trained and armed by the SADF to murder, maim, rape and destroy on its behalf.

The history of the so-called Mozambique National Resistance has been told in considerable detail by the former head of Rhodesian intelligence, and was put on the record in Washington recently by State Department testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This group was created by Rhodesian Intelligence and handed over to South Africa's military intelligence just prior to Zimbabwe's independence. South Africa converted the MNR, as Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker said, "from a nuisance into a well-armed rebel group" and remains a "reliable supplier of high-priority items." These surrogate forces have no political program and no credible leadership, and their brutalization of the population is not likely to win many converts.

We know that the leaders of these bandit units are campaigning hard for recognition by the United States. They have secured the support of several congressmen. Following the July 1985 repeal of the Clark Amendment (which banned aid to Angolan rebels) and the granting of aid to UNITA in March 1986, a meeting of these various organizations was held in Washington in August 1986. They hoped to get the kind of recognition and assistance that Jonas Savimbi's UNITA has been granted. To deny the legitimacy of the government of the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) is to invite chaos and disorder. UNITA's support is drawn from a single ethnic group, not from the population of the whole country. The South Africans have made no secret of their intention to overthrow the Angolan government. Cuban troops were invited by the MPLA government to defend the sovereign government of Angola, part of whose territory had been overrun by South African forces.

We would be as delighted as the Angolans to see the Cubans,

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and indeed all foreign troops, leave Angola—once South African troops have withdrawn, the occupation of Namibia by South Africa has ceased and an independent government has emerged there, and the violent apartheid state of South Africa has been destroyed. The root cause of the stalemate in Namibia's progress toward independence is South Africa's insistence that the popular liberation movement SWAPO (South West African People's Organization) should not rule, and U.S. insistence that the departure of Cuban troops from Angola be linked to Namibian independence.

The Western nations have failed to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, passed in 1978, which calls for Namibian independence. South Africa's attempt to set up a transitional government as an alternative to SWAPO has failed dismally. South Africa's administrator-general continues to rule Namibia with an occupation force of 120,000 South African military and locally raised irregular forces. No one can accuse SWAPO of being a communist organization; it has a national, democratic program with a socialist approach, the form and timing of which are to be determined by an independent legislature. South Africa's campaign for regional dominance has cost about 500,000 lives in Angola and Namibia in the past five years, according to an estimate by the United Nations Children's Fund.

Given South Africa's destructive strategy against all its neighbors, we are shocked that the U.S. Congress, instead of coming willingly to our assistance, has attached conditions to the proposed $50 million in aid to SADCC. The aid legislation, passed in July, includes the Pressler Amendment, which bars assistance to countries in the region that advocate the form of terrorism commonly known as "necklacing" or allow persons who practice "necklacing" to operate in their territory. "Necklacing" is used by certain persons in the townships in South Africa against those they regard as collaborators with the regime. No country in the region has ever condoned the practice nor has any South African liberation movement. We have condemned it forthrightly from every public platform. We are a peace-loving people who are appalled by the brutality that is a fact of daily life in South Africa, brutality that is unleashed first and foremost by the regime.

We in the region regard that vote in Congress as an attempt to blackmail us into supporting apartheid, since it concerns a practice over which we have no control whatsoever. The so-

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called necklacing practiced in the South African townships certainly did not come from us and has never been experienced in any of the other liberation wars in southern Africa. To suggest that we condone it is a mere excuse for the United States to continue supporting apartheid instead of assisting the forces of freedom and justice.

V

What are the vital interests of the United States in our region? More than half of the United States' purchases of a dozen minerals considered strategic or critical are imported from South Africa. Most of the strategic minerals, however, can be purchased elsewhere in the region. For example, although South Africa accounts for about one third of the world's production of chrome ore, my country contains most of the known deposits of high-grade chrome ore. Zambia, Zaïre and Botswana are also alternative sources of some strategic minerals.

The United States is tied to the South African economy by as many as 200 U.S.-based multinational companies, which have direct investments estimated at billions of dollars. The pressure of the anti-apartheid protest has forced several companies to divest their shareholdings in South Africa. It must also be noted that these corporations' investments in black Africa north of the Limpopo River and south of the Sahara are much larger than those in South Africa.

Another common excuse for the maintenance of U.S. relations with apartheid South Africa is the protection of the Cape sea route. This is an old excuse for policies of aggression in our region. The British government used it as the main justification for proposing to sell arms to South Africa in 1971. But it is common knowledge that modern air transport has made the Cape sea route irrelevant as a strategic point. The U.S. Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, which published its report in January, concluded that "the active collaboration of the South African government, whatever its ideology, is *not* an important factor in protecting the Cape sea route."

These then are the cosmetic issues for which there are alternatives and solutions. The Advisory Committee report goes on to say: "A greater source of danger to the West is the growth of Soviet influence in the region, promoted by white

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intransigence in South Africa, growing political instability, rising levels of racial violence, and armed conflict."

Political and material support of desperate bandit groups, dissidents and self-seeking, discredited individuals by a superpower like the United States is a prescription for chaos and instability in the international political system. Calling such a hodgepodge of individuals "freedom-fighters" does not make them any such thing. The bandit groups that gathered in Washington in August 1986 have no such credentials.

Financial and material aid, and food, should not be used as levers in the conduct of the foreign policy of a superpower. The far right in the U.S. Congress focuses much attention annually on the foreign aid bill in order to deny financial resources to those states which seek to pursue an independent policy.

In Zimbabwe we have totally rejected any aid or investment from any quarter that seeks to change, influence or modify the policies that we have enunciated, based on our perception of Zimbabwe's national interests. For us, this is a matter of principle. Although we have been blacklisted and denied financial aid by President Reagan's Administration, we have stuck to our principles and strongly defended our sovereign right to define our own policies, and articulate them in any forum.

We will neither amend our policies nor change our behavior in order to please others, even if they are superpowers. My party is one of the few liberation movements in the world that fought a major war of national liberation, involving thousands of troops, without the support of a superpower. The sovereignty and independence we have now attained are so dear to us that no number of pieces of silver can ever buy them from us.

For me this campaign of the right goes over familiar ground. During our war of liberation I was accused of leading surrogate Russian forces, when in fact the Russian government adamantly refused to give us a single gun or ruble, and in 1978 they even refused me permission to pass through the Moscow airport in transit. The ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa and SWAPO of Namibia are fighting for the same freedom and independence that we fought for.

We have been encouraged to see the U.S. State Department seeking to improve its relations with Mozambique. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa on June 24, 1987, Assistant Secretary Crocker said "no country

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in southern Africa has worked more consistently than Mozambique with the U.S.A. to further the cause of peace and stability in southern Africa." He praised Mozambique's human rights record, and the strenuous efforts which we know are being made to revitalize the economy and strengthen institutional development.

The Reagan Administration now apparently regards the fate of Mozambique as a critical issue for southern Africa and for U.S. interests in the region. It is giving Mozambique $75 million in humanitarian aid and $10 million in economic aid. Mr. Crocker approvingly cited British training for Mozambican army personnel and new British economic assistance, and noted that Britain and the United States have recently assigned resident military attachés to Maputo. This should be a good signal to Pretoria. He also pointed out that all of Mozambique's neighbors, with the exception of South Africa, support the government "against the insurgents and would regard official contact with them by Western governments as a hostile act implying endorsement of South African destabilization efforts."

In spite of the expressed support of the American and British governments for the Mozambican government, we were surprised that so little aid was granted to Mozambique, and that Angola was excluded from the list of those SADCC countries to be aided in the current year. As I have argued, these governments are the main targets of South Africa's destabilization policies in the region. They are the legitimate governments of their respective states. They are greatly in need of political and material support. Denying them much needed resources means direct support for South Africa and destabilization.

We take note of the Reagan Administration's commitment to operate within our regional consensus. But we remain concerned that the main objective of the Administration's policy planners is not to stem Pretoria's regional aggression; rather, their main fear is that the people of the region may turn toward communism and the Soviet Union. We are cognizant of the fact that both superpowers are searching for friendly port and/or military facilities in the region, trying to expand their political and economic influence and to deny that influence to the other.

But it should be noted that, in keeping with our philosophy of genuine nonalignment and true independence, no country in the region has permitted military or naval base facilities to

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either superpower, although Britain has provided military training to the Mozambican government and sent a military vessel to call at the port of Maputo last year. Britain also provides military training to the Zimbabwean army, and has done so since our independence in 1980. A British Special Air Service unit was sent to Botswana for a training exercise in 1986.

The socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia are willing to give us weapons to defend ourselves against apartheid's onslaught. And when they do so there are those who question our nonalignment. This is mischievous and inaccurate. None of us fought for our independence to become the proxy of anyone else. Nor are we. The vast bulk of our trade is with Western countries, and they also provide most of our development aid, but this does not make us a proxy of the West any more than arms from the socialist countries make us their proxy. If it were not for apartheid's destabilization of our region, we probably would not need these arms.

Those who judge Africa in terms of East and West do us a grave disservice and they display deep ignorance. Those who see South Africa only in the context of "the whites" and "the blacks" display equal ignorance. We are not opposed to the whites in South Africa; neither are the liberation movements, as they have often stated. It is the policies of apartheid that we oppose and will continue to oppose with all the moral, political and diplomatic power available to us, in support of the oppressed people of South Africa.

We would like to take seriously the words of Secretary of State George Shultz, speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year: "We want a democratic and prosperous South Africa, where all races participate politically and economically, at the center of a peaceful and rapidly developing southern African region."

These words must now be matched by deeds, and existing relations expanded to create mutual trust. This will not be achieved through loaded Senate votes making these relations conditional, but by taking concrete steps to remove the source of violence in our region. Only when we have achieved this will the region be able to achieve its vast economic potential. The interests of the United States in peaceful development are eloquently presented in the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee report:

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As a nation with long-term interests in southern Africa and a fundamental commitment to the promotion of justice and democratic values, the United States cannot stand aside as a human tragedy of potentially immense proportions threatens to unfold in South Africa. The stakes are too high. At risk are the lives of thousands, possibly millions, of South Africans, black and white, the future political and economic viability of the entire southern third of the African continent, and history's judgment of the United States.

Against this background it is necessary for the U.S. Administration to condemn by concrete actions those enforcing the apartheid system and to support, again concretely, those struggling for freedom and justice. The U.S. Congress did pass last year, over the Administration's veto, a package of limited sanctions. But the United States should give political, moral and material assistance to the majority who will sooner or later take their "rightful place in the governance of the country," and whose relations with the United States will be "strongly influenced by the links that are established during the period of the struggle."

The time has passed for engaging in dialogue with only the apartheid regime; the policy of "constructive engagement" is dead and has been committed to history. U.S. policymakers and leaders of other nations deeply involved in South Africa should encourage dialogue among all parties and promote compromise. I would add that African leaders from the region have played a positive role in this regard and will continue to do so. We have provided venues for informal meetings to encourage familiarization and communication that can lead to a better understanding between individuals on both sides of the problem. There is a vast barrier of culture and scarce or false information (the latter deliberately created) that must now be bridged. We emphasize the importance of these informal discussions, such as those held recently in Senegal and elsewhere. It is urgent to convince Mr. Botha that it is in his interest to negotiate sooner rather than later. He and his colleagues must be persuaded of the need for a new political system, and that apartheid cannot be "reformed." He must be persuaded at the outset to extend basic human, legal and judicial rights to all citizens of the country, and to reintegrate the "homelands" into one country, to release political detainees and to lift the bans on individuals and political organizations.

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VI

When it comes time for negotiating, Mr. Botha must have (as Rhodesia's Ian Smith had) a powerful force standing over him to guarantee good faith in enforcing the decisions, because South Africa has amply proved its unwillingness to keep its word in international negotiations. It concluded its nonaggression Lusaka Accord with Angola and its Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in early 1984, but the report of the Commonwealth's "Eminent Persons Group," *Mission to South Africa*, confirms that "South Africa violated both these Accords from the very outset, giving the region further proof that it could not be trusted to honor even solemn Treaty obligations."

An atmosphere conducive to negotiation can be achieved with a combination of internal and external pressures that increase the cost of maintaining apartheid. Even the State Department's advisory report agrees that multilateral sanctions will have an effect in terms of signaling the termination of economic growth and political stability until apartheid is ended.

The Anti-Apartheid Act passed by the U.S. Congress a year ago was just such a signal. It banned the importation of South African coal, uranium, iron and steel, agricultural produce, textiles and krugerrands, and prohibited new U.S. loans, investments, credits and the sale of computer technology to the South African government and its agencies. It also terminated landing rights for South African Airways. Unfortunately, the thrust of the Anti-Apartheid Act has been blunted and watered down by the Pressler Amendment to the 1987 Appropriations Bill. As noted, the effect of this amendment is to deny financial resources to selected Frontline States, thereby making it difficult for them to participate in the sanctions program against South Africa.

Despite its pleading to the contrary, the United States has considerable leverage which has never been used, and sanctions are only part of this. It is the superpower to whom South Africa looks as an ally; it is a major trading partner and a member of many international organizations. There are material pressures which have never been used, or in some cases not enforced, in political, economic, cultural and military areas. It is true that only 200 U.S. corporations have, or had, direct investments in South Africa but these corporations wield considerable influence in Washington. If they are serious in their attempts to divest and distance themselves from apartheid, they must also

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use their political clout at home to bring apartheid to an end as quickly as possible.

The Commonwealth has been active in the international campaign to end apartheid, both in imposing its own limited sanctions and earlier leading the way in promulgating the international arms embargo.

Sanctions relating to military, economic, cultural and sporting activities isolate the regime; they are one method of raising the cost of apartheid both economically and psychologically. South Africa has been taking serious steps for a decade to prepare for this eventuality and to minimize the effect on the economy and the military machine. However, that is no reason to exclude sanctions from the list of pressure points, nor is the excuse that sanctions will destroy the economy.

The opponents of sanctions say, in the first place, that such measures will hurt the blacks in South Africa the most. This is a spurious argument. In South Africa, the black response has been clear and categorical: if sanctions will play a part in terminating the suffering, they must be imposed. The Anglican archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, has put this point most eloquently:

> For goodness sake, let people not use us as an alibi for not doing the things they know they ought to. We are suffering now, and this kind of suffering seems to be going on and on and on. If additional suffering is going to put a terminus to our suffering then we will accept it.

A second argument is that sanctions against South Africa will hurt the neighboring majority-ruled states. But we are already suffering, as I have clearly illustrated earlier, and if additional suffering is necessary, we are also ready to pay the price. For several months the Frontline States consulted each other on whether to impose the Commonwealth package of sanctions, which was agreed upon at the Bahamas summit. It became clear that some Frontline States are not able to impose sanctions because their economies are tied into the South African economy like Siamese twins. This is true of those countries in the South African Customs Union as well as others. But although unable to do so themselves they urge those who can—especially the big powers—to adopt sanctions.

A third excuse used to argue against sanctions is that they do not work, the case of Rhodesia being cited as an example. But no single government, not even South Africa, could give

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formal recognition to the Rhodesian regime as long as it remained the target of comprehensive U.N.-sponsored mandatory economic sanctions. They worked in limited, but important and costly ways. Rhodesia was forced to sell its products at below-market prices and buy its imports at a premium.

VII

The time for easy and comfortable choices in South Africa has run out.

This is the conclusion of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, and it is a conclusion that we, the inhabitants of southern Africa, heartily agree with. We now expect those who wield power in the United States to understand the magnitude of this conclusion and seize the opportunity to retrieve their moral credibility by actively seeking a solution that can bring peace and justice to our region and allow us to invest our resources in the development of our people instead of defense. This should be the priority of U.S. policy toward the region.

The U.S. Administration should accept the value of sanctions as a means of raising the cost of maintaining apartheid, and should persuade its allies to adopt them. The United States should broaden its contacts with South Africans of all races and political persuasions in an effort to bridge the credibility gap widened by previous policies. This assumption of a more open, less rigid position applies also to its political and economic influence elsewhere in the region, which can be enhanced considerably by increasing assistance to the SADCC member countries and ending aid to UNITA bandits in Angola.

The United States and its allies have the capacity to play the role of power brokers in initiating negotiations toward a just, equitable society in South Africa and the participation of all its citizens in the democratic process. This is a process which we in southern Africa understand very clearly, for precedents abound within our region.

We in Zimbabwe saw how our armed struggle and our political mobilization, coupled with sanctions and other international pressure on Ian Smith, brought him to the bargaining table and ended the intransigent position of no majority rule "in a thousand years." There is now the example of Zimbabwe's reconciliation, our nonracial society and our agro-industrial economic base by which to judge the future of a black-ruled South Africa.

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Zimbabwe is also an example by which to judge the enforcement of a cease-fire; one in South Africa could end the spiral of violence that has sucked the children of the townships into its vortex. When the cease-fire was declared in Zimbabwe the guns were laid down, and despite provocations from our adversaries, our people did not pick them up again but went to the polls in peace and cast their ballots and chose their government. Our circumstances in the region are not easy, and we have made mistakes as well as achieved successes, but I think people will agree that our transformation from a state of war to a country in which people of all races participate fully offers some hope for the future of our misguided and restive neighbor.

It goes without saying that in South Africa such negotiations cannot take place from prison cells, and therefore political prisoners and detainees must be released and bans on individuals, organizations and political parties lifted, so the representatives of the people can take their places at the bargaining table. The alternatives, in the words of Mr. Botha's predecessor, the late Mr. John Vorster, more than a decade ago, "are too ghastly to contemplate." Civil war is already upon us. The Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group presented the reality clearly to the international community in their report, published more than a year ago:

> The blacks have had enough of apartheid. They have confidence not merely in the justice of their cause, but in the inevitability of their victory. The strength of black convictions is now matched by a readiness to die for those convictions. They will, therefore, sustain their struggle, whatever the cost.

Time has run out. Serious choices must be made now. Just as the leaders of the United States over a century ago chose to try to overcome their house divided and use the strength of freedom, equality and human dignity to build a powerful nation, we must make the choices necessary to assist South Africa in shortening this difficult period in its history and getting on the road to prosperity and peace. We must do this, not only in the interest of regional peace and security, but in the interest of global peace and stability, giving due and careful consideration to the future of our small planet.

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Ricardo Arias Calderón

PANAMA: DISASTER OR DEMOCRACY

Shortly after the ratification of the Torrijos-Carter treaties on the Panama Canal in 1978, I visited an academic friend in the United States who follows U.S. policy on Latin America and raised with him the issue of Panama's continued military regime and the need for democratization. He responded quite candidly and bluntly: "From the point of view of U.S. political leaders, Panama's problems are solved. The fight over ratification has been costly. They won't spend more political resources on Panama." Nine years later, early this year, I raised the same issue with a high State Department official in Washington; his response was a diplomatic but forceful put-off: "Do the people of Panama really reject military rule?" In both cases, Panama's democratization was not perceived as an issue, at least not an urgent one.

Since June I have talked again to both of these persons, this time in Panama. Neither could possibly have repeated their previous remarks, nor did they. The very fact of their visits indicated changed perceptions. They were in Panama precisely because its regime and the need for democratization had exploded into a major national commotion, which the international news media could not ignore and the world community could no longer disregard.

Since early June Panama has been shaken by an unending succession of public demonstrations, both small and large, including on several occasions very effective general strikes. These demonstrations have covered the metropolitan area, especially the financial center, as well as the outskirts of the capital and the most important provincial cities, and have encompassed every major component of Panamanian civilian society.

The national unrest was triggered by the accusations of Colonel Roberto Díaz Herrera, who was retired in late May. A first cousin of the late General Omar Torrijos, he had been

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the second in command of the Panamanian Defense Forces and was considered to be the guardian of orthodox *torrijismo,* a version of national security ideology, wrapped in populism and nationalism. Díaz Herrera had not reached the rank of general nor was he able to take his turn as commander in chief, as planned by the highest members of the General Staff less than a year after General Torrijos' death in 1981.

On June 7, 1987, the independent newspaper *La Prensa* and other Panamanian media began to publish a series of startling declarations by Colonel Herrera. He accused General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the current commander in chief, of ordering the 1985 murder of Dr. Hugo Spadafora, an outspoken critic of Noriega; taking part in the purported murder of General Torrijos; fostering the electoral fraud of 1984; benefiting from large-scale corruption; and participating in the narcotics traffic.

Because Herrera was the first high-ranking officer to break the rule of silence upon dismissal and confessed his own role in both the fraud and the corruption, his declarations had tremendous impact on public opinion. They triggered an upsurge of popular protest against the rule of General Noriega. Not since the beginning of the military regime in 1968 has such a broad, intense and sustained movement of protest erupted; its aim is nothing less than a basic realignment between civilian society and the military.

On June 10 the National Civic Crusade was formed to coordinate the protest movement. Originally it comprised more than a hundred organizations: civic clubs; private enterprise associations, led by the Panama Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture and the National Council of Private Enterprise; teachers' and doctors' professional organizations; student groups and, eventually, labor groups. The Catholic Church served initially in an advisory capacity. Gradually the Crusade has developed local chapters and now represents approximately 200 organizations.

Five democratic opposition parties, while not integrated formally in the Crusade, have acted together in support of its objectives and activities: the three political parties of the Democratic Opposition Alliance, and two other parties which are in the process of obtaining legal recognition. They represent a broad spectrum of populist, Christian democratic, liberal and social democratic political persuasions. In a July 8 manifesto the five party presidents called for "the new government which our people demand, completely freed from the structures of

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the militaristic regime and the legitimacy of which must be based on the known will of the majority of the people."

The National Civic Crusade has made two fundamental demands: for justice, with special insistence on the removal of General Noriega as commander in chief (so that accusations against him can be the subject of an independent judicial investigation), and for the democratization of governmental institutions. The Crusade has adopted the position that it will not negotiate with the government until General Noriega has been removed. It has insisted, even in the face of violent repression, that only peaceful methods of civil disobedience be used to fight for these objectives.

The protest movement has met with the most brutal and widespread official repression since the 1968 military takeover, including the longest and most drastic suspension of constitutional guarantees in Panamanian history, a blatant recourse to paramilitary groups, and the prolonged closing of opposition press and radio. Thousands of persons have been beaten and teargassed since June. Over 1,500 protesters have been arrested, dozens of them tortured while under official custody or in jail. Between 500 and 1,000 persons have suffered bullet or bird-shot wounds. More than ten Panamanians have been forced to leave the country since June, and at least ten have been killed.

A public opinion poll, published in early August, surveyed the metropolitan population of Panama.[1] Its findings confirm the desire of the Panamanian people to end General Noriega's regime:

—77 percent of those interviewed consider that the elections of 1984 were dishonest;

—79 percent believe that General Noriega runs the country, while only eight percent believe that President Eric Delvalle does;

—67 percent think that the Panamanian Defense Forces interfere too much in national affairs and 77 percent think that their functions should be exclusively military;

—finally, 75 percent consider that General Noriega should resign as commander in chief, while just 13 percent say that he should remain in this position.

[1] The poll was conducted by the Costa Rican affiliate of Gallup International, CID (Consultoría Interdisciplinaria en Desarrollo, S.A.).

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II

The commotion of these past months did not mushroom overnight, merely as a result of Colonel Herrera's declarations. It has been at least ten years in the making. Four basic factors have generated the present impasse: the frustration of the democratization process, the emergence of a renewed version under General Noriega of military control over the country, corruption and the consequent breakdown of civic and moral values, and the ongoing economic crisis.

With the signing of the Torrijos-Carter treaties a process of democratization began in Panama. General Torrijos realized that the ratification of new treaties on the canal could not be completed without some form of national consultation, and that this consultation entailed loosening his dictatorial rule. As the negotiations came to a close, the military regime lost the overarching excuse it had used to justify itself. Moreover, the then Democratic leadership of the U.S. Senate, as well as President Carter, made it explicitly clear to General Torrijos that U.S. congressional ratification required his commitment to adopt certain measures, such as legalizing political parties, allowing the return of Panamanian exiles, abrogating laws that restricted freedom of the press and imposed severe punishment on alleged "subversives" by administrative authority.

President Carter referred to this understanding in a public statement released on September 7, 1987:

> Ten years ago today, Panama's leader, Omar Torrijos, and I signed two Panama Canal Treaties at the Organization of American States in the presence of sixteen heads of state from throughout the hemisphere. . . .
>
> On that day ten years ago, Omar Torrijos and I spoke about how our two nations could become lasting partners. He told me that could only happen if Panama were to become a democracy, and he pledged his commitment to that goal. I am sure that General Torrijos would be very disappointed by recent developments in Panama, and that he would hope, as I do, that the military would defend the nation by removing itself from politics and permitting the people to decide their own future by free elections.

Nonetheless, General Torrijos maintained a militaristic version of the Mexican political system based on the Democratic Revolutionary Party, which he founded; on a legislature of 505 representatives, the so-called popular power; and on the National Guard, the paramount institution according to the second article of the then-prevailing Constitution. Even so, until

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his death, Torrijos allowed a more pluralistic environment, which permitted the democratic opposition to organize and express itself.

This process of managed democratization continued under General Torrijos' successors, particularly General Rubén Dario Paredes. After becoming National Guard commander in 1982, General Paredes made sweeping changes in high governmental positions, including the presidency, and fostered the revision of the 1972 Constitution, by way of a referendum, to include requirements for representative democracy. Unfortunately, he insisted on maintaining what he publicly called "real power" until after the presidential election scheduled for 1984, and insisted on becoming the official presidential candidate.

The *torrijista* regime began to wane after its founder's death, but a decisive realignment between civilian society and the military did not take place. The failure of this attempt at what might be called "authoritarian democratization" culminated in the electoral fraud of the 1984 elections. It has been extensively analyzed and documented in a book that became Panama's all-time best-seller, *Asi fué el Fraude* (Anatomy of a Fraud). The 1984 electoral fraud marked a resurgence of militarism, in the guise of a new strongman, Manuel Antonio Noriega.

Noriega had been chief of intelligence for more than ten years; his influence was great by virtue of the services he provided to General Torrijos. In the latter's shadow, he was shielded from public scrutiny, not to mention discussion or criticism of his activities. International publicity focused almost exclusively on Torrijos' populism and nationalism, ignoring the regime's repressiveness. There is evidence that Torrijos harbored some fears of his subordinate's power and methods, but he had come to depend on Noriega's services to maintain his own position. This ensured Noriega's long tenure, his accumulation of political, economic and military resources and influence, and thus his triumph over Díaz Herrera in the succession struggle.

On August 12, 1983, Noriega became commander in chief. Twenty-five days later he pulled the rug out from under the presidential candidacy of retired General Paredes. By early January 1984 he had chosen the official presidential candidate and orchestrated the official alliance of parties. On February 13 he substituted President Ricardo de la Espriella with President Jorge Illueca. And by May 30 his chosen candidate, Nicolás Ardito Barletta, had been proclaimed president and

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the official parties had been granted a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Assembly.

The Democratic Opposition Alliance, ADO,[2] obtained a majority of some 50,000 votes, but it was unable to mobilize the country in defense of its victory. The official alliance, National Democratic Union, UNADE,[3] managed to have Ardito Barletta, a former vice president of the World Bank, declared the formal winner by 1,713 votes. But it failed to convince the nation that a democratically elected and therefore legitimate government had finally been established.

III

Instead, within nine months after his promotion to commander in chief, General Noriega appeared to be fully in charge of the country. He expanded the military's control by creating the Panamanian Defense Forces, which incorporated the National Guard, the Air Force, the Naval Force, the Canal Defense Force, the Police Force, the Traffic Department, the Department of Investigations and even the Immigration Department. With this came an increase in the number of officers, troops and military units, and the upgrading of both equipment and training for anti-terrorist and low-intensity warfare contingencies. This expansion required more physical installations, particularly in the areas adjacent to the canal, and more financial resources for the military.

There is no effective civilian supervision of the Defense Forces; the commander in chief's power is all-encompassing. To strengthen it even further, according to both General Paredes and Colonel Díaz Herrera, General Noriega has developed, parallel to the institutional line of command, a direct line of command through a group of his closest and most trusted followers, regardless of their specific rank. This group is implicated rather directly in some of the activities of which he is accused. Noriega also uses the intelligence service to keep surveillance over officers, and is said to count for his personal security on a unit trained by a former Israeli intelligence officer. According to reports, he distributes perquisites and

[2] ADO is composed of three parties: the Authentic Panamanian Party, led by Dr. Arnulfo Arias Madrid; the Christian Democratic Party; and a third party, MOLIRENA.

[3] UNADE includes the *torrijista* Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), the updated traditional parties—the Labor Party (PALA), the Republican Party and the Liberal Party—and two smaller parties.

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funds from unbudgeted sources so as to foster dependency on himself.

General Noriega has also placed active and retired military officers at the head of civilian agencies considered to have national security significance, including Civil Aeronautics, the Port Authority, the railroad between the cities of Panama and Colón, the Bayano Development Corporation (which manages the area surrounding the Bayano hydroelectric dam), the Institute of Renewable Natural Resources, the Office of Student Affairs in the Ministry of Education, the University of Panama security guards, and the office charged with giving administrative support to Panama's representatives in the bilateral organisms created by the canal treaties, DEPAT (Executive Directorate for Treaty Affairs).

This last fact is of special importance. It points in the direction of a new concept of the role of the military regarding the canal. General Torrijos argued that the defense of the canal required only 200–300 "bilingual policemen," and the strategic "umbrella" of the United States from bases located outside Panama.[4] Moreover, he never suggested anything but civilian administration for the operation of the canal itself. General Noriega, however, has moved in the direction of a growing military establishment for the defense of the canal and even toward military operation of the canal. To predict what such administration of the canal might be like, one need only look at the administration of the country under military rule during these past years.

The next Panamanian government, to be elected in 1989, will have a serious impact on the future of the canal: in 1990 Panama will nominate the chief administrator of the Canal Commission; in 1991 the tri-nation Commission for the Study of the Alternatives for the Canal (composed of Panama, the United States and Japan) must present its conclusions, which may very well require a national referendum in order to be implemented; and through the early years of the coming decade Panama must make decisions on its gradual assumption of the administration of the canal, which is to be concluded by the end of 1999.

General Noriega repeatedly tells the younger officers and troops that he is their guarantee that they will be there to receive the canal in the year 2000, suggesting that the military

[4] Interview published by *U.S. News & World Report*, Sept. 19, 1977, pp. 20–21.

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is in ultimate control of the nation's course and is the final arbiter of its political life and government.

General Noriega has not only expanded the military's role in the political sphere; he has also brought the civilian government under his control. After replacing President De la Espriella in 1984, he forced the resignation of President Ardito Barletta in 1985 when the latter favored an investigation of Dr. Hugo Spadafora's murder. While all cabinet members are careful not to thwart the commander in chief's wishes, some are more beholden to him: for example, at present, the ministers of the Presidency, of Government and Justice, of Education and of Health.

General Noriega has also managed to subordinate more or less directly to himself the judicial branch—both the Supreme Court and the Attorney General's office; the legislative branch, by making the president of the assembly and a group of legislators strictly dependent on him; and the Electoral Court. He has also imposed persons answering to him as presidents or secretaries general of the two largest official parties, PRD and PALA.

One disastrous effect of Noriega's rule has been corruption of unprecedented proportions; it has become endemic in public administration. A scandal involving a $200 million housing program, financed by the Social Security System, exploded in 1982. Five years later, despite an approximate loss of $50 million, not one of those considered responsible is in jail, and the government plans to reduce social security benefits and increase the corresponding fees. In this as in other instances, the gross abuse of resources, perquisites and commissions has produced galling contrasts between the flaunted wealth of important officials and the growing economic insecurity of the general population. Furthermore, since 1984, when Colombian narcotics chieftains sought refuge in Panama, the involvement of Panamanian authorities in the narcotics traffic has become an issue. Corruption has thus acquired an ominous, foreign character, beyond the negative aspects of domestic administrative corruption.

Some observers note that the repressiveness of the Panamanian military regime is not comparable to its South or Central American counterparts. Since the founding of the republic in 1903 Panama has been largely free from systematic violence. There are several reasons for this: Panamanian society has historically been more tolerant due to the integration of very

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different peoples. Also, the military regime has followed policies of co-opting leftist groups and offering many facilities to regional guerrilla groups. Nevertheless, the current regime has been the most repressive in Panama's experience, and it is from this point of view that the great majority of the population judges and rejects it.

The regime does not shrink from using violence against its opponents. On September 13, 1985, Dr. Spadafora was decapitated after detention by agents of the Panamanian Defense Forces near the Costa Rican border. A former follower of General Torrijos, Spadafora had become a very forceful critic of General Noriega; shortly before his death, he had accused Noriega of participation in the narcotics traffic. The country was horrified by the crime as well as the cover-up, which involved the replacement of a president and the manipulation of the judicial system.

The continuation of the military regime, under a strongman who is himself the object of the gravest unanswered criminal accusations but not subject to investigation by any national authority, has systematically undermined the values of Panama as a civilized community. For the past two years the civic clubs, with the support of the Catholic Church, have conducted a campaign to regenerate civic and moral values.

The extent to which Noriega has violated national laws and values goes beyond anything Panama has previously experienced. The criminal accusations against Noriega at home and abroad have intensified the rejection of him. While General Torrijos' military rule was wrapped in populism and nationalism and his personality exercised a certain attractive power, General Noriega's personality tends to produce distrust more than anything else. Also, the accumulated level of the external debt has not permitted any costly populist measures, and the implementation of the canal treaties has left little rallying ground for nationalistic enthusiasm.

IV

The present crisis has roots in the economic policies of the Torrijos years, which had two basic aims. One was to transfer investment from domestic private enterprise to the state. This was accomplished through a systematic increase in public expenditures fueled by an unchecked external debt, which went

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from $113.8 million at the end of 1968 to $3.8 billion on May 31, 1987.

The other purpose was to foster the development of the internationally oriented sectors of the economy—the Colón duty-free zone, the banking center, reinsurance activities, registry of vessels, tourism and others—in order to maintain a high level of foreign-exchange earnings, which in Panama have ranged historically from 35 to 40 percent of GNP. This was accomplished by providing an environment relatively free from regulations and taxes. The overarching objective was undisputed military control of public power, without resistance from weakened domestic private sectors and with support from favored international private interests.

The basic flaws of these politically motivated economic policies have become quite apparent. First, despite the dramatic growth in public employment, the trend since 1974 has been toward greater unemployment due to the prolonged stagnation of domestic industrial and agricultural activities. According to independent economists, in 1984 unemployment reached 19 percent of the labor force.[5] Income distribution has deteriorated accordingly: in 1983 the poorest 22 percent of the population received only 5.5 percent of the total income, whereas the top 18.6 percent received 54.5 percent.[6]

Second, the economy's capacity to generate revenues has diminished, creating severe budgetary strains. When in 1982 Latin America's external debt reached crisis proportions, it became impossible to sustain the *torrijista* model of development, which was based on a high level of public spending, financed by external borrowing, and on Panama's growth as a financial center. Since then Panama's GNP decreased for two consecutive years in 1983 and 1984. Although in 1985 and 1986 the growth rate of GNP was slightly higher than the 2.1 percent growth in population, the per capita GNP in 1986 was still below the 1982 level.

Concurrently, from 1982 until April 1987, the total assets of Panama's banking center decreased from $49 billion to $39 billion. Its share of the total foreign deposits in five important international banking centers—the Bahamas, Cayman Islands,

[5] This figure is estimated on the basis of the historical 60-percent ratio of the labor force to the working-age population.

[6] *Hacia una Economía más Humana*, Panama, 1985, pp. 26–27, 42–47.

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Great Britain, Panama and the United States—diminished from 4.3 percent to 2.6 percent.[7] As a result, the Panamanian government has had to modify some economic policies to receive World Bank structural adjustment loans. It has rescheduled the commercial portion of its external debt with growing difficulty.

In the judgment of most Panamanian economic decision-makers, the so-called structural adjustments do not fit the unique characteristics of Panama's economy, which relies on the export of services for its foreign exchange earnings to a degree unequalled by any other country in Latin America. These adjustments have therefore generated widespread opposition.

At the beginning of 1987 Panama's economy found itself without new sources of growth and in a very tight fiscal situation. The population, especially the poorer and younger segments and the emerging middle classes, felt marked insecurity, and a large majority had become convinced that the government, under military control, was incapable of charting a new course of development for the nation. Thus economic pressures have converged with the political upheaval, with the government as the target of both.

The principal sectors of the economy have played a decisive role in the protest movement. The new generation of leaders of private enterprise organizations has been in the forefront of the demonstrations and the strikes. The banking area of Panama City has been the scene of major demonstrations and the ensuing repression, with the nearly 6,000 banking employees and executives from the more than 120 banks playing an important part. The labor rank and file has also responded to the Crusade, even though the leadership of most unions has remained under military influence.

Panama's economy is the most open in Latin America. The U.S. dollar is used as currency and two-thirds of GNP are generated by services, while three-fourths of foreign exchange earnings come from exporting services. Consequently, domestic and foreign confidence in the country's stability is of paramount importance to the economy. What has happened since June of this year is a radical loss of precisely such confidence.

[7]"Impacto de la Crisis en el Centro Bancario" by Ing. Luis H. Moreno, in *Impacto de la Crisis Actual en la Economía Nacional*, Panama: National Council of Private Enterprise, Panama, Aug. 11, 1987.

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This loss has been exacerbated by the official reactions to the protest movement: on the one hand, brutal, widespread repression (particularly to the extent that it has been directed at many economic decision-makers, their families and their employees); on the other hand, the growing prominence of the more radical, Marxist-oriented elements among the government supporters both as spokesmen on socioeconomic issues and foreign policy and as participants in paramilitary groups.

The first result of this crisis of confidence has been the drainage from banks in Panama of up to 15 percent of their total deposits, greatly reducing banking credit. Construction activity, Colón Free Zone commerce, industrial production for the domestic market, agricultural production of some basic grains, and tourism have all felt the paralyzing effects of the commotion and the credit crunch. Unemployment has begun to rise, and the August CID-Gallup poll reported that 75 percent of the interviewees felt their living conditions have deteriorated since 1986, and 64 percent expect an even worse immediate future.

The government's fiscal situation has also seriously deteriorated: no stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund since last December; noncompliance with some of the provisions of the current structural adjustment loan agreement with the World Bank; a growing deficit in an already unbalanced budget, and a dim outlook for servicing the external debt and refinancing the portions due this year and in the coming two years.

One of Panama's leading economists, Dr. Guillermo Chapman, has predicted that as matters now stand Panama's GNP will decrease in the second half of 1987 at an approximate rate of seven percent, the most severe contraction of the Panamanian economy since the end of World War II. He added that the country will face a higher level of unemployment, concentrated mainly among younger people with a relatively high level of education. He concluded that "from the point of view of economic development, the 1980s are a lost decade for Panama." The only solution to the economic crisis, in his view, is "an integral political solution," namely "a truly democratic regime."[8]

For the first time since the beginning of military rule in

[8] "Impacto de la Crisis en la Economía Nacional" in *Impacto de la Crisis Actual en la Economía Nacional, ibid.*

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1968, the leading actors of Panama's private sector economy are vitally interested in a change of regime in favor of democratization.

V

As in the case of the Philippines and Haiti, the foreign media have reported Panama's commotion to the international community, and in substantially accurate terms: the Panamanian people versus General Noriega's regime. The impact on foreign political leaders and governments has not been negligible, and it accounts for a significant change in attitudes.

Because of the special historical relationship between Panama and the United States due to the canal, this change has been especially important in the United States. Over the years the U.S. government provided great support to Panama's military regime. Even while pursuing elsewhere a policy in support of democratization, its policy toward Panama has been one of tolerance, if not complicity. The U.S. Agency for International Development provided assistance to the government of Panama at the highest per capita level of any Latin American country in the high middle income category.

Above and beyond canal treaty provisions, the United States organized, within the past four years, the largest joint military operations in Panama's history. A corresponding by-product has been additional financing for the Defense Forces' so-called civic action programs, in direct competition with the civilian government's capacity to respond to the needs of the population. Moreover, the overlap between the intelligence services of both governments reached the point where, according to public statements by William Jordan, former U.S. ambassador to Panama during the period of the treaty negotiations, General Noriega had worked for the CIA, from 1966 onwards.

The underlying rationale for such support has been clear. For the U.S. government—as represented in Panama by its embassy, its Southern Command, its CIA and national security agents, its Drug Enforcement Administration personnel and so on, with their respective and sometimes competing views—the top priority in Panama has been the security of the canal and, as a condition of the same, the stability of Panama's regime. The United States has considered the Panamanian Defense Forces as the most important factor for Panama's stability and thus the domestic agent which could most affect the canal's security. It has sought, therefore, to have a close, positive

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relationship with the military leadership, regardless of other considerations. Human rights and democratization have been at best a secondary priority of U.S. policy toward Panama, competing for such a position with the protection of U.S. private investments in the country, which are the third largest in Latin America, after those in Mexico and Brazil.

Yet since the end of 1985 some change in U.S. policy has been perceptible. The replacement of President Ardito Barletta, in September of that year as part of the cover-up of Dr. Spadafora's murder, was considered a direct affront to U.S. policy. The U.S. government had been willing to forgo democratic substance in Panama, but demanded at least the semblance of civilian rule in order to maintain some degree of coherence in its regional Central American policy.

Doubts began to surface among U.S. policymakers, but no alternative course was adopted. When a new ambassador, Arthur Davis, was appointed in 1986, he expressed explicit concern over the repressive and corrupt aspects of the military regime at his Senate confirmation hearings. Some months later, in an October 23 speech in Panama, Ambassador Davis clearly related the future of the canal to democratization: "Fully functioning democratic institutions in Panama are the best guarantee to Americans and Panamanians alike for success in the turnover of the canal to Panama."

The case of Panama as one of the few remaining exceptions to Latin American democratization began to catch the attention both of important members of Congress and of the U.S. media. Closed hearings on General Noriega's ties to the narcotics traffic and to Spadafora's decapitation were held by a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In June 1986 *The New York Times* published two exposés on the accusations against him, including reference to his role as a double agent for the CIA and Fidel Castro.

The unrest in Panama since June finally seems to have led to a new U.S. policy direction. Two bipartisan Senate resolutions have demanded the cutoff of all aid, even the sugar quota, unless the government of Panama takes measures similar to those demanded by the National Civic Crusade. On June 30 Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams acknowledged that in Panama "the foremost public issue today is quite simply democracy," and placed Panama in the same category as Chile, Haiti, Paraguay and Suriname, countries "where the transition to democracy is in trouble or

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in doubt." He also said: "the old complacency inside and outside Panama over the inevitable dominance of the Panamanian Defense Forces in the nation's politics is gone."

U.S. agencies interested in Panama now seem agreed on the following points: that without effective democratization Panama's stability and, consequently, the canal's security cannot be assured; that the evolution of the Defense Forces toward a professional, nonpolitical organization is required for democratization; and that General Noriega's role as commander in chief is a major obstacle to this evolution and a primary source of the country's turmoil.

To the extent that such agreement exists, official U.S. views on Panama now coincide with the demands of the overwhelming majority of Panamanians for justice and democracy.

VI

Besides repression in its various forms, the regime's response to the Civic Crusade, the economy's performance and the changing international context has been intransigence. Official propaganda has repeatedly shown General Noriega on television surrounded by younger officers clapping while they shouted defiantly: "*Ni un paso atrás*!" ("Not one step backward!") The regime's civilian followers in government and the official political parties have been either inactive, in a state of confusion or at odds with each other. Their efforts at counteraction in the streets, in the legislature and through the media have been irregular and quite unsuccessful in gaining support.

General Noriega has attempted to present the Civic Crusade in terms of class struggle and even in terms of race struggle, as a fight of the white middle and upper classes versus the black lower classes. This portrayal was so contrary to the experience of participants and observers and so contrary to the grain of Panama's mixed and pluralistic society that it generated a strong backlash. Even though it received some international attention, it was abandoned as the movement developed.

Longer lasting has been the regime's attempt to counter the protest movement with nationalistic anti-Americanism. It says the movement was created by a conspiracy of U.S. rightist circles and reactionary Panamanian traitors to destabilize General Noriega's regime. The alleged conspirators' motives are supposedly to avoid the transfer of the canal administration to Panama in 1999 and to neutralize Panama's support of Central American peace efforts as a member of Contadora.

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While this portrayal has only been fully accepted internationally by the more leftist governments and currents of opinion, it has had some impact in Latin America. It has contributed to the reticence of Latin American political leaders and organizations to address the issue of Panama's commotion. It has also helped the Panamanian government to obtain some support in international organizations.

But Panamanian public opinion has been completely unreceptive to such an explanation, even though 45 percent of those interviewed in the poll mentioned earlier have doubts that the United States will comply with the Torrijos-Carter treaties. University and high school students, who number about 200,000 and tend to be intensely nationalistic, have not once demonstrated in favor of General Noriega; they have repeatedly demonstrated against him.

Among the reasons for the domestic failure of this government tactic are awareness of General Noriega's past record; U.S. reaffirmation by bipartisan spokesmen of its commitment to comply with the canal treaties; and the declaration by the presidents of the five democratic opposition parties of Panama that, for them, "the full nationalization of the canal is irreversible and demands the real preparation of the Panamanian state to assume integral responsibility for its administration and the effective neutrality of the passageway."

General Noriega has sought to reaffirm his control over the Defense Forces. Through meetings and seminars he barrages officers and troops with indoctrinating messages along two lines: the demand for his removal is tantamount to a demand for dismantling the military institution itself; and only the Defense Forces, as they presently function, can assure full and effective sovereignty over the canal, for which purpose they need to exercise control over the country's political life.

But the very efforts displayed by General Noriega to strengthen his control over the Defense Forces reveal that he senses danger from within. For the first time, a commander in chief has faced open challenges from recently retired high officers—first from Colonel Díaz Herrera, then from his predecessor, General Paredes, who has also called for his ouster. There are indications that current members of the General Staff have expressed serious concern at the turn of events. Some officers who are perceived as more professional than political have been charged, beyond their specific functions, with responsibility for repression, as if to implicate them.

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Others have been suddenly sent outside the country on prolonged missions. Close relatives of some in the military have taken part in activities of the Civic Crusade, and the families of the military are often exposed to the pressures generated by the protest movement.

Such indications point to the eventuality that some within the Panamanian Defense Forces will act, as other military have acted in the rest of Latin America, to produce changes within their institution and thus make democratization possible without widespread violence. Meanwhile, however, the Defense Forces under Noriega serve as a dam, containing the waters of discontent while they rise higher and higher.

VII

Given their accumulation over ten years, the three basic conditions which now challenge General Noriega's rule—namely, the civic movement for democratization, the vital economic interest in political change and the new critical attitudes in the international community, particularly in the United States—will not cease. On the contrary, their interaction multiplies the pressures.

If the intransigence of the Defense Forces continues, the prognosis is one of national disaster. Whether such a disaster will produce violence of the sort that has existed in some Central American countries is uncertain, given that Panama has been historically a nonconfrontational society. Civilian opposition has been neither led nor supported by Marxist-Leninist groups, with their known willingness and capacity for organized insurrectional endeavors. For these reasons such a development seems precluded, at least in the short run. But intense turmoil will continue, accompanied by more violent incidents, as has already been seen.

As national disaster becomes a reality rather than a predictable eventuality, the regime is becoming more intransigent and escalating its repression of the protest movement. If President Delvalle remains willing to provide token civilian cover, General Noriega will be able to maintain the pretense of constitutionality. If not, another coup d'état could occur, forcing Delvalle out, as happened with his two predecessors.

Could the regime, under General Noriega, revive the strategy of authoritarian democratization, preempting to some extent the demands of the civic movement? The movement's long gestation argues against such a possibility: Panama today is

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where it is precisely because General Noriega and what he represents cannot brook progress toward real democracy. The widespread distrust of the regime's key figures also precludes this possibility. General Noriega has said that he will retire after the "free" elections of 1989, but it is generally understood that if he manages to stay until then, he can remain for as long as he wants or retire to run the country through a commander in chief and a president of his own choosing.

Some U.S. observers imagine that President Delvalle could replace General Noriega and thus gain legitimate authority to lead Panama to democratic elections in 1989. This scenario overlooks the fundamental fact that Delvalle does not have the power to replace Noriega.

National disaster is not inevitable. The more professional military, especially those who do not consider themselves part of the activities of which General Noriega is accused, could move the Defense Forces toward changing their command and agreeing to a role compatible with civilian democracy. Some of these officers have studied recently in countries which have democratized successfully and may understand what a similar process can mean for the country and for themselves.

Certain conditions would favor such a positive turn of events. The present interaction among the Civic Crusade, the economic forces and the new international attitudes should be maintained; without these pressures, no transformation will take place. It is also important that a viable democratic alternative be proposed to the whole country and to the actors who have an important part in its future. An alternative has been proposed by the Christian Democratic Party, within the parameters agreed upon by the opposition democratic parties in their July manifesto. It encompasses three basic suggestions:

First, a call to the Panamanian Defense Forces to proceed to an institutional change in their command and take part in a joint civilian-military effort to design a new professional and constitutional role for their institution. This could include the creation of a Ministry of National Defense and Public Order to serve as the institutional link between the military and the president as head of state and supreme chief of the Defense Forces.

Second, the establishment of a three-member civilian junta to assure the rapid, peaceful transition toward a fully democratic government by way of general elections to be held, at the latest, within 18 months. Such a junta would integrate, in

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a spirit of national reconciliation, the three basic and diverse components of present-day Panama: the democratic opposition parties which won the 1984 elections and whose foremost leader is Dr. Arnulfo Arias Madrid; the Civic Crusade, which has been coordinating the main civic, professional and economic organizations of the country; and those in the present regime who accept the need for authentic democratization.

Third, once the commitment has been made to proceed with the institutional change in the military command, representatives of the aforementioned components of public life would draw up the specifics of the transitional government and its immediate tasks, which include reconstituting the key state offices, facing the socioeconomic and fiscal paralysis and preparing the country for orderly, democratic elections.

VIII

The people of Panama are living in great anxiety, but also with great hopes. The current attempt at participatory, peaceful democratization has convinced us that there is a Panamanian national will to create a democratic, just and sovereign society. Our efforts have brought a new understanding and some sympathy on the part of the international community. We hope to succeed in the only possible way, that is, under our own initiative. But we also hope that we can count, at long last, on the solidarity of democratic peoples and governments.

What we expect first is that the international community recognize General Noriega's regime for what it is: an antidemocratic, repressive and corrupt regime, which frustrates the Panamanian people's right to self-determination and which violates fundamental human and civil rights. The Civic Crusade should be recognized as expressing the wishes of the vast majority of the Panamanian people for a change in regime. Those who recognize these facts should act accordingly, withdrawing all forms of support from the present regime while respecting any binding treaty provisions, specifically those affecting Panama's sovereignty over the Panama Canal.

The people of Panama seek some additional commitments from the United States. The United States should give some concrete assurances of its determination to work with a democratic Panama, on the basis of mutual respect for the national interests of each, regardless of the differences in power. Specific commitments need to be made now, to be fulfilled once democracy has been effectively established in Panama. Most

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helpful would be an agreement to revise Law 96-70, which regulates implementation of the Torrijos-Carter treaties and which has imposed restrictive and even unfair conditions.

The second commitment would be to undertake the widening of the canal's Culebra Cut, which presently limits the canal's usefulness. The revenues received roughly balance the operating costs; these cannot be substantially altered. Thus the Canal Commission is unable by itself to assume financial responsibility for such an undertaking. Widening this part of the canal would be beneficial to all who use it, including the United States, and would also help reactivate Panama's economy.

From the peoples and governments of Latin America, Panamanians have some special expectations. Those who have enjoyed democracy for some years—and those who have recently recovered it—should not forget that they demanded and obtained international solidarity in their efforts to establish democracy and to consolidate it. Reasons of state or unwillingness to parallel U.S. policy do not excuse reticence or indifference when human rights and democracy are at stake.

Also, now that the Esquipulas II agreement among the Central American governments offers, for the first time, some hope for joint democratization and peace in that region, the democratic members of the Contadora Group and its Support Group should make it clear that the government of Panama cannot participate in the International Verification Commission meant to supervise compliance with the agreement's provisions while it violates these provisions with regard to its own people. The Latin American democracies need to strengthen the authority of Contadora, both to help make Esquipulas II work and to establish a positive precedent of a Latin American solution to a Latin American problem. Overlooking the contradiction which the Panamanian government represents weakens Contadora's authority at this crucial moment for the region and renders Latin America less responsible for itself.

We do not want others to do our job for us. We are doing it, and as Panamanians we are proud of that. But we do expect others to show solidarity. We need it and are not ashamed to say so, because no people is an island.

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George R. Packard

THE COMING U.S.-JAPAN CRISIS

Television viewers in Japan saw an extraordinary news broadcast on the morning of July 2, 1987: nine members of the U.S. Congress were smashing a small Toshiba radio with sledgehammers at a press conference on Capitol Hill. The congressmen were expressing their anger at the Toshiba Machine Company of Japan, which had violated regulations of COCOM, the Coordinating Committee for multilateral export controls, by selling eight computer-guided multiaxis milling machines to the Soviet Union. The equipment permitted the Soviets to mass-produce a more silent propeller for their submarines and thus avoid detection by many of the current U.S. methods. One Pentagon official estimated that it would cost the United States some $30 billion to regain the technological superiority lost in the illegal sale. The sledgehammer scene, which was largely ignored by the American media, was shown over and over again in Japan, to the point where it now lodges uneasily in the collective national consciousness.

The anger of the congressmen was understandable. From the facts then available (and neither the Japanese government nor Toshiba Corporation, parent of the Toshiba Machine Company, has denied them), the security breach was considerable, and possibly irreparable. As seen from Capitol Hill, an ungrateful Japan, still spending only about one percent of its GNP for defense, still protected by American forces and a U.S. defense budget which consumes about six percent of GNP, was aiding a potential adversary for profit.

But the event triggered far more complex emotions on both sides, and reflected growing mutual frustrations. For many American leaders, Japan was already guilty of running up a huge trade surplus through questionable tactics while keeping its own market largely closed to American products. Spectacular advances by Japanese engineers in a variety of high technology fields raised the specter of losses in one after another

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American industry, following the fate of such industries as steel, television, automobiles, machine tools and, most recently, certain kinds of semiconductors.

On the other hand, Japanese reactions included a mixture of shock, anger and embarrassment. A number of industry leaders expressed the view that the entire Japanese nation should not be held responsible for the sins of one private corporation. They noted that no Norwegian products had been smashed, even though a Norwegian state-controlled enterprise, Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk, had been judged equally guilty of violating the COCOM regulations. (In October 1987 the Norwegian government disclosed that Kongsberg had shipped more than 140 banned computers to the Soviet Union and had cooperated with companies based in France, Italy and West Germany to ship other high-tech equipment to the Russians during the past ten years. Still no Norwegian products were smashed on Capitol Hill.) Many Japanese believed the Americans were venting their frustration over their own inability to restore competitiveness and balance the federal budget. A variety of Japanese viewers found the televised spectacle to be unworthy of elected officials, and some suspected a U.S. conspiracy to hold back Japan's progress in high technology.

As if to fulfill Japan's suspicions, and vent its own wrath, the Senate approved by an overwhelming majority in late June a provision in the omnibus trade bill demanding compensation and banning Toshiba imports for two to five years. This action triggered an immediate reaction from American distributors of Toshiba products as well as a number of leading U.S. corporations, who argued that the ban could cause grave economic damage to the dozens of American companies which depend on Toshiba parts. It seemed clear by late autumn that the ban would be significantly watered down or removed altogether before the trade bill became law. But the emotions rubbed raw by the episode lingered on. Dealing with this crisis of confidence will be an immense challenge for Japan's newly chosen prime minister, Noboru Takeshita.

II

There is a volatility and an emotional quality to Japanese-American relations that is unique. At the turn of the century the Japanese were viewed sentimentally as America's favored protégés, a diligent, clean but backward island people who eagerly sought our scientific, technical and even moral insights.

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But almost overnight, after Japan sank the Russian fleet in 1905, it came to be regarded as part of the "yellow peril"—a threat to our new empire in the Pacific, a scheming predator with designs even on Mexico. In 1906 the San Francisco Board of Education excluded Japanese children from its regular schools, and Congress soon passed laws (aimed especially at Japanese) barring Orientals from immigrating to the United States. Racial hatred was never far from the surface along the long, dreary road to Pearl Harbor. It exploded with a vengeance in World War II.

From the postwar period to the early 1970s, Japanese were content once again to accept vast amounts of American culture, democracy and economic tutelage. Americans were pleased to view Japan once again as an eager, docile and nonthreatening ally in the Pacific.

Since the 1970s we have seen a gradual decline of trust, at least at the government level. As Japanese exports have poured into American markets, Japanese corporations have been accused of conducting "adversarial trade," targeting one American industry after another for destruction. For their part Japanese leaders have become privately critical of American weaknesses. The extraordinary friendship between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone tended to obscure the strong undercurrents of hostility within the higher levels of government and the private sectors on both sides.

Despite the hostility at this leadership level, at the grass roots Japanese and Americans continue to be fascinated with each other. As emotions have waxed and waned over the years, neither trade wars nor a shooting war have dampened the mutual enthusiasm for learning from each other at the grass roots. Japanese admire American creativity, optimism, openness, egalitarianism, self-confidence and enthusiasm for free enterprise. Americans are impressed with Japan's sense of history, aesthetics, reserve and, most recently, its managerial, scientific and technological genius, and its growing wealth.

There is, however, a continuing penchant among leaders on both sides of the Pacific to misunderstand and usually to underestimate each other. Woodrow Wilson dismissed Japanese requests for a racial equality clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations, though he had studied at Johns Hopkins University with Inazo Nitobe, Japan's great internationalist who later served as deputy secretary of the League of Nations

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from 1919 to 1926. Franklin D. Roosevelt turned down Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye's request for a meeting on the eve of World War II on the advice of the U.S. ambassador, Joseph Grew, who spent ten years in Tokyo without bothering to learn the Japanese language or to cultivate Japan's real leaders.

Japan's military leaders attacked Pearl Harbor in the conviction that Americans were too weak and preoccupied in Europe to fight back. Then in 1954 John Foster Dulles told a congressional committee that Japan lacked the skills to export much of anything to the United States, but might find a few markets in Southeast Asia. As for Japan, although Prime Minister Nakasone stood as an exception, most Japanese postwar government and business leaders have preferred to entrust direct contacts with American counterparts to a trained corps of "barbarian handlers."

In sum, only a tiny and fragile network of personal friendships cushions the shock of conflicting interests in the manner, for instance, that enables British and American leaders to settle their differences.

III

In 1987 one could observe this legacy at work. Japan, having risen from protected protégé to leading creditor nation of the world, challenged America's lead in technology and supplied an eager U.S. market with high-quality manufactured goods. The Japanese government announced a breathtaking trade surplus of $101 billion for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1987. Meanwhile, the American trade deficit climbed to an unprecedented $167 billion, of which nearly $58 billion was with Japan.

The U.S. Congress made trade legislation its highest priority and aimed several protectionist measures squarely at Japan. The 2,000-plus pages of the trade bill contained an enormous variety of measures aimed at protecting the domestic market and forcing open markets abroad. Some provisions sought to limit investment by other nations whose own economies were closed to U.S. investment. Reciprocity and "a level playing field" were the central themes. Congressman Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) anchored his presidential ambitions to an amendment aimed at forcing down Japan's trade surplus and limiting presidential discretion to negotiate. An appreciation of the yen versus the dollar by more than 60 percent since the September

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1985 Plaza Agreement on monetary exchange rates had failed to stem the rising tide of Japanese exports.

In March of this year Fujitsu Ltd. was discouraged from acquiring the Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation on competitive and national security grounds, although Fairchild was already in the hands of the French-owned company Schlumberger Ltd. In April President Reagan ordered the first trade sanctions against Japan since World War II—a 100-percent tariff against some $300 million worth of Japanese exports containing chips—in retaliation for Japan's alleged violation of a 1986 semiconductor agreement.

Even before the revelation of Toshiba Machine Company's illicit sales to the Soviet Union, the media on both sides became strident, even belligerent. Japanese charged that the American budget deficit lay at the heart of the problem. Why couldn't the president and Congress balance the budget and restore American industrial competitiveness instead of making scapegoats of the Japanese? The American media, while generally opposing protectionism, carried charges by U.S. business and government leaders that the Japanese were engaging in unfair trade practices, targeting U.S. industries for annihilation, dumping products in an open American market and closing the Japanese market to outsiders through a variety of nontariff barriers. "Japan-bashing" took on a new kind of respectability.

Two widely quoted articles captured the essence of American grievances. The late Theodore White, in an emotional *New York Times Magazine* article in July 1985, argued that a relentless Japanese economic juggernaut aimed at deindustrializing America was seeking to win the "War of the Pacific" through unfair economic tactics, having lost the opening battle of conventional military forces.[1]

More recently, Karel G. van Wolferen, a Dutch journalist, contended in an article in *Foreign Affairs* that the Japanese do not accept free enterprise and free trade as it is understood in the West, that the Japanese business-government alliance is out to "systematically undermine Western industries" through "adversarial trade," and that there is no political or decision-making center in Tokyo capable of shifting gears.[2]

Media criticism led to shifts in public opinion polls. A *New*

[1] "The Danger from Japan," July 28, 1985.
[2] "The Japan Problem," Winter 1986/87.

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York Times/CBS-Tokyo Broadcasting System survey taken in May 1987 showed that 55 percent of those Japanese polled viewed Japan-U.S. relations as "unfriendly," up dramatically from less than one third who held that view a year earlier. And a *Washington Post*/ABC poll taken the same month showed that 63 percent of Americans supported higher trade barriers, as against 49 percent in 1985. (Still, 77 percent of Americans viewed relations with Japan as "friendly.") Finally, and astoundingly, an *Asahi Shimbun* poll of April 1987 showed that the People's Republic of China was now the favorite foreign nation of the Japanese people, bumping the United States into second place for the first time since the Vietnam War days. Ironically, this fondness did not seem reciprocal; Chinese criticisms of Japan increased sharply in 1987.

What was new in all this was the suspicion both in Washington and Tokyo that the other nation was pursuing divergent goals for the first time since World War II. High-level officials in Washington have come to wonder whether Japan would again become a military rival in the Pacific. Officials in Tokyo worried that the West was once again ganging up on Japan—a worry that goes back at least as far as the Triple Intervention of 1897, when France, Russia and Germany pressured Japan into giving up a piece of Chinese territory it had won in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.

IV

Underlying the harsh rhetoric of the trade dispute is the often forgotten reality that the two nations are more tightly intertwined economically and militarily than ever before.

Export industries have led Japan's economic growth in the past decade. Japan depends on the American market to absorb nearly 40 percent of its exports, and this dependence will not change soon. Conversely, during the past five years of massive U.S. budget deficits, the flow of Japanese capital into U.S. Treasury bonds and corporate securities has kept U.S. interest rates low and sustained an economic recovery. The cumulative impact of Japanese investment in the United States has given Japan a huge stake in sustaining the value of its dollar investments and avoiding a serious U.S. recession that would decrease that value. In short, the Japanese need a healthy American economy as much as Americans do, and most Japanese government and industry leaders are quick to recognize this fact both publicly and privately.

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A commission chaired by the former governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruo Maekawa, offered a blueprint for structural reform of the Japanese economy that recognized this growing interdependence. The Maekawa report, issued in April 1986 and elaborated upon in April 1987, called for an urgent effort to stimulate domestic demand, reduce dependence on exports, cope with outrageously high land prices, improve housing, shorten working hours, spur competition in the distribution of rice, and lower trade barriers to other agricultural products—all within two to three years. The report recommended that taxes be reduced, imports of manufactured goods increased, foreign investment in Japan encouraged, remaining trade barriers reduced, and domestic capital markets liberalized. The government of Japan was urged to play a greater role in resolving the Third World debt crisis, furnish more overseas development assistance and increase imports from the less developed countries.

While skeptics inside and outside Japan tended to dismiss the Maekawa report as more of the same old empty promises, the truth was that important elements of Japan's ruling elite had recognized that Japan's mercantilist policies could not continue without disrupting the entire system of free trade on which Japan's prosperity depends. Whether these elements would ultimately prevail hung in the balance in the autumn of 1987. Clearly Japan has entered a great national debate. So far, at least, a general consensus is moving toward acceptance of the Maekawa recommendations. The greatest danger is that a new surge of nationalism, stimulated by Japan-bashing from abroad, could block the forces of healthy change.

Opening Japan's markets will cause more than the usual amount of pain. The obvious place to begin is in the agricultural sector. Japan has protected its inefficient farmers to the point where Japanese consumers must pay five or six times the world price for rice and three or four times the American price for beef. The system perpetuates itself, first, because successive Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governments have relied on the farm vote and still do—although to a lesser extent now than in earlier years. Second, Japanese have revered for centuries the ideal of farming and the culture of rice. Even today most urban Japanese maintain close ties with relatives in some remote rural area, and many formal ceremonies involve rice wine (sake), rice paper, rice straw or baskets. Finally, the outside world has always seemed alien, hostile or even threatening,

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which has created an age-old disposition among Japanese to avoid dependence on any foreign power for such basics as food.

A number of leading opinion-makers in Japan, such as commentator and author Kenichi Omae, have recently come forward with land reform plans aimed at turning rice paddies into housing developments. Farmers would lose their low-property-tax status and would be forced from the cultivation of fields in the urban and suburban areas. Land prices, which have skyrocketed in the past several years, would ease downward. Credit would flow to home-builders and buyers, who would quickly seize the chance to escape from their cramped apartments. The resulting boom in construction, home appliance sales, suburban infrastructure and leisure activities could fuel a new era of growth that would be less dependent on exports and might even increase imports.

All of this will probably come to pass, but the process will be slow and painful, and the results will not greatly ameliorate U.S.-Japan trade relations within the next five years, when the danger of combustion is the greatest. In any event, it is certain that Japan will never entirely abandon its farming. Imports of California rice will be grudging and incremental.

V

Despite trade frictions the U.S.-Japan military relationship is working better than at any time since the revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security took effect in 1960. Japan still views the Soviet threat more calmly than the United States, but it has taken substantial steps to build up its defensive capabilities and to integrate its forces with those of the United States.

There are still critics in Congress and the Pentagon who argue that Japan is not doing its fair share. The Nakasone cabinet breached the self-imposed one-percent-of-GNP limit on defense spending set ten years earlier by another conservative cabinet (but not by much; in the current budget year defense spending will amount to 1.004 percent of GNP). This will presumably remove some of the political and psychological restraints against even greater defense spending. But Japanese leaders were shocked by harsh criticism from China over this step, and they continue to face strong domestic opposition to a more rapid military buildup. Thus it seems clear that American advocates of faster Japanese rearmament will be disappointed for some years to come.

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An astonishing episode, however, may give these same critics second thoughts about the wisdom of pushing the Japanese defense capabilities. Having urged the Japanese since 1953 to ignore Article IX of their own constitution, which prohibits the maintenance of offensive war-waging potential, the Pentagon was greatly disturbed to learn that the Japanese in early 1987 were considering a plan to design and build their own jet fighter, the FSX, for the 1990s. This sent shockwaves through the American aerospace industry, which correctly viewed the plan as an effort by Japan to build up a more competitive aircraft industry. It also signaled the coming of age of a significant new military-industrial complex in Japan that would exert a great deal of clout over domestic and foreign policy in the years ahead.

From the time of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's visit to Tokyo in June 1987 until last October, the issue was argued behind the scenes among Japanese politicians and business leaders. None of them doubted Japan's ability to make a better fighter plane than any that could be produced in American industry, though the unit cost might be higher. All of them agreed on the economic and political benefits of developing Japan's independent aerospace industry. And most of them viewed the issue as one of national pride: Japan should move forward in every area of high technology, regardless of American displeasure. Weren't the Americans again trying to hold down Japanese technological progress on all fronts?

It took the Toshiba incident and the pending American trade legislation to induce Prime Minister Nakasone and Defense Agency Minister Yuko Kurihara to stand up to the forces of "techno-nationalism" in Tokyo. After much agonizing and quiet pressure from Washington, Minister Kurihara announced on October 2, 1987, that Japan would use either the General Dynamics Corporation's F-16 or the McDonnell Douglas Corporation's F-15 as the basic model, with some modifications, for 100 aircraft to be used in the 1990s. While the plane will be built largely in Japan, the licensing agreement will ensure that at least $1 billion and several thousand jobs come to the United States. Later in October Japan appeared to have chosen to produce 130 F-16 aircraft under license from General Dynamics.

It was significant that Senator John Danforth (R-Mo.), a leading advocate of tougher trade measures against Japan, also hails from the state which is home to both McDonnell Douglas

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and General Dynamics. The Japanese understood, correctly, that a decision to go it alone would have produced a firestorm on Capitol Hill. They would have been charged with exacerbating the U.S. trade deficit. The political and military alliance would have become hopelessly entangled with economic questions. The forces for Japan-bashing would have been strengthened, and the Toshiba sanctions would almost certainly have become law.

The whole Toshiba-FSX affair may in the end produce two perversely beneficial results. First, to ward off further sanctions against Toshiba, Defense Minister Kurihara also announced on October 2 a new research program intended to improve both nations' ability to detect submarines, as well as a Defense Agency plan to take other long-overdue steps to build up its antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Second, the episode may bring new caution to those who have been pushing Japan to do more rearming. It should now be clear to them that there are forces in Japan ready and willing to go much farther and faster down the road to an independent military force—with or without U.S. approval. Prime Minister Takeshita could be more responsive to their pressure.

With its massive economic strength, Japan should most certainly do more to defend the security arrangements from which it has benefited. By every lesson of history and common sense, however, its contribution should come in the form of development assistance to nations of critical importance in the strategic balance. The good news is that Japan has been moving steadily in this direction. The bad news is that the movement has always been too little and too late, and always in response to American pressure.

It is still true, nevertheless, that the U.S.-Japan security treaty is working better today than ever before. As further evidence of the growing military interdependence of the two nations, the Pentagon has requested, and since 1985 Japan has agreed to transfer, certain dual-use technologies—the first such transfer of Asian military technology to a Western power in recent memory. We can expect that Japan will develop new technologies which will be of interest to the United States, including those flowing from its participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative. Mr. Nakasone considerably broadened the interpretation of Article IX when he declared in September in the Diet that Japanese minesweepers could legally operate in the Persian Gulf.

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VI

Despite these objective conditions—or perhaps to some extent *because* neither side can see a happy way out of depending on the other—the American-Japanese dialogue has become increasingly acrimonious. For Japanese leaders, America has become a clumsy ally—almost an embarrassment. The president and Congress seem unable to balance the budget. This, plus a general loss of competitiveness, has led to the huge American trade deficits and the dramatic stock market declines of October. American politicians once again became mired in a Watergate-like scandal in the Iran-contra affair. One after another candidate on the Democratic side is wounded or eliminated by affairs that seem inscrutable. Meanwhile, Japan serves as scapegoat. "What is wrong with making good products?" an official protested privately last summer. "Nobody is forcing the American people to buy our goods."

As Japan's prosperity grows, albeit at a pace slower than in the 1970s, as its cities and rural areas flourish, Japanese leaders who visit the United States see its urban squalor, bankrupt farmers, shoddy transportation systems and its widespread problems of crime, drugs and racial animosity, and tend to believe that the United States is finished as a great power. Prime Minister Nakasone's remark of September 1986, that America's racial minorities tend to keep its educational level low, reflected a widely held but normally unstated view among Japanese leaders.

Japanese leaders look over their shoulders and see South Korea and other newly industrialized countries challenging them and forcing them into higher value-added advanced technology industries. For centuries Japanese leaders have felt vulnerable to external shocks, from tsunami and earthquakes to Commodore Matthew Perry's Black Ships and atomic weapons. They have devised various ways of coping with insecurity, including playing on their isolation and insularity and exalting the superiority of certain national characteristics.

As recently as in the 1930s and during World War II the Japanese people were told they were a divine race, descended from the Sun Goddess, possessed of a unique purity and virtue. It should not be forgotten that all of Japan's leaders who are over 55 today were formally educated to accept this myth, though most educated Japanese did not.

The national virtue currently being exalted is Japan's genius

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for high technology and its progress toward a new utopia—an Information Society. Japan will make its mark, assure itself of security and prosperity, and give vent to its special kind of nationalism by being first on the frontiers of science and technology. Yet everywhere they look, long shadows play upon the success of the Japanese. Protectionism threatens to close markets abroad. Warfare in the Persian Gulf threatens their oil supply, on which all else depends. And at home demands are growing that Japan's newly acquired wealth should be more widely shared among ordinary citizens. Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer believes Japan has fostered "unhealthy economic growth." "Among the developed countries," he wrote to me recently, "Japan stands out as the worst example of poor housing, poor public facilities such as sewage disposal, hospitals, school buildings, parks, roads and space for amusements." Japan's leaders are coming belatedly to the realization that wrenching change lies ahead. A great national debate is raging beneath the surface, not about whether change will come, but rather about how and when it will come and how it will be managed.

Japanese opinion leaders and decision-makers are tending in this debate toward the old error of underestimating American vitality and resilience. If dependence on America hurts their national pride, they are also frustrated by the lack of attractive alternatives. To abandon the security treaty with the United States would require unacceptably high defense costs—and a crippling domestic struggle over whether to possess nuclear weapons. It might also result in a loss of U.S. market share and severe restrictions on future direct and indirect investments in the United States. There is a Soviet card to play, but Japanese leaders long ago weighed the advantages of joining in the development of Siberia, with its possibilities for investment, exports, access to raw materials and profits from joint enterprises, and concluded that partnership with the United States was safer, more profitable and more congenial in general than dealing with the Soviets, who have ever appeared threatening and untrustworthy.

The resulting paralysis will not come from any lack of central organs of government which can recognize what is good for Japan and bear ultimate responsibility for national decision-making, as Mr. van Wolferen suggested in his *Foreign Affairs* article. On the contrary, since World War II the Japanese have demonstrated in crises an extraordinary capacity to set a na-

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tional course based on achievable goals and take whatever action was required to follow it. Their decision to shift abruptly from encouraging population growth before the end of World War II to discouraging such growth at the end of the war was taken at the highest levels of government and propagated efficiently, resulting in an almost immediate decline in the birthrate.

Similarly, as shown in a recent Harvard Business School study,[3] Japanese government and business leaders adopted a well-planned economic strategy in the 1950s aimed at raising Japan's standard of living to that of Europe and America through intensive and carefully staged employment of capital and technology. Japan entered into a revised security treaty with the United States in 1960 despite massive protests in the streets of Tokyo. In 1979–80, after the second oil shock, it joined with other Western nations to attempt to limit OPEC's power. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, Japan, unlike most U.S. allies, joined in a boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

Decisions are made differently in Japan, through seemingly endless discussions, meetings, reports and exchanges ending in consensus. Yet this should not blind us to the fact that rational decisions have been made on the basis of both extraordinary vision and common sense and, further, that implementation can be extraordinarily rapid once consensus has been achieved. To contend, as Mr. van Wolferen does, that Japan "has no top" is to miss the point entirely.[4] The "top" in an advanced democracy, whether Japan, the United States or Western Europe, is where you find it in any given political season.

Rather, the problem today is that Japan's foreign economic policy has been far too successful. Now it must change. Japan cannot continue to protect its home market while piling up record surpluses year after year. The current dilemma is that the internationalists such as Mr. Nakasone and Haruo Maekawa are attempting to convince a highly successful democracy that it must voluntarily change the very strategies that have led to unprecedented prosperity. What politician will have the courage to openly come out for policies that would ruin Japan's traditional farming communities, destroy leading exporters,

[3] Thomas K. McCraw, *America Versus Japan*, Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1986.

[4] van Wolferen, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

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allow foreign corporations to own a portion of its most technologically advanced industries, or let foreign banks influence interest rates? What business leader will stand up and say that Japan's current export-led consumption and spending spree must yield to slower growth? Merely to ask these questions is to point to the unlikelihood that change will come soon or easily.

On the other hand, few nations have managed wrenching change as well as Japan over the past century, and many signs suggest that the Japanese are once again girding themselves for a new era. The challenge facing both America and Japan is to manage the coming change without reviving an unhealthy Japanese nationalism that could destroy a mutually beneficial economic and security relationship. American diplomacy must exert steady, quiet pressure aimed at supporting Japan's internationalists and avoiding the kind of emotional bashing that strengthens the nationalists.

VII

If one examines closely the existing governmental agencies for managing the U.S.-Japan relationship, the situation appears nearly hopeless.

In Washington it is hard to discover a "Japan policy." There is no part of the executive branch whose mission it is to oversee all aspects of the relationship. The State and Defense Departments, which in the 1960s exerted dominant influence in creating political and military policies toward Japan, have seen their power eroded by new claims from Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative as economic issues have risen to the fore. Today a welter of intergovernmental working groups, task forces and coordinating bodies share bits of the action, but no one department or agency can be said to be in charge.

To this disarray one must add the growing power and interest of Congress or, more precisely, of individual members, committees and staff members concerned with particular aspects of the relationship, such as protecting an industry against Japanese imports or gaining access to the Japanese market for a constituent. To the mix must also be added an ever-increasing army of lobbyists and special interest groups, some representing Japanese interests and some working for American corporations. These lobbyists often turn out to be former officials from the very U.S. government agencies they are now trying to

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influence. It has even been charged by some congressional staff members that current U.S. government officials lean one way or another on issues in hopes of jumping subsequently to a lucrative lobbying position with one of the special interest groups.

None of this is particularly new to Washington nor unique to the U.S.-Japan relationship, but the result of all the tugging and pulling is that U.S. behavior toward Japan is eccentric, episodic and devoid of any long-term vision of where this important relationship should be headed and how it will get there. Japanese negotiators have learned to wait patiently until today's issue gives way to tomorrow's. They cannot be blamed for failing to understand or act upon American priorities, for no one can say at any moment what these priorities are.

One might argue that wiser leadership and better management could bring order from this chaos. Indeed it is possible to cite other relationships where sound policy and effective diplomacy have combined to advance the U.S. national interest in spectacular ways, such as in the Nixon-Kissinger reopening of relations with the People's Republic of China. In Washington's China policy, as in its Soviet policy, there is, for better or worse, a conceptual framework within which specific policies can be developed. Americans who specialize in Chinese or Soviet affairs generally have a voice in policy formulation. There is also a widely shared presumption that serious U.S. national interests are at stake.

None of this is true for Washington's Japan policy. No referee oversees the tug-of-war politics among competing agencies and interest groups. No one seems able to draw conclusions about the proper balance between Japan as a trusted ally in East Asia and Japan as a tough economic competitor. Japan specialists, with occasional exceptions, are not considered a vital part of the policymaking process, and are sometimes excluded entirely on the grounds that they may be too sympathetic toward Japan. The economic issues have become so complex in any case that no specialist can be expert in all matters ranging from soybeans to semiconductors. Yet our relations with Japan are at least as important as those with China and the Soviet Union.

The Japanese government, with fewer personnel in the relevant agencies and fewer bureaucrats in the decision-making process, is better equipped to negotiate complex issues and manage the relationship according to an overall strategy. The

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Finance Ministry, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Foreign Ministry all have well-trained and competent America specialists who tend to remain longer or return more often to the same issues, giving Tokyo a major advantage in international knowledge and expertise. It is doubtful that any politician—even a prime minister—could assert a special interest over the general national interest as defined by senior bureaucrats in these ministries.

Yet Tokyo will find it increasingly difficult to resolve economic issues with the United States for a different set of reasons. First, many senior bureaucrats are wedded to outdated policies under which Japan must forever concentrate on exporting manufactured goods, even though these exports produce a flood of protectionist measures in Japan's best overseas markets.

Second, to the extent that Liberal Democratic Party members are gradually entering into policymaking roles, evidence so far suggests they will represent single-interest groups in their constituencies rather than Japan's national interest, and that these interests overwhelmingly favor an untenable status quo. And Japan today lacks a cadre of *genro* (senior statesmen) who can successfully assert the national interest over various special interest groups.

Third, Prime Minister Takeshita, though equally committed to maintaining the U.S.-Japan partnership, is a far more cautious politician than Mr. Nakasone. The former finance minister's strength lies in his long experience in domestic political manuevering. The fact that he leads the largest LDP faction in the Diet will encourage Americans to expect quick reforms in Japan. Barring some new "shock" to Japan's economy, however, it is likely that he will move so slowly in forming a consensus that American policymakers and politicians will find fresh cause for outrage.

Fourth, Japan is already challenging the United States with a major new drive toward creativity and leadership in advanced technology. This drive is neither sinister nor secret. MITI announced as long ago as 1980 its plan to create a series of 19 "Silicon Valleys"—to be known as "technopolises"—throughout 16 prefectures of Japan. This bold public-private initiative will bring together new, advanced-technology plants in industrial parks with universities and the needed infrastructure of airports, roads and recreational facilities. All of this is based on the premise that Japan has largely caught up with Western

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science and technology and that any new advances must come from the creative genius of the Japanese people themselves. The government is also considering ways to reform the Japanese education system from top to bottom to foster greater creativity.

Given Japan's record to date, it would be foolish to doubt that this strategy will result in spectacular advances and growing supremacy in a variety of fields such as industrial ceramics, lasers, semiconductors, biotechnology, solar energy, robotics, superconductors and possibly in space exploration. These advances, in turn, will be largely used in consumer products and will lead to *increasing* exports, rising "techno-nationalism," and deepening fears among Americans that we can no longer compete. Japanese bureaucrats and politicians will be sorely tempted to seek new avenues for national advancement. American officials will find it harder than ever to ward off self-defeating protectionist measures. The media will have a field day publishing the charges and countercharges of angry politicians. Public opinion in both nations could take an ugly turn. Traditional diplomacy will fail.

VIII

Trade issues are inherently boring or incomprehensible to most senior policymakers, who would much rather deal with grand strategy than beef or semiconductors. This situation allows the dialogue between the United States and Japan to be dominated by a cacaphony of those lawyers, lobbyists and businessmen who have a direct personal stake in the outcome of legislation that will never become known even to those Americans generally knowledgeable about international affairs. It is for this reason that traditional bureaucratic and diplomatic methods cannot solve our current crisis with Japan.

Instead of leaving economic problems to the politicians, bureaucrats, lobbyists and media on both sides, consideration should be given to the establishment of a permanent "Wisemen's Commission" of four or five experienced statesmen on each side. The idea is not new, but the current tensions give it a new urgency.

The commissioners would meet once a month and direct a permanent staff to get the facts and recommend fair solutions. Commissioners would include, but not be limited to, individuals with experience in Japanese-American affairs. They would represent a broad cross-section of each nation with represen-

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tatives of the interests of business and labor, agriculture, science and technology, education and culture, and would include women and minorities. They would vote as individuals from the private sector rather than as government delegates. Unlike the previous two Wisemen's Commissions under Presidents Carter and Reagan, which had only short lifetimes of 18 months, the fact that this commission would be permanent could result in more follow-through and oversight. The two governments could, of course, ignore the commission's recommendations, but only at a cost. The media could be counted on to publicize those recommendations for dispute resolution that were deemed "fair" by respected private-sector individuals in each country.

The commissioners should have five-year renewable terms and a skilled permanent staff able to deal with language, cultural, economic and technological problems. Let each government pay up to half the expenses of the commission, with the private sector paying the other half on each side. Let each government agree in advance to accept the findings of the commission and, in specific instances, let it mediate trade disputes. In this way issues could be settled in an atmosphere which is free from emotional nationalism, where the facts are not in dispute, and in accordance with the overriding interest of each nation in maintaining a cooperative relationship.

All kinds of objections would immediately arise: it will be hard to find truly wise individuals who are acceptable to both sides; other nations would view this as exclusive binationalism, a roadblock to multilateral freedom of trade. Politicians in both countries would cry out against allowing national decisions to come under the influence of an international body. Bureaucrats would correctly see this as a curb on their power and would fight tooth and nail against it.

But wise and decisive leadership on each side could prevail. A future U.S. president and Japanese prime minister could use the Wisemen's Commission as a building block toward freer international trade. It could defuse protectionist sentiment and relieve congressmen and Diet members of the burden of making unpopular decisions. It could be an inclusive body, aimed at eventually bringing others such as Canada or the United Kingdom into the arrangement.

The commission would recognize that the sum of all the special interest groups on each side of the Pacific is not equivalent to the national interest of either country, that the special

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interest groups may legitimately pursue their profits and loudly lobby their legislatures, but that transcending goals must prevail. Harmonious relations between the United States and Japan are, and will be in the future, in the vital interests of both democracies. Or, to put it the other way around, a breach leading to open hostility would undermine the entire balance-of-power system which has brought, and continues to bring, stability and dramatic economic growth to East Asia in the postwar era. It would be irrational for each nation to risk such a course, but rationality has not been our hallmark over the past century.

The commission could be charged with the task of developing a plan for complete freedom of trade between the United States and Japan by the end of the next decade, along the lines of the free trade agreement reached by the United States and Canada in October 1987. It could save thousands of hours of bureaucratic bickering every day and allow leaders on both sides to work toward grander visions. They would address the basic insecurities and vulnerabilities of each nation and try to find long-range solutions to these questions. Obviously its work would ultimately require the approval of both governments through their normal processes. But the negotiations aimed at reaching intergovernmental accords could be conducted by the "wisemen" in an atmosphere free of emotion and lobbying by special interests, since the negotiators would have neither bureaucratic turf to defend nor an election to face every two years.

Both Japan and America entertain serious doubts about their national security over the long run. Japan worries about access to food, oil and other raw materials; America worries about the Japanese threat to its high-tech industries. The Wisemen's Commission could be charged with drawing up plans for a "mutual economic security treaty" between the United States and Japan. In such a treaty, Japan would be guaranteed access to American (including Alaskan) oil, food and raw materials. The United States would be guaranteed access to Japan's leading-edge technologies and markets through licensing, direct investment, joint enterprises and a variety of other means. If such a treaty could provide freedom from anxieties and paranoia, the entire relationship could move away from the prevailing acrimony toward closer collaboration.

If all this sounds visionary and difficult to implement, consider the alternative. The U.S. bilateral deficit with Japan

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would continue to grow, leading to further calls for protectionist legislation. This, in turn, would lead to retaliation, recrimination and a search for different partnerships. Each side would seek to gain technological superiority in a zero-sum game. Industrial espionage would run rampant. Japan would turn toward markets and raw materials from the Chinese and Soviets. Japan would find it necessary to protect a widening economic sphere in Asia and the Pacific, placing it in direct confrontation with the United States and upsetting the balance of power.

No rational person would hope for such an outcome. But that is where we are headed today in the absence of a serious decision by leaders on both sides to change course. The scheme above is ambitious and unprecedented, but so are the size and interdependence of our two economies. No lesser goal can be worthy of the two leading democracies of the world than to resolve their differences and discharge the responsibilities toward the entire planet which greatness has thrust upon them. They must face together the problem of their mutual success—lest they be destroyed by it.

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Donald K. Emmerson

INVISIBLE INDONESIA

Southeast Asia has been a costly reminder to Americans that the significance of a country and the attention it receives are separate matters. In the 1960s American commitments, losses and protests greatly inflated the importance of South Vietnam to the United States. Illustrating the opposite distortion in the 1980s is Indonesia, a vast and resource-rich archipelago that remains unknown to most Americans.

Indonesia's visibility will increase in the years to come. Not because of prolonged headline-generating instability: Indonesia is not a Philippines in the making. Not because of rapid economic growth: Indonesia is less likely than Thailand or Malaysia to become, after Singapore, the second successfully industrializing Southeast Asian country. And not because of big-power ambitions: although it aspires to the status of a major power and occasionally feels constrained by the need to cooperate with its smaller neighbors, Indonesia is not preparing to abandon or override the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

What will make Indonesia better known is its success or failure in selecting someone to replace General Suharto, who has been president for nearly two decades and whose mandate is scheduled for another five-year renewal in March 1988. Indonesia must also adjust to the end of the OPEC-driven joyride in oil and gas, Indonesia's main exports, whose slack prices have forced the government to devalue the rupiah, cut domestic spending and add to its already substantial burden of foreign debt. Meanwhile, autonomist groups in East Timor and Irian Jaya, regions that were coerced into joining Indonesia, and fundamentalist Muslims, who resent living in a heterodox society under a non-Islamic state, are testing the ability of the central government to implement the national motto, "Unity in Diversity."

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The New Order, as Suharto's regime has been called, retains considerable resources. Not least among these are the president's own political skills and the proficiency and reputation of the technocrats on whom he relies for economic advice. A political format resilient enough to have lasted two decades has a good chance of surviving for another two. All the more reason to pay attention to this important but little-known country, in order to understand in advance the political and economic transitions it is preparing to undergo. That understanding can, in turn, lessen the chance of an inappropriate response should events in Jakarta put Washington on the spot.

II

If in the creation of a regime one can read a scenario for its future replacement, what happened in 1965–66 when Suharto took power from Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, augurs ill for the serenity of the next succession. Within the army an attempted coup was reversed and used to justify a massive countercoup that left hundreds of thousands of leftists dead or detained. Because it capped a history of instability and showed what damage intramilitary violence could do, the birth trauma of the New Order warrants review.

The trauma began in Jakarta early on October 1, 1965. Six high-ranking anti-communist generals, including the army commander, were seized and killed at the behest of dissident officers acting in a degree of concert with the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Ostensibly led by an army lieutenant colonel named Untung, the conspirators seized the Jakarta radio station and broadcast an indictment of their superiors, one that could be repeated by future coup-makers against the present military regime if it is not careful.

"Power-mad generals," said the rebel announcer, quoting Untung, "have neglected the lot of their men." They "have lived in luxury, . . . insulted our women and wasted government funds." They "must be kicked out of the army and punished." "The army is not for generals," Untung continued; it belongs to "all the soldiers" who are "loyal to the ideals of the revolution of August 1945."[1]

August 17, 1945, is *the* sacred date in Indonesian nationalist history, when Sukarno proclaimed the independence of the

[1] "Initial Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Untung," in *Indonesia*, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, no. 1, April 1966, p. 135.

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republic. On the next day he became its first president, and for the next five years he would lead what became known as the "1945 revolution"—a chaotic series of military and political campaigns, interspersed with negotiations, aimed at stopping the Dutch from reacquiring their former colony from the defeated Japanese.

In 1948 in the city of Madiun on Java, the densely populated and politically pivotal island where some three-fifths of all Indonesians live, a revolt brewed within this revolution. Leftist Indonesian forces occupied the city and its radio station and broadcast denunciations of the leadership of the republic. The militants were especially angered by the plans of officers with backgrounds in the Dutch colonial army, notably a divisional commander named Abdul Haris Nasution, to rationalize and professionalize the republican armed forces. The leftists viewed such officers with suspicion as elitists who might be scheming with the Dutch to demobilize and disband the revolution's true protagonists—young, radical and anti-capitalist.

For most of the top leaders of the PKI, who had not participated in the uprising, the coup d'état in Madiun created a painful choice: to side with Sukarno and betray their party's own left wing or to back the rebels and betray the republic. Already too deeply committed, the party joined the uprising and was severely beaten. Nasution's division recaptured the city, killing many Communists in battle, executing others after capture and purging leftist dissidents from the army.

With moderates more firmly in control of the fledgling republic, the United States could support it more readily. Their own anticolonial history and their growing conviction that the Dutch could not win militarily were additional reasons for the Americans to favor negotiations toward Indonesian independence. Holland eventually ceded all of its ex-colony save the western half of New Guinea. No longer seriously contested from the outside, a unitary Republic of Indonesia was established on August 17, 1950, with Sukarno still in charge.

Over the next 15 years the Indonesian government tried and abandoned parliamentary democracy, put down religious and regional challenges to central authority, and finally moved leftward, propelled by Sukarno's increasingly strident brand of nationalism and the recovery and growth of the PKI into the world's third largest communist party.

By 1964–65 Sukarno's regime was in full disarray: radical posturing and political instability reinforced diplomatic isola-

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tion, and all three accelerated economic decline. Abroad, Indonesia renounced Western aid, walked out of the United Nations, withdrew from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and lined up with Maoist China on an axis from Jakarta to Beijing. At home, production fell and inflation rose. When Java was hit by famine and Western observers predicted still worse times ahead for the economy, Sukarno shouted at them in English over national radio, "Go to hell!" In the same speech he pictured his political enemies eagerly awaiting his death in order to take his place. It seems clear from the context that he had in mind the chance of an anti-communist military coup.

In August 1965 Sukarno fell ill. Rumors circulated that he might die. If he did, who would fill the vacuum? Left and right worried lest the other side move first.

In what purported to be a preemptive strike to protect Sukarno from a military coup of the kind he had alluded to, Untung's group moved first, on October 1. The coup-makers claimed to have cleansed the army of counterrevolutionary generals who had been plotting, with help from the American CIA, to overthrow the president. A "Revolutionary Council" was announced and given supreme authority over the nation. Of the council's 45 ostensible members (many of whom had not been consulted), half were military officers, including the chairman and vice chairmen; only four were civilian members of the PKI. Reinforcing the junior-against-senior-officer theme, Lieutenant Colonel Untung declared that henceforth the highest rank in the armed forces would be his own, and that all enlisted men and noncommissioned officers throughout the military who were willing to support his movement would be promoted one rank—two ranks for those who had actually participated in that morning's "purge" of the generals.

Untung got no further. It was General Suharto's turn to move. He rallied the army, neutralized dissident troops, blamed the Communists, banned their party, hunted them down, dismissed the cabinet and isolated Sukarno. By ridding it of leftists and Sukarnoists, Suharto revamped the People's Consultative Assembly, empowered by the constitution to elect the president. The body that had named Sukarno "president for life" in 1963 replaced him with Suharto as acting president in 1967 and as full president the following year. Sukarno died powerless in 1970.

Outside Indonesia there is a widespread misperception that

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most of the hundreds of thousands killed in the violence of 1965–66 were ethnic Chinese. A more plausible estimate is that among those who died the Chinese were underrepresented compared with their already small (three percent) share of the population. But the anti-communism of the times encouraged some Muslim hotheads to dust off the old stereotype of the Chinese as wealthy, disloyal infidels—an explosive image fusing class, national and religious prejudices. In cities and towns mobs hounded and killed Chinese, looting their shops and homes. Rumors spread that China had known in advance of Untung's coup plans and had smuggled weapons into Indonesia to help him succeed. A series of attacks on the Chinese embassy in Jakarta led in 1967 to a suspension of diplomatic relations with Beijing that remains in effect today.

Analysts still disagree over where to locate the "true" source of Untung's conspiracy: within the armed forces or within the PKI. Who was the instigator, who the scapegoat? Less plausibly, responsibility for what happened on October 1, 1965, has been assigned to Sukarno, the CIA and even Suharto himself. But if the prologue to the affair remains in doubt, its consequences do not. Suharto's countercoup laid the basis of an authoritarian regime led by officers and technocrats preoccupied with political stability and economic growth and willing to work with the West. Suharto and the economy settled down to business, and both did well. The routine workings of stability and growth that made American business and government elites favor Indonesia caused Western news media to lose interest for lack of a story.

III

The annexation of formerly Portuguese East Timor in 1975–76 was only a partial exception to the rule of Indonesian invisibility.

The facts of the affair were harrowing enough: in August 1975 in a brief war between moderate and radical nationalist East Timorese, several thousand died. The Portuguese withdrew and the radicals prevailed. The Indonesians, having given notice that they would not tolerate an independent, leftist half-island state inside their own archipelago, rallied the defeated moderates, sponsored a political party advocating integration with Indonesia, and applied military pressure. In November 1975 radicals tried to create a legal fait accompli by proclaiming the Democratic Republic of East Timor and appealing for

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international recognition. In December the Indonesians invaded by land, sea and air, and they made the territory their 27th province the following year. The radicals took to the hills to start a guerrilla war that still goes on.

The fighting, and especially the famine and disease bred by it, may have reduced by a third or more the 650,000 people who lived in East Timor before the invasion. Yet in relation to its scale the tragedy occupied little American television time or press space. U.S. media in 1975–76 were preoccupied with the fall of Indochina and the flight of its refugees.

As for Washington, realpolitik dictated that it look the other way. In retrospect, before its annexation by Jakarta, East Timor was a small, doomed anachronism—comparable to Goa before New Delhi swallowed that Portuguese enclave in 1961. As Henry Kissinger observed in 1975, Washington had "enough problems of greater importance" elsewhere not to make an issue of East Timor.[2] In Washington's eyes the half-island was in any case better governed by Indonesia than by a leftist "democratic republic." Nor did Jakarta's policy of denying or managing the access of foreign journalists to East Timor facilitate exposure of what was going on.

More obscure still is what Australian journalist Robin Osborne has called "Indonesia's secret war" in Irian Jaya,[3] the province of eastern Indonesia that western New Guinea became. Compared with what happened in East Timor, the fighting in Irian Jaya has been more sporadic, less intense and spread out over a longer period. At the heart of the unrest lie grievances of the indigenous Papuans against Indonesian rule.

Although militarily East Timor has been more of a problem to Jakarta than Irian Jaya, the latter holds greater potential for future trouble. While the land border of East Timor makes counterinsurgency easier by enabling Indonesian troops to enter from their own soil, Irian Jaya's much longer land boundary facilitates insurrection. Unlike their Timorese counterparts, refugees by land from Irian Jaya find themselves in another country, Papua New Guinea, where someday they may be able to create bases in support of anti-Jakarta guerrillas on the Indonesian side, especially should a future government in Port Moresby decide to support their aims.

[2] Cited in "The Obscure Tragedy of Timor," *The Wilson Quarterly*, Spring 1981, p. 130.
[3] Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985.

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

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The line through New Guinea splits a loosely "Melanesian" zone overlapping Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. The geographic, demographic and linguistic barriers to creating a pan-Melanesian identity are enormous. Scattered across a swath of Pacific waters, from eastern Indonesia through the Solomons and Vanuatu to Fiji and New Caledonia, the Melanesians—broadly defined—account for less than one tenth of one percent of the world's population yet speak as many as a fourth of the world's languages. Some 800 distinct languages are spoken on the island of New Guinea alone.

Irian Jaya's mountainous terrain favors guerrilla operations, but it inhibits the growth of a transtribal "West Papuan" identity, let alone a New Guinea-wide Papuan or transinsular Melanesian one, needed to popularize the revolt. The leaders of Papua New Guinea have not been eager to antagonize their giant neighbor or to cultivate a refugee-based insurgency that could grow out of control. If they are not checked, however, Indonesian repression and maltreatment—including Javanese feelings of superiority over a less "civilized" population—could broaden the base of Papuan resistance. A pan-ethnic identity need be no less deeply felt for having modern-political rather than traditional-cultural origins.

Anti-Javanese sentiments in Irian Jaya should also be viewed in demographic context. In terms of the flow of its population, Indonesia resembles the top half of a wheel. Java, Madura and Bali are the tightly packed hub from which migrants move along spoke-like air and sea corridors to and from a rim of "outer islands," the largest of which are Sumatra, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. The density of settlement and scarcity of land at the hub compared with the rim have impelled Jakarta to resettle slightly more than a million families at some 250 sites around the archipelago since 1969.

This "transmigration" has fueled the insurgency in Irian Jaya by giving flesh to Irianese fears of Javanese colonization. More recently, ecological damage done by transmigrant settlements has attracted criticism from abroad. The resulting attention, however modest, has helped to publicize conditions in the province, and that has marginally improved the rebels' ability to make their case overseas. But the impetus to transport new families from hub to rim has weakened under the pressure of falling oil prices, which have led to major cutbacks in Jakarta's budgets for transmigration. The World Bank, long an assiduous lender for such projects, has been persuaded to pay more

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attention to the environment, and that has further reduced the priority on moving more people. As the growth of the controversial program is slowed, its recruiting advantage to the insurgents will decline.

Neither East Timor nor Irian Jaya has the potential to secede from Indonesia in the foreseeable future. But the location, ethnic makeup and frontier status of the larger half-island suggest that Indonesian governments to come may find it easier to have erased an artificial border on Timor than to defend one on New Guinea.

IV

In a nation so vast and varied the integration of periphery with center is a structural problem to be resolved only in the long run. Of more immediate concern is the economy, whose record of growth is being jeopardized by weak prices for Indonesian exports.

Up to now, economic development and political stability have been the New Order's strongest suits, in contrast to the decay and chaos of the Sukarno years. Between 1965 and 1968 Indonesia's annual inflation rate was brought down from 600 to ten percent, and the government's budget deficit cut from 64 percent of expenditures to zero. From 1965 to 1985 per-capita GNP rose on the average by 4.8 percent per year—faster than in any other Southeast Asian country save Singapore. By 1982 the World Bank could reclassify perennially "low-income" Indonesia as a "middle-income" country.

Political clout, wise decisions, foreign loans and OPEC prices have been the interlocking keys to the economic success of Indonesia's New Order. Without sufficient authority and will, Suharto could not have reversed Sukarno's beggar-the-economy policies. Mandated and protected by Suharto, Western-trained technocrats could resurrect the market and reopen the economy, safe from the political risk of being seen to impose fresh austerities on an exhausted population while enticing foreign investors with easy terms. In the absence of such drastic steps foreign donors, lenders and investors would not have rallied so massively in support of the new government. Nor would Indonesia's Western and Japanese backers have been so willing to commit themselves had Indonesia lacked oil and gas, or had OPEC (Indonesia is its sole Asian member) not boosted world prices to a record high of $34 per barrel or equivalent in 1981.

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These connections also worked in reverse, from oil back through policy to politics. Suharto's Indonesia has not been immune from the profligacy that hydrocarbon windfalls tend to induce in their recipients. Under the free-spending leadership of Suharto's old friend and army colleague General Ibnu Sutowo, the national oil company, Pertamina, bypassed the technocrats to borrow at commercial rates huge sums for dubious purposes. The resulting debt balloon—$10.5 billion—burst in 1975 when the company defaulted on a loan from a Texas bank. Sutowo was eventually fired and the technocrats were called in to clean up the mess. The affair cost Indonesia dearly, but at least it strengthened the economists' position and discouraged the grandiose overoptimism that Sutowo had come to personify.

Corruption remains widespread, but petroleum dreams have not replaced sound policies in Indonesia. Knowing that oil and gas were in finite supply and their prices artificially high, the technocrats sought to use the bonanza to develop agriculture and industry and diversify exports. Returns on hydrocarbons enabled the government to import and subsidize the fertilizers and pesticides and to finance the irrigation networks needed to make best use of the new high-yielding varieties of rice—a politically crucial food in which the country became at least temporarily self-sufficient.

Roads, schools, clinics and markets were built and repaired and people were employed. Enhancing the long-term worth of these measures was a successful family planning program that benefited from President Suharto's strong commitment to reducing the population pressure on future generations. By attending to the rural areas, where three-fourths of all Indonesians still live, the government created a growing constituency of villagers who had more things to buy, more places to go and more choices to make for themselves and their children.

It is not that economic development has made the government uniformly popular. While helping some people, modernization has endangered others, notably those whose labor could be displaced by machines. Rather, by promoting the countryside's transformation, the government has become indispensable to a kind of life—modern life—that villagers understand to be the future. In this sense the legitimacy of the New Order reflects less the personal popularity of the men leading it than the prudence of the peasants caught up in it. For all his

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charisma, Sukarno could be ignored; he delivered mainly speeches. Suharto delivers the goods.

Or at least he used to. Dragged down by falling oil prices, the annual rate of growth in real GDP gave up six points between 1981 and 1985, decelerating from 7.9 to 1.9 percent. In 1986 the economy stopped slowing down, but oil and gas revenues fell by almost half from the previous year, and the country's current-account deficit more than doubled. New foreign investment declined. Suddenly there was much less left over for the urban middle class, including their politically conscious sons and daughters on college campuses.

The roller-coaster price of oil reminded Indonesians of the risks of participating in the world capitalist system. Had he been in power, Sukarno might have reacted to his country's misfortune by excoriating the West, perhaps even suspending the repayment of foreign debt. Instead, Suharto moved quickly to reassure foreign lenders and investors by making administrative and economic reforms. In 1985, for example, to clean up the legendary corruption and inefficiency of Indonesian ports, the sensitive business of inspecting goods and assessing duties was turned over almost entirely to a Swiss company, the Société Générale de Surveillance. According to one foreign shipping executive: "Now goods move in about three days; it used to take as much as three weeks."[4]

In 1986 Indonesia took additional steps to make its exports more competitive and its economy more attractive to foreign investors. The rupiah was devalued by 31 percent against the U.S. dollar. Previously restricted from holding a majority of the shares in a joint venture, a foreign partner could now own up to 95 percent for five years if it agreed to add to its investment by an amount that the Indonesian partner could not afford and if the increased investment enabled the venture to export at least part of its production—a clear trading of local control for foreign exchange. Import duties and restrictions on a range of goods were reduced or removed.

Further steps were taken in 1987 to deregulate foreign trade, and for the first time Suharto cut government spending. Civil service salaries were frozen and many rupiah-financed projects shelved. Funds earmarked for development were reduced by 22 percent, and the cuts into specific programs were even deeper—transmigration by 54 percent, for example, and fer-

[4] *The Wall Street Journal,* Oct. 1, 1987, p. 30.

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tilizer subsidies by 70 percent. Nor did Suharto exempt the defense budget, cutting in half spending on new facilities and programs for the armed forces and freezing military salaries.

But retrenchment is not enough. To cover the shortfall, the government has had to increase its foreign debt. In June 1987 the United States, Japan, the World Bank, the IMF and more than a dozen other Western countries and multilateral organizations met again as the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) to review Indonesia's progress and commit funds to its future. From $536 million in 1969, IGGI's annual vote of confidence in Indonesia had nearly quintupled to more than $2.5 billion in 1986. In 1987, responding to Indonesia's difficulties and Suharto's belt-tightening, the donors committed almost $3.2 billion in aid and loans. Although the strong yen inflated the real gain to Jakarta, on paper Indonesia's creditors had upped their assistance by one-fourth in a single year.

The size of such credits compared with the softness of oil and gas prices have helped to make Indonesia the fifth-largest Third World borrower, burdened with a debt service ratio of about 40 percent—double the 20-percent danger mark that economists used to cite. At the end of 1986 Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves were enough to cover only five months of imports. Yet Suharto refused to press for rescheduling of his country's debt.

Added to the budget-cutting, devaluation and other austerities that Suharto was imposing on Indonesians, his efforts to attract and reassure foreigners might have seemed politically unwise—even suicidal. Why, on the eve of a national legislative election in April 1987, did the president and his technocrats make themselves vulnerable to portrayal by nationalists as sacrificing public welfare to appease foreign banks?

V

One answer is that the president felt he had to. His creditors were too indispensable, and he was too convinced of the need to avoid the failings of Sukarno, whose nationalistic posturing and fiscal overindulgence had done such damage to the economy in the 1960s.

Another answer is that Suharto did not have to worry about opposition to his policies. In all three preceding national legislative elections under the New Order, in 1971, 1977 and 1982, the government's political vehicle—Golongan Karya (GOLKAR), meaning Functional Groups—had received a consistent major-

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ity of 62 to 64 percent of the vote. In 1987, despite the bad economic news, GOLKAR won a record 73 percent.

The poll could be dismissed as a meaningless exercise in self-congratulation by an undemocratic regime. At stake in 1987 were 400 seats, with an additional 100 to be filled later by presidential appointment. The 500-seat legislature would then be doubled in size, again by appointments in professional and other categories, to create a 1,000-seat People's Consultative Assembly that would meet and name the president in March 1988. Theoretically GOLKAR could lose all 400 contested legislative seats and still get Suharto renamed president by a margin of 200 votes.

But from an Indonesian perspective, the very fact that the election is not a serious test for the regime helps to oblige the regime to take the contest seriously. Precisely because everyone expects the government to win, it is under great pressure to do so. By this odd but operative logic, New Order elections turn out to be tests of legitimacy after all.

The figure of 73 percent for GOLKAR has not been massively miscounted to show a big win. Unlike elections in the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, polls in Indonesia under Suharto have been predetermined not in the reckoning of votes but in their solicitation. Indonesian civil servants are expected to support the authority of the government that employs them; some do so sincerely, some with reluctance, some from fear. The general population is pressured to vote GOLKAR by village, district and provincial heads hoping to improve their careers, enhance the claims of their constituencies on government resources, or both; again, some voters comply willingly while others feel constrained.

GOLKAR's record victory in 1987 does not mean that nearly three-fourths of all Indonesians, acting as individuals, freely preferred the government to its opposition. But it also does not mean that the 62.4 million who voted for GOLKAR were coerced into doing so against their will. What the results of the election demonstrate is the sheer authoritative nature of Suharto's regime and the absence of a workable alternative.

One unworkable alternative is the creation of an Islamic state. There are more Muslims in Indonesia than in any other country. Westerners who learn this fact but do not know Southeast Asia may wonder whether the future of Indonesia is Iran.

The answer is no. The Islam that first filtered into the

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archipelago centuries ago had already been colored by its interaction with South Asian Hinduism, Buddhism and mysticism, with which it continued to acculturate in its new maritime home. The resulting syncretic legacy sustains to this day—especially among the politically crucial Javanese—a tolerance of creedal differences as mere variations on the underlying unity of all faiths, including Islam. Islam did become politicized in precolonial sultanates, against the Christian-colonial Dutch, and as the sacred law that Muslim leaders sought to implement, peacefully and by force of arms, in independent Indonesia. But apart from requiring that the president be Muslim, the constitution remained non-Islamic, the rebellions were put down, and the disunity of Islamic politicians made them easier for Sukarno and Suharto to co-opt.

From a peak of 48 percent of the vote in the 1955 legislative election, political Islam fell to fluctuating within a range of 25 to 30 percent in the contests of 1971, 1977 and 1982. In the run-up to the 1987 election the Nahdatul Ulama, the largest Muslim political association in the country, withdrew from the Islamic opposition Development Unity Party. NU members were freed to decide between GOLKAR and the third alternative, the Indonesian Democracy Party, an amalgam of secular-nationalist and Christian minority groups. Without its mainstay, the Development Unity Party was reduced to an all-time electoral low of 16 percent. Meanwhile crackdowns on preachers accused of using Islam to incite hatred of the authorities reminded Muslim dissidents of the cost of openly challenging the regime.

Whoever eventually replaces Suharto may try harder to woo the Islamic community, with funds for mosques and other gestures, following the president's own example. The repression of fundamentalists could stiffen their resistance. But there is no ayatollah waiting in the wings, and the stage is distinctly non-Iranian. Whatever drama of succession will unfold in Indonesia, it is most unlikely to have a theocratic ending.

VI

President Sukarno tried and ultimately failed to balance the state on three ideological legs: nationalism, religion and communism. When Suharto took over he destroyed and outlawed communism, and by 1987 he had, in effect, also retired religion as a legal political actor. As for nationalism, in reopening and

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reindebting Indonesia to the capitalist West, that part of Sukarno's triad too would seem to have been abandoned.

On what then does the New Order rest?

Economic growth is an obvious reply, and to that end foreign support has been and remains invaluable. Military aid has also been important. U.S. training, weapons and planes, for example, continue to strengthen Indonesia's armed forces. In 1988 Jakarta hopes to purchase advanced F-16 fighter aircraft—Indonesian resources and American sales credits permitting.

But former Minister of Mining Slamet Bratanata's remark to a *New York Times* reporter that American aid in particular "has kept this Government in the saddle for 20 years"[5] is an exaggeration. U.S. assistance was crucial at the beginning of the New Order, but Japan and the multilateral banks have also played leading roles. Since 1984 Washington has reduced its aid by more than a third. Its contribution to the 1987 IGGI package, for example, was less than a third the size of Tokyo's. By fiscal year 1987 U.S. aid to Indonesia had declined to $99 million—88 percent economic, 12 percent military—and the appropriation for FY 1988 appeared likely to be pared down again. Bratanata also ignored the role of oil.

In any case, whether driven by foreign aid, oil prices or smart policies—or a combination of these and other things—economic growth does not by itself explain the longevity of the New Order. The distribution of the benefits of growth has been uneven, and those who have enjoyed them do not necessarily attribute their good fortune to the government, nor determine their loyalty solely according to material considerations. A more complete accounting for the New Order's stability would have to include the habit of compliance, or at least acceptance, built into Javanese political culture—an advantage that would in principle help to sustain any authoritative regime.

Nor should the role of nationalism in all this be dismissed. Economic growth has boosted the national pride of many Indonesians, which has helped to legitimate the regime. A government that limits the after-tax income of foreign petroleum companies to 15 percent of the market value of the oil they extract—12 percent for Caltex—is not a patsy of the multinationals. (In 1966 the foreigners' share was 35 percent.) Where Sukarno struggled for self-reliance without the West, Suharto has tried to achieve it by using the West. Indonesia as

[5] *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1987, p. 4.

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a whole is better off materially now than it was under Sukarno, and Indonesians can take pride in that, not for self-interested reasons but as citizens of a nation with a future.

Alongside these supports, coercive deterrence is another pillar of the New Order. Beginning with the annihilation of the PKI in the 1960s, Suharto has shown himself willing to use force against his opponents. When unrest on campuses flared in the 1970s, students were targeted. In the 1980s, especially since the hijacking of an Indonesian airliner by Islamic militants in 1981, defiant Muslims have become the authorities' chief security concern. Trials and sentences and several executions have served as warnings against subversion.

Paralleling these crackdowns have been closures of domestic newspapers and magazines. Of the publications forced to disband in the 1960s and 1970s most were suspected of complicity in violent events, notably the killing of the generals in 1965 and a murky outburst of mob violence against Japan and ethnic Chinese that took 11 lives and caused great damage in Jakarta in 1974. The authorities argue that a free press must not be allowed to whip up class, ethnic or religious tensions that a multicultural society cannot afford. But what made these incidents especially sensitive was their association with conflict inside the military.

Press closings in the 1980s—not to mention the warnings and the self-censorship—have been ordered to protect the population from radical Islam and, more controversially, to shield from exposure and criticism a pattern of lucrative cooperation between the government and favored businessmen, including members of the president's own family. Economic reporting that could have been construed to allude to such connections caused the banning of Indonesia's largest afternoon paper, *Sinar Harapan*, in 1986.

The foreign press too has been affected. In 1986 a series in *The Sydney Morning Herald* on the Suharto family fortune so angered the president that he ordered the Australian press out of Indonesia. Australian reporters and *The New York Times* were denied on-the-spot coverage of President Reagan's visit to Indonesia later in the year. In July 1987 *Far Eastern Economic Review* correspondent Shim Jae Hoon reported the banning of another major domestic daily, *Prioritas*, only to find that his own visa would not be renewed.

Military discipline is the final and most essential leg upon which the New Order rests. The attempted coup of 1965 in

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Jakarta, like the one in Madiun in 1948, taught Suharto to guard against two things: communist conspiracy and army disunity. Military rebellions in the late 1950s, when officers in the regions challenged their commanders in the capital, reinforced in the experience of army leaders the importance of unity within the armed forces.

The New Order has shown it can survive a slowdown in economic growth. Instruments of coercion and habits of acceptance inhibit the potential for mass unrest. But if the military splits, so will the regime, because the armed forces form its core.

For convenience, the problem of ensuring a cohesive and loyal military can be mapped on two axes, horizontal and vertical. On the horizontal plane, other things being equal, the larger the size of the armed forces the more subject they are to factionalism—intercultural, territorial and between services. If, to oversimplify, the rebellions of the 1950s expressed intramilitary tensions between centralist Java and the regionalist, Islamicist and ethnically anti-Javanese outer islands, the attempted coups of 1948 and 1965 illustrated differences in recruitment and orientation among territorially organized army units on Java itself. Also facilitating Untung's conspiracy was the extent to which the PKI had gained sympathy among air force and navy officers, which enabled the plotters to operate from Halim air base on the outskirts of Jakarta.

To achieve horizontal cohesion Suharto reduced the size of the armed forces, amalgamated territorial commands, strengthened the primacy of the army over the navy and air force, and rotated officers to ensure their loyalty to the center and not the region where they happened to be assigned.

Success in maintaining horizontal cohesiveness could have jeopardized intramilitary unity on the vertical dimension between ranks and generations. Streamlining the command structure reduced the array of positions to which junior officers could aspire. Suharto lessened this pressure while facilitating military control over government by entrusting normally civilian positions in his administration to armed forces personnel, active or retired. In 1986 officers filled two-fifths of the posts in the higher central bureaucracy, including presidential aides, ministers and top ministerial staff. Military men have been named as ambassadors, governors and district heads and have replaced village heads purged in the anti-communist sweep of

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the 1960s. Officers also occupy appointed seats in parliament—now reserved for personnel on active duty.

By fortifying government in this manner, Suharto skillfully implements what the Indonesian armed forces call their "dual function": to shape the state while defending it. He has shown no intention of civilianizing his government, and it is difficult to imagine his successor, assuming he is a military man, doing so except under pressure.

VII

The prolongation of Suharto's tenure as president will not in itself generate such pressure. In March 1988, as previously noted, the People's Consultative Assembly is expected to extend his presidency for another five-year term. In the run-up to this quinquennial event, political temperatures in Indonesia typically rise, as the focus shifts from GOLKAR to the president himself. Demonstrations may occur, as they did in Bandung in 1986 when hundreds of university students greeted visiting French President François Mitterrand with chants of "Liberté!" But in late 1987 there was still no reason to think that Suharto's presidency would not be renewed on schedule.

Who will eventually replace Suharto is a taboo subject in Indonesia. Early in 1987 General Sudharmono, the chairman of GOLKAR and a possible choice for vice president, ruled out discussion of the succession until after 1992. The question will arise sooner should the president fall seriously ill. If he is still in power in March 1993, when his fourth term expires, Suharto will be 71 years old. But he appears to be in good health.

In November 1986 Suharto did remark in a speech accepting renomination by GOLKAR that if in 1988–93 he should be judged incapable of fulfilling his presidential duties, "please release me quickly without much ado."[6] In such an event the vice president would presumably take over until the assembly could meet to name a successor.

Perhaps that scenario could unfold "without much ado." But military officers would be tempted to maneuver behind the scenes. Students could be drawn to the streets, possibly to demand the direct election of a new president. Meanwhile, presumably, Muslim leaders would be trying to improve the chances of a successor more sympathetic to political Islam.

[6] Shim Jae Hoon, "Searching for Signs of Suharto's Successor," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Nov. 20, 1986, p. 49.

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Could Suharto avoid instability and protect his reputation by designating his own successor now, well in advance of the transition? That option has drawbacks: by disappointing those within the army who hoped to be chosen but were not, it could jeopardize military unity—the one crucial precondition of the New Order and the lesson of Madiun in 1948 and Jakarta in 1965. By preempting the People's Consultative Assembly, not to mention the electorate as a whole, it could trigger opposition on campuses, especially in Jakarta and Bandung, where Western democratic values have taken hold. Yet it is almost impossible, short of a coup, to imagine Suharto abstaining from a role in the selection of his successor. The most likely prospect is that he will make up his mind very late in the game, probably but not necessarily in consultation with trusted colleagues in the army.

Much will depend on the support that Suharto enjoys when the transition does finally come. Instructive in this regard are events elsewhere along the Pacific Rim. In South Korea a rather unpopular military president's attempt to designate his successor triggered mass opposition by students, workers and elements of the urban middle class. In the Philippines another authoritarian ruler became so isolated that he was overthrown, leaving in his wake an unstable civilian democracy and a deeply divided military threatened by communists and Muslims alike. In Mexico, on the other hand, the head of a long-ruling party was able to maintain his prerogative to name his replacement, prolonging the life of a semi-authoritarian regime.

The trouble with the "Mexican solution" is that it presupposes more political pluralism than the New Order has been willing to allow. And GOLKAR lacks the historical legitimacy of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party. In Indonesia the armed forces strengthen the regime, but they also limit its ability to evolve along democratic lines.

Counterbalancing these concerns are some encouraging signs. Compared with its performance in previous elections, in 1987 the military appears largely to have resisted the temptation to intervene on behalf of GOLKAR against the two opposition parties, though perhaps only because their weakness made it unnecessary. One of the two, the Indonesian Democracy Party, was able to call for less regulation of foreign trade and more power for the legislative branch. Large photographs of Sukarno and speeches by the late president's daughter Megawati elicited shouts of approval from crowds at the party's

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rallies. Within GOLKAR, and even among military officers in parliament, voices could be heard recommending modest steps toward economic and political liberalization. The New Order is not a Western-style democracy by any means, but it does allow for some internal give and take, and that flexibility could prove crucial when the test of succession finally occurs.

VIII

Even if power is transferred peacefully from Suharto to someone else—probably a Javanese, almost certainly a general, necessarily a Muslim—the country's size and resources will in the long run guarantee greater awareness of the archipelago among Americans.

The most bullish projection for Indonesia has been made by the consulting firm Forecasting International. The company packed 64 variables into a computer model, ran it for 41 major nations, and concluded that no country on the list will improve its stability, economy, security, unity and influence faster than Indonesia: from 22nd place in 1984 Indonesia should race past West Germany, France and Singapore to reach seventh place sometime between 1989 and 1995, possibly during Suharto's next term.[7] In bearish contrast is the 99th place assigned to Indonesia in *Euromoney*'s expert-consensus ranking of nations according to their economic prospects through 1988.[8]

These are extreme predictions. But in between them, on a zigzag trajectory of its own, invisible Indonesia will make its presence known.

[7] Marvin Cetron with Alicia Pagano and Otis Port, *The Future of American Business: The U.S. in World Competition,* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985, pp. 156–157, as supplemented in conversation with Cetron, July 8, 1987.

[8] *Euromoney* (London), September 1986, p. 369.

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Wolfgang Leonhard

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION TURNS 70

For 70 years the red flag with the hammer and sickle has flown over the Kremlin. On special occasions huge portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin—and, until the mid-1950s, Stalin—are displayed. Marxism-Leninism is taught in all primary schools, high schools and universities, and is the ideology of all members of the party and the party's youth organizations.

The leaders in the Kremlin always claim that the Soviet period has been marked by historical and ideological continuity; that the ideology has not changed since Lenin but has merely been subject to "creative development." In truth, although certain principles of Soviet ideology do exhibit continuity, there have been significant changes. This essay illustrates when and how these changes took place, focusing on five periods: the revolutionary era under Lenin (1917–24), Stalin's totalitarian period (1924–53), the contradictory phase of de-Stalinization under Nikita Khrushchev (1953–64), the period of bureaucratic restoration and increasing lethargy and decline under Leonid Brezhnev (1964–82) and, finally, the current period and its significance for the future of Soviet ideology.

II

The Bolsheviks came to power as a small, revolutionary party in an economically backward country of some 140 million inhabitants, over 80 percent of whom were peasants and over 70 percent of whom were illiterate. Russia was a country in which industrial workers made up only a tiny part of the population, whose economy had been wrecked by the First World War, in which famine, misery and need were widespread. The Bolsheviks in 1917 were revolutionary Marxists who had adopted fundamental Marxist concepts with Leninist modifications. In particular they were motivated by a belief in

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class struggle and violent revolution, by confidence that the victory of socialism was inevitable because it was dictated by historical laws, and by revolutionary internationalism.

The Bolsheviks maintained that the proletarian revolution would break out, not in the country in which capitalism was most developed, but in the "weakest link in the chain" of imperialism. This would occur during a "revolutionary situation" characterized by crisis among the upper classes and an increase in social contradictions. The Bolsheviks maintained that this situation existed in Russia in October and November of 1917. Finally the time had come for the "last, decisive fight," as it is called in the *Internationale*. Unlike the "reformists" and "opportunists" who dreamed of nonviolent reforms (for which they were opposed most bitterly by Lenin's group), the Bolsheviks were convinced of the inevitability of violent revolution, since every revolution—and a socialist one in particular—was inconceivable without civil war. The Bolsheviks further believed that their revolution in Russia would be the start of a worldwide uprising of the proletariat, since only a global revolution could overthrow what they characterized as international imperialism.

The revolution, the Bolsheviks held, could be guaranteed only by the establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" that would overthrow the bourgeoisie and crush its attempts at counterrevolution. According to Lenin, the dictatorship of the proletariat would establish democracy for the masses but at the same time limit the liberty of the oppressors, exploiters and capitalists. This dictatorship of the proletariat was to be under the guidance of the party and was seen as only a temporary stage, "a period of struggle between dying capitalism and nascent communism." The victorious struggle during this period would culminate in the ultimate goal: a classless society, in which famine, misery, exploitation and oppression would be overcome; in which social contradictions would belong to the past; in which the state would wither away and the human being achieve the highest development of his personality.

But the Bolsheviks were soon forced to recognize that they were not supported by a majority of the population, not even a majority of the working class: in the elections to the Constituent Assembly shortly after the revolution they received only one-quarter of the votes, while the Social Revolutionaries, a moderate socialist peasant party, achieved an overwhelming majority. When the Constituent Assembly, whose election the

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Bolsheviks had always demanded, refused to approve the measures already taken by the government it was forcibly dissolved by a detachment of Red Guards. Moreover, the newly established Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle Against Counterrevolution, Speculation and Sabotage (the "Cheka" or secret police) directed its activity not only against the declared opponents of the revolution, but also against members of other socialist parties. Democratic freedoms were abrogated and political dissidents were prosecuted.

During the civil war (1918–21) the dictatorial element of Bolshevism grew stronger. In order to win the war the Bolsheviks centralized economic, political and military power, banned the elected "workers' control committees" and militarized public life. The long years of struggle, famine and privations caused revolutionary enthusiasm to fade. The military-dictatorial methods employed during the civil war became an integral part of party life, and an apparatus of officials detached from the rank and file of party membership emerged.

The discontent that grew among workers and peasants at the end of the civil war—resulting in strikes, peasant revolts and a mutiny of the sailors at Kronstadt—endangered the Soviet system. Lenin reacted by proclaiming the "New Economic Policy" (NEP) at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921. Peasants obtained the right to sell their products on the free market, the odious fixed quotas were replaced by a graduated tax in kind, and small and medium-sized private enterprises were allowed to operate. Lenin stressed the importance of material incentives and asked that every important branch of the economy be structured upon the principle of personal incentive. He criticized excessive centralization and advocated economic autonomy on a regional and local basis. He also sought to create a cooperative system instead of a centrally planned state economy.

This NEP, which is once again a focus of general interest in the Soviet Union, was unfortunately not linked to similar changes in the political sphere. The Tenth Party Congress in 1921 approved a resolution proposed by Lenin concerning the unity of the party and restrictions on the free exchange of opinion within it. Lenin called upon party members to close ranks, warning that anyone engaging in any form of criticism should take account of "the position of the party, surrounded as it is by enemies."

Lenin was aware that the party apparatus was becoming

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increasingly bureaucratic. Shortly before his death he wrote quite pessimistically that the Soviet administrative system was in fact the old "Russian apparatus" which the Bolsheviks "took over from tsarism and slightly anointed with Soviet oil." Lenin was also worried about the growth of Russian nationalism: "There is no doubt that the infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and Sovietized workers will drown in that tide of chauvinist Great Russian riffraff like a fly in milk."[1]

Lenin died on January 21, 1924. His last urgent proposal, that Stalin be deposed as general secretary, was not implemented. Lenin could hardly have imagined that his warnings about bureaucracy and Russian nationalism would prove so true.

III

> Comrades! We Communists are people of a special mold. We are made of special stuff. We are those who form the army of the great proletarian strategist, the army of Comrade Lenin. . . . There is nothing higher than the title of member of the party whose founder and leader was Comrade Lenin.

Those words were spoken by Stalin on January 26, 1924, in his "oath" at Lenin's graveside. This oath contains, in embryonic form, a good deal of what was to become typical of Stalinism: the comparison of the party with an army; the glorification of the leading role of the party, whose members were of a "special type" and molded "of special stuff"; and the glorification of one person (at this point still Lenin) as the leader.

Lenin's death provided Stalin with the opportunity to introduce a cult of Leninism. Whereas Lenin had rejected glorification of his person, there were now bombastic declarations of loyalty to his memory. Lenin's body was embalmed in a mausoleum, and on Stalin's order the "Lenin enrollment" was launched. Within a few months hundreds of thousands of new members joined the party—mostly people who had not taken part in the illicit revolutionary struggle under tsarism or the

[1] In this article I have quoted from the multivolume English-language editions of the *Collected Works* of Lenin (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960–66) and Stalin (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952–55), as well as from Stalin's *War Speeches* (London: Hutchinson & Co., no date) and *Leninism: Selected Writings* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1942).

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revolution itself and who were therefore loyal to Stalin's party apparatus. The old Bolsheviks of the years of the revolution became a minority in the party.

This process was linked with Stalin's new doctrine of the party as an elite organization, in which subordination and discipline were emphasized both in practice and in doctrine. The Communist Party, according to Stalin, was the "advanced detachment within the Soviet state" and the "commanding corps of the working class." The Bolshevik Party, it was announced, was "a sort of order of knights of the sword within the Soviet state," characterized by "unity of will" and "complete and absolute unity of action." The party, it was said, should be strengthened "by purging itself of opportunist elements."

Just a few months after Lenin's death, Stalin proclaimed his new doctrine of "socialism in one country." As I have mentioned, it had been an article of faith for all communists that the establishment of socialism in the Soviet Union would be possible only after successful revolutions in the Western industrial countries. In December 1924, however, Stalin announced that "the victory of socialism in one country is quite possible and probable," even if capitalism remained in other countries. In June 1925 he declared that the Soviet Union had long possessed all that was needed to build a complete socialist society. In February 1926 Stalin added that "we are capable of completely building a socialist society by our own efforts and without the victory of the revolution in the West."

These statements marked the abandonment of Lenin's revolutionary internationalism. Stalin's new doctrine of "socialism in one country" was diametrically opposed to everything that had been theorized by Marx, Engels and Lenin; nevertheless it was entirely in keeping with the views of the practical party functionaries who supported Stalin. They now had one task: to "build socialism." Lenin's doctrine of a social revolution was now replaced by the doctrine of industrialization to increase the power of one country. Construction of new factories and power stations, even of the Moscow subway, were praised as victories for the construction of socialism. Stalin announced the emergence of "new commanders for the work of building the new economy and the new culture . . . and the new society." He even compared socialist society to an army: just as an army could not be created without new commanders, so the classless

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society could not be built without them—an idea that would certainly have astonished Marx and Engels.

According to Stalin, the construction of socialism was taking place while the Soviet Union was encircled by capitalism. As long as this "capitalist encirclement" existed, Stalin declared, "the organs of suppression, the army and other organizations" would be indispensable, since "without these organs constructive work by the dictatorship with any degree of security would be impossible."

The specter of capitalist encirclement was designed to give the populace the impression of living in a beleaguered fortress and to justify the growth of suppression. Marx's important doctrine of the "withering away of the state" during the course of the socialist revolution was now replaced by Stalin's announcement that the Bolsheviks "stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed."

The period of industrialization and the forced collectivization of millions of small peasant farms (1928–1934) laid the foundation for the economic power of the Soviet Union. However, the growth of heavy industry was accompanied by the increasing power of the new elite and by the growth of suppression. The revolutionary internationalism of Lenin's era was increasingly supplanted by Soviet patriotism, which was gradually fused with Russian nationalism. As early as 1928 Stalin spoke of the Soviet Union as the "motherland of the world proletariat." From 1934 on the term "Soviet patriotism" was emphasized. Love of the motherland, her honor, her glory and her power, was propagated.

On November 25, 1936, I witnessed a memorable evening as a young man in the Soviet Union. The radio was turned on in all factories, collective and state farms, schools and universities, offices and clubs. The entire populace of the Soviet Union had been informed weeks in advance of the time and importance of this speech. Now they were enjoined to listen to Stalin's speech to the Eighth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets in Moscow.

Stalin solemnly announced: "Our Soviet society has already in the main succeeded in achieving socialism. It has created a socialist system; that is, it has brought about what Marxists in other words call the first, or lower, phase of communism. Hence we have already achieved the first phase of communism, socialism." Therefore, Stalin declared, the "exploitation of

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man by man has been abolished." The Soviet Union, he said, was distinguished by "moral and political unity," so that "only one party can exist, the Communist Party."

When this proclamation was made, Stalin's great purge had already begun; during its course, seven million people were arrested, including the flower of the Soviet intelligentsia and over 70 percent of the senior party, state and economic officials and the officer corps. Especially hard hit were Lenin's former comrades-in-arms, who were now defamed as "agents," "murderers" and "mad dogs." They were sentenced on trumped-up charges and shot. The great purge of 1936–38 was justified by Stalin as part of the intensification of the class struggle due to the development of socialism. The greater the successes of socialism, Stalin argued, the greater would be the fury of the remnants of the exploiting classes, which would resort to desperate means. In March 1937, just four months after his proclamation of the "victory of socialism" and his declaration that the exploitation of man by man had been abolished in the Soviet Union, Stalin announced the intensification of the class struggle.

At the time when the great purge was coming to an end, in the autumn of 1938, a new textbook, the *History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks), A Short Course*, was published. All of Lenin's closest comrades-in-arms—above all Leon Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev and Nikolai Bukharin—were labeled enemies, renegades and spies. Stalin was praised as the sole legitimate heir to Lenin and the single glorious leader. At the same time, the party Central Committee passed a resolution condemning the separation of Marxism and Leninism and introduced the obligatory term "Marxism-Leninism"—although this Marxism-Leninism was in fact a mere recital of Stalin's interpretations, proclaimed as universal doctrine.

During the late 1930s a decline in the influence of ideology was evident. Presumably Stalin also observed this, and his increasing emphasis on Soviet patriotism and Russian nationalism may in part be explained as a substitute for ideology. The slogan, "for our homeland, for communism," which became a central theme from 1938 on, was an attempt to unite patriotism with Stalinist communism. In November 1941, after the German invasion, Stalin referred to "the Great Russian nation" without mentioning the other nationalities, and the exemplars of patriotism he cited were all Russians, including the tsarist generals Suvorov and Kutuzov. In the spring of 1943 Stalin

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ordered that the *Internationale* be abandoned as the Soviet national anthem and replaced by a patriotic hymn in which Russia was placed at the fore. In a victory toast on May 24, 1945, Stalin described the Russian people as "the most outstanding nation of all nations forming the Soviet Union" and "as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the people of our country."

During the last years of the Stalin era (1945–1953) a campaign was launched against "cosmopolitanism," accusing Soviet scientists of overestimating foreign theories and achievements. The conquests of non-Russian territories and peoples by tsarist Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were retroactively declared to be progressive events in Soviet history.

The growth of nationalism was accompanied by an expansion of the cult of Stalin, who was glorified as the "leader of progressive humanity," a "great genius of Marxism-Leninism," and a "coryphaeus of learning." Not a single important article was published in *Pravda* without at least one quotation from or reference to Stalin—regardless of the topic. There were Stalin's five-year plans and the Stalin constitution; aviators were called "Stalin's hawks." Stalin's 70th birthday on December 21, 1949, was celebrated with indescribable pomp. Among other things a huge portrait of Stalin was carried aloft over Moscow by balloons and illuminated at night so that he looked down on the people from on high.

It is true that Stalinism was an outgrowth of Leninism and that Stalin could cite some of Lenin's statements and ideas. Both believed in "historical laws," the struggle between capitalism and socialism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat as a transition to socialism. Both advocated the leading role of an elite party based on ideological principles. Both believed in depriving the exploiting classes of their power, in the relentless struggle against various groups labeled "enemies" and—finally—in the achievement of socialism as the first stage in the development of a classless communist society.

Yet Stalinism was a break from the decisive principles of Leninism. Leninism was a revolutionary doctrine aiming at a revolutionary transformation of society. The crucial tenets of Leninism were the dictatorship of the proletariat as a temporary period between declining capitalism and developing communism, international revolutionary solidarity and a successful world revolution. Stalinism, on the contrary, formed an ideology that focused on the strength, power and authority of the

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Soviet state, the development of "socialism in one country," the intensification of the class struggle, the notion of capitalist encirclement and the glorification of the one leader. Stalinism was a justification of the bureaucratic-dictatorial system of the U.S.S.R. and the dictatorship of the new elite that commanded and controlled the entire political, economic and intellectual life of the country in the name of Marxism-Leninism.

This was reflected also in Stalin's style. The writings of Lenin were pervaded with lively (and often unjust) polemics. Stalin, on the other hand, pronounced his political theorems in dogmatically simple sentences, often in the form of a question he proceeded to answer, repetitiously. To elucidate political problems and processes, Stalin frequently used similes drawn from the military or technological spheres. Thus he compared the party to an army: the senior, medium and lower party functionaries to generals, officers and noncoms; political strategy to the conduct of war; political tactics to a battle. He likened Soviet society to a great machine, with the leaders sitting at the control levers, while the ordinary citizens were tiny cogs. Stalin transformed the party from a revolutionary association of comrades-in-arms into a pliant instrument of the bureaucratic-dictatorial apparatus, with its members intimidated by vigilance campaigns, purges, arrests and suspicion.

IV

"The heart of Lenin's comrade-in-arms and the inspired continuer of his work, the heart of the wise leader and teacher of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, has ceased to beat." On the morning of March 6, 1953, the death of Stalin was announced with a roll of drums and the playing of the Soviet national anthem. But the official mourning was limited to three days (in contrast to seven days on the occasion of Lenin's death) and not one of the Soviet leaders published a commemorative article. Starting soon after his death, Stalin's words were quoted less and less often in the Soviet press. On April 16, 1953, "collective leadership" was proclaimed as one of the fundamental principles of the party.

Thus the period of de-Stalinization began. It was to be distinguished by many contradictions and several setbacks. A campaign was launched against "dogmatism," aimed at justifying a departure from Stalin's obsolete doctrines; "socialist legality" was proclaimed, implying measures to curtail the power of the secret police. Even in the labor camps conditions

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improved. The "special courts" introduced by Stalin were dissolved and leading officers of the secret police and commandants of labor camps were dismissed or arrested. A steadily growing number of prisoners was released from the camps. Cultural life was marked by a "thaw," and the "new course," proclaimed on August 8, 1953, implied that Stalin's priority for heavy industry would be replaced in part by an emphasis on consumer goods.

During the process of de-Stalinization, Nikita Khrushchev played an important role. In his heart he remained a true Soviet communist, but his hope was to strengthen the political and economic situation of the Soviet Union and to free communism of Stalin's heritage by reducing terror and introducing reforms.

The high point of the revision of Soviet policy and ideology was the 20th Party Congress (February 14–25, 1956). The Stalin era was characterized as having been dominated by "arbitrariness," the suppression of creative activity and an atmosphere of lawlessness. Stalin's personality cult as well as the condition in which he left Soviet ideology were openly criticized. Mikhail Suslov complained that ordinary mortals had been permitted only to assimilate and popularize whatever Stalin had proclaimed. Anastas Mikoyan described books written during the Stalin era on the history of the party as "unimpeachable standard works in which facts are falsified, in which some people are arbitrarily praised, and others not mentioned at all." Prominent party leaders of the time were declared to have been "wantonly branded as enemies of the people." Such "historical scribbling," it was announced, had nothing in common with history. Khrushchev demanded a new textbook on the party's history based on facts.

With the beginning of the atomic age, the rise of the national liberation movements in Asia and Africa, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power and the expansion of its international political activity, it was inevitable that outdated doctrines of foreign policy would be replaced by new concepts. The antiquated doctrine of the "decay of capitalism," for example, could no longer be maintained. In autumn of 1954—before the 20th Party Congress—Soviet periodicals warned against "oversimplified ideas" about capitalism. It was important, they warned, "to assess correctly the forces and potential of capitalism," not to be afraid "to allow controversial questions to be discussed" and "not to suppress" the achievements of

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capitalist countries that resulted from their development of production, science and technology.[2] At the 20th Party Congress, Mikoyan even declared that the theory of "capitalist encirclement"—one of Stalin's crucial doctrines—had nothing to do with reality; that there could be "no question of a capitalist encirclement."

Even more important was Khrushchev's declaration that the hitherto sacrosanct belief in the "inevitability of wars" was outdated. From the publication of Lenin's book *Imperialism—The Highest Stage of Capitalism* in 1916 until Stalin's last article, "Economic Problems of Socialism," which appeared in October 1952, this had been propagated as one of the most crucial Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Now Khrushchev proclaimed a new doctrine: that war was not inevitable, and that coexistence was possible and necessary to prevent the unleashing of war. Countries with different social systems might not only coexist, but could also attempt to cooperate. Khrushchev declared this to be "the general line of our country's foreign policy." Coexistence, however, was to be limited to the diplomatic sphere; in the ideological realm struggle would continue.

Doctrines were also needed to govern the changing relationships within the Soviet bloc: given the victory of revolutions in Yugoslavia and China and the desire of some East European allies for greater independence, it was incumbent upon the Soviet leadership to develop an ideology to meet the changed conditions. In June 1955, on the occasion of a visit to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev admitted that there could be different forms of socialism. At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev proclaimed that there were different roads to socialism in different countries. Under certain conditions the transition to socialism could be accomplished peacefully, he argued; it was by no means always linked with civil war as it had been in Russia. These new doctrines of foreign policy were long overdue if the U.S.S.R. were to assume a role as a world power, but at the same time they revealed the increasing difficulty the Soviet Union was experiencing within its own sphere of power.

The most far-reaching condemnation of Stalin was made on February 25, 1956, in Khrushchev's report entitled "The Personality Cult and its Consequences," known as Khrushchev's "secret speech." Khrushchev revealed the existence of

[2] *Kommunist*, no. 14, 1955, and V. Diachenko, "Task of Research in the Economic Field," *Voprosi Ekonomiki*, no. 10, October 1955, p. 155.

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Lenin's "testament" of December 1922 and his urgent appeal that Stalin be deposed as general secretary. Khrushchev implied that Stalin was implicated in the murder, in December 1934, of the Leningrad party leader Sergei Kirov. He gave a detailed account of Stalin's personal role in the great purge of 1936–38, and accused Stalin of having dismissed all warnings of a Nazi invasion; and, finally, he described Stalin's military errors during World War II. Citing numerous examples, Khrushchev criticized Stalin's methods of rule, his "crude abuse of power," his "despotic character," his "mania for greatness" and his self-adulation. Khrushchev mentioned Stalin's guilt in the deportation of entire peoples at the end of World War II, and finally Stalin's preparations for a great new purge in the early 1950s, including his order to obtain confessions with torture.

The purpose of Khrushchev's "secret speech" was to dissociate himself from Stalin's reign of terror, to break with the past and prepare the way for reforms in various fields. Khrushchev wanted to free Soviet ideology from the burden of Stalin's outdated doctrines while maintaining the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. So it was that Stalin's rise to power, the emergence of Stalinism and the program of forced collectivization were not mentioned in Khrushchev's speech. His criticism was limited almost exclusively to Stalin's person and his methods of rule, without any analysis of the Stalinist system as such. His call to overcome the "former infringements" of socialist legality and to eliminate the influence of the "cult of personality" on philosophy and economics was undoubtedly important. However, it was confined to countering the excesses of Stalin's system and not to overcoming Stalinism as such.

Even this degree of de-Stalinization met with strong opposition and could only proceed erratically. Khrushchev tried to surmount the growing difficulties with overly optimistic plans for the future. At the Extraordinary 21st Party Congress (January 30-February 5, 1959), Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union had already entered upon the "period of the full-fledged construction of communism." At the end of June 1961 a draft of the new Soviet party program was published, in which the construction of communism was no longer formulated as an ultimate goal, but as an immediate task. By 1970 the Soviet Union was to have surpassed the United States in per-capita production and was to have the shortest working day in the world. The transition to the higher phase of com-

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munism would take place between 1970 and 1980. The party program promised that before 1980 education and medical care would be free of charge; that rents would be abolished; that water, gas, heating, electricity, public transportation and the main meal of the day would all be free as well.

With this program for the future, Khrushchev intended to give the Soviet populace new ground for hope and a motivation to work harder. The 22nd Party Congress (October 16–31, 1961) adopted the new party program, which was praised as the "Communist Manifesto of the twentieth century." This congress was marked by a new settling of accounts with Stalin which in part even surpassed that of 1956. Citing many details, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders described the horrors of Stalin's reign of terror. A resolution was passed to remove Stalin's body from the Lenin mausoleum, and to rename the towns and villages—including Stalingrad—that bore his name.

The 22nd Party Congress revealed Khrushchev's contradictory ideological and political aims: to free Soviet communism of the burden of Stalin's heritage and to promulgate overly optimistic, even illusory, goals which had more to do with the wishful thinking of the party leader than with reality.

This new wave of de-Stalinization was soon blocked by bureaucratic and authoritarian forces. Thus, Khrushchev tried hasty campaigns and reorganizations to overcome the contradictions between his overly optimistic goals and reality. There was too much resistance to allow genuine reform.

The period of de-Stalinization ended with Khrushchev's overthrow on October 14, 1964. His name disappeared from Soviet publications, and his death in 1971 was only mentioned in passing in the Soviet press. He is the only prominent Soviet leader who was not buried at the Kremlin wall on Red Square.

The 11 years of de-Stalinization had their influence also on ideology. During this period Marxism-Leninism was used to prepare and justify the continuously changing political course of the Kremlin leadership. Never before in the history of the Soviet Union were political concepts changed and replaced by new doctrines so often. Many of Stalin's doctrines—including the intensification of class struggle and the inevitability of war—were eliminated and new concepts were propagated. Stalin's *History of the CPSU (Bolsheviks), A Short Course*, the leading ideological work, was replaced by a new, more detailed history of the party, in which some of Stalin's falsifications were omitted, while others remained.

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Soviet citizens were presented with a variety of new ideological documents, such as the declarations of the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, a new textbook on Marxism-Leninism published in 1959 (the first concise version of the entire theory of ideology), the "Declaration of the World Conference of the Eighty-One Communist Parties" (December 1960) and the new Soviet party program (October 1961), not to mention special textbooks on dialectical materialism, historical materialism, political economy and political concepts. Meanwhile, Marxism-Leninism had become an obligatory subject at all colleges and universities.

Despite these efforts, ideological influence was deteriorating. For many people the criticism of Stalin had come as a shock. More and more Soviet citizens realized the contradiction between ideological theories and reality. Khrushchev's visions of reaching the ultimate phase of communism by 1980 aroused increasing skepticism. Nevertheless, Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964 was a great disappointment for all who had set their hopes on his reforms and de-Stalinization programs.

V

In contrast to the optimistic but contradictory period of de-Stalinization under Khrushchev, the next 18 years under Leonid Brezhnev (October 1964-November 1982) were characterized by immobilism and a moral and political decline. De-Stalinization ended with an authoritarian-bureaucratic restoration.

A few months after Khrushchev's downfall prisoners ceased to be released from prisons and camps, and rehabilitations were halted. Liberal intellectuals were arrested in the autumn of 1965. Khrushchev's terminology, including "socialist legality" and "overcoming the cult of personality," was avoided. Criticism of Stalin and of the Stalinist era was reduced drastically and replaced by the glorification of military feats and heroism of World War II. In place of critical reflections about the Stalinist past, the successes of the party—and increasingly of the army—were now extolled.

The new leadership, which had overthrown Khrushchev in a palace coup, consciously emphasized the continuity of Soviet development and Bolshevik tradition in order to legitimize its own position. By adopting a more positive view of the Stalin era and dissociating itself from de-Stalinization, the Brezhnev leadership signaled that emphasis was no longer on reforms

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and changes, but on maintaining and consolidating the power and authority of the leadership and the system. In the ideological sphere new concepts and goals were no longer propagated, and the struggle against deviationists, dissidents and reformers was increased—not only in the Soviet Union but in Eastern Europe.

In 1968 the Brezhnev leadership countered Czechoslovakia's "Prague Spring" with political pressure and finally with military force. Shortly thereafter the Soviet leadership proclaimed the doctrine of "limited sovereignty," generally known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, according to which each socialist country's sovereignty was limited by the broader interests of the "world socialist system"—i.e., the Soviet Union. The relationships among socialist countries were to be based, not on principles of international law, "abstract sovereignty" or a "formal observance" of the right of self-determination, but according to jointly elaborated (i.e., Soviet-dictated) political and ideological decisions. The defense of the socialist system in a particular country was declared to be a concern of the entire "world socialist system." The Soviet leadership announced this doctrine not only to justify the occupation of Czechoslovakia but also to reserve for itself the right to intervene if another country in Eastern Europe should introduce reforms that exceeded those approved by the Soviet leadership.

This harsher course was confirmed at the 24th Party Congress (March 20-April 9, 1971). Instead of the ideological struggle, the Soviets now spoke of an ideological war: "We are living under the conditions of a continuous ideological war," Brezhnev declared. It would therefore be a socialist duty, he announced, "to eliminate firmly and efficiently any ideological deficiencies in time." Brezhnev particularly criticized the Western broadcasting systems for transmitting news to the Soviet populace that had been withheld by the leadership. Dissidents, members of the civil rights movement and reformers were called traitors, renegades and even spies.

Typical of this authoritarian course was an emphasis on military-patriotic education and the cultivation of the military-patriotic tradition. A commemorative plaque and bust were placed over Stalin's tomb under the Kremlin wall and he was mentioned more frequently in a positive manner—although without the bombastic praise given in former times. For the first time since Stalin's day, the notion of the "Great Russian people" was stressed again, and as particular national traits of

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the Russians, Brezhnev cited energy, self-sacrifice and diligence. All of this meant that Russians were elevated above the numerous non-Russian nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

Khrushchev's illusory promise to achieve communism by 1980 vanished. The "transition to communism" was mentioned less and less and was replaced by the new, vague doctrine of "mature socialism"; the Soviet Union apparently had entered this phase, though no definition of the term was given. The ideological incentives of a future communist society were replaced by discipline and subordination to the resolutions of the party leadership. The contradiction between ideological goals and Soviet reality became stronger than ever before.

During this period apathy, corruption and moral-political decline became increasingly apparent. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, in his speech on January 27, 1987, at a plenary session of the Central Committee, described the resultant malaise as an "accumulation of negative processes," and as "symptoms of a crisis within the society." According to Gorbachev, all of this had a marked effect on ideology: "In many respects the theoretical concepts of socialism stagnated on the level of the 1930s and 1940s." He complained that during the Brezhnev era the contradictions between the ideal and the actual state of Soviet society had not been "the object of profound scientific research." In the social sciences, according to Gorbachev, "animated discussion and creative thinking" vanished, while "authoritarian assessments and considerations were extolled as unimpeachable truths." The serious defects in politics and ideology "were in many cases veiled by means of great events and campaigns . . . celebrations and numerous jubilees. . . . The world of everyday reality and that of a demonstrative prosperity deviated more and more from each other."

VI

Seventy years after the Bolshevik Revolution, ideology in the U.S.S.R. has reached its nadir. Marxism-Leninism was once a source of inspiration, hope and strength; now it is merely paid lip service and taken seriously only by a small minority. Since Khrushchev's overthrow in 1964 the deterioration of ideological influence has become so obvious that one could call it an ideological vacuum in Soviet society. Several causes led to this decline.

First there is the contradiction between the theory of Marxism-Leninism and Soviet reality. More and more Soviet citizens

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as well as party members and even party functionaries have asked themselves: How can the ideological claim of having built socialism and formed a higher social order be compared with the real situation? What is the explanation for such incredible and inhuman developments as the dictatorship of Stalin, the mass terror, the great purge? What have privileges for party functionaries, obvious social inequalities and the growing nationalistic conflicts to do with Marxism-Leninism? What is the reason for the clash between claims of "socialist democracy" and the existing bureaucratic party apparatus?

A second factor in the decline of ideology is its erroneous estimate of the fate of capitalism. Soviet pronouncements on the development of the Western industrialized states have proved to be wrong. Neither a polarization of Western society into two opposed classes nor a dissolution of the Western middle class has taken place; there are no signs of an alleged decay of capitalism to be followed by successful socialist revolutions in the West. The official doctrines of Marxism-Leninism are not able to recognize—let alone analyze—the successes, problems and contradictions of modern industrial societies.

Third, the official claim of "Marxism-Leninism" to be an "international theory" is more and more doubtful, because unified world communism is a thing of the past. Different nations under communist rule—for example, Yugoslavia, China, North Korea and Albania—have altered the theories of Marxism-Leninism according to their own specific conditions and goals.

Soviet citizens, especially members of the scientific-technological intelligentsia, have turned away from Marxism-Leninism because the Soviet version seemed incapable of explaining the many novel problems of a modern industrial society. Marxism-Leninism has failed to provide convincing answers to humanity's existential problems, to satisfy people's ethical concerns or to explain, let alone remedy, the moral crisis of Soviet society—the increase in theft, corruption, bribery and hypocrisy.

The fact that Marxism-Leninism is an obligatory subject in all Soviet institutions of higher education has not stopped the erosion of ideology; on the contrary, it has actually contributed to ideology's decline. Courses are one-sided, schematic, boring and irrelevant to everyday concerns. Students have to memorize the supposedly infallible theses and concepts of the official ideology and are not allowed to take an active interest in

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independent varieties of Marxism—the study of Trotskyism, Chinese and Yugoslav communism, or the Frankfurt school and Eurocommunism is still forbidden. All of this has led most people in the Soviet Union to the conclusion that Marxism-Leninism is little more than a means for the regime to legitimize its continued rule and its policies.

Many Soviet citizens are seeking an ideological alternative to Marxism-Leninism, and many of those are finding it in religion. Gone are the times when religious believers could be found mainly among the older generation in rural areas. More and more young people, even sons and daughters of party officials, profess their faith openly—much to the chagrin of the party. Another common alternative is found in seeking one's historical roots and national traditions. Finally, in some circles one finds a renewed interest in such political alternatives as liberalism and social democracy—but also neo-Stalinism and, increasingly, nationalistic conservatism.

Under these conditions it is understandable that the party's repeated demands for an intensification of ideological work should meet with disinterest, even rejection. The ideology of Marxism-Leninism, once both a source of inspiration and an instrument for the legitimization of the regime, is no longer a vital force in Soviet society. The monotony and one-sidedness of ideological instruction and propaganda is generally considered repugnant. There can be no doubt that the Soviet regime has lost its ideological legitimacy for most people.

VII

Are we, then, witnessing the death of Soviet ideology? Will the U.S.S.R. become a "normal superpower" not motivated by a strong ideology? This is very doubtful. On the contrary, during recent years several ideological-political trends have appeared, and there is reason to believe that the U.S.S.R. is approaching an ideological crossroads. The three possible ideological alternatives for the future might be: 1) a reformation and modernization of Marxism-Leninism in accord with Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring); 2) a rise to predominance of Russian nationalism; or 3) a victory of neo-Stalinism.

The first alternative is linked with Gorbachev. He is a product of the Soviet system, but by Soviet standards he is an unusual leader. The first lawyer in the top leadership position since Lenin, he is also an agronomist. Gorbachev's career has

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been in the post-Stalin era, and he is the first postwar Soviet leader not to have participated in World War II.

Gorbachev's rise to the top has been particularly rapid. Until 1978 he was first party secretary in the Stavropol region of the northern Caucasus. In the summer of that year he was called to Moscow and promoted to the Central Committee Secretariat, where he took charge of agriculture. In November 1979 he joined the Politburo as a candidate member, and by October 1980 he had become the youngest full member of that body. In the summer of 1983, during Yuri Andropov's short rule, Gorbachev took over responsibility for cadres, ideology and consumer industries. In April 1984 he extended his influence by becoming chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Supreme Soviet; after that it took him less than a year to accede to the top post. Past top leaders had needed three decades to accomplish what Gorbachev did in seven years. His quick rise nurtures the hope that his resoluteness, independence and sense of initiative has not been broken by decades of routine bureaucratic work.

Apart from his personality, it is mainly the decay he witnessed during the Brezhnev period that was decisive for Gorbachev's reformist ideas. Like other well-informed and active functionaries he perceived that the bureaucratized economic system has blocked technological innovation, and that the continuing agricultural crisis has led to grave problems in food supplies. He realized the increasing contradictions in relations among the nations of the Soviet Union, the drastic decline of ideology, the increase of social problems—and, most of all, the degeneration of the officials of the regime.

In the first weeks after his nomination to succeed Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985, Gorbachev apparently still hoped to realize his "acceleration" (*uskoreniye*) by exhorting the people to show greater dynamism and imposing discipline through such measures as an anti-alcoholism campaign. Very soon, however, he recognized that real change could only be achieved by *glasnost* and *perestroika*. The two concepts are interrelated. Through the open discussion (*glasnost*) of shortcomings, problems and mistakes—a greater openness in the mass media, more freedom in literature and art, and a critical reevaluation of the Soviet past—Gorbachev hopes to activate Soviet citizens, to overcome their apathy and to win them over for future reforms, i.e., for *perestroika*.

The term *perestroika* implies far-reaching reforms in the

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Soviet system, in its political, economic and legal sectors, with the aim of reducing the bureaucracy, making the system more flexible and increasing the autonomy of enterprises in industry and agriculture. Of course Gorbachev does not want to install democracy, pluralism, the rule of law or the free market system as these are understood in Western democracies. He does, however, strive for changes that justify the expression "radical reforms." The political climate has already changed, although reforms of the system have hardly begun.

That *glasnost* meets strong opposition, that proclaimed reforms are delayed, has led some observers to conclude that Gorbachev's program is merely propaganda, the tactic of a new leader. This seems very unlikely; Gorbachev could have a much easier life if he would stop criticizing the failures of the Soviet system and calling for far-reaching reforms. The problem is not that he is a mere tactician, but that strong forces are in fact blocking his reforms. There are three opposing forces.

The first group is the political elite; above all, the Central Committee with its 307 full members and 170 candidates. Many among the elite fear that *glasnost* and *perestroika* might lead to a decline in the regime's authority. Their opposition is demonstrated by occasional censoring of Gorbachev's speeches, postponement of plenary sessions of the Central Committee and adoption of resolutions that are watered-down versions of Gorbachev's original proposals. All of this is a clear sign that his power is limited. His proposals to promote non-party members to important government posts and introduce a multi-candidate election system at all levels have so far been blocked.

The second strong opposition force is the huge bureaucratic apparatus (the state economic apparatus alone consists of 15.3 million officials). Its members fear losing their positions and privileges through the reforms.

Finally, Gorbachev has to reckon with a widespread skepticism among the population; many Soviet citizens are used to bureaucratic orders and find it difficult suddenly to promote changes and reforms. Many industrial workers are fearful about the new wage system. And there is, above all, a widespread disposition among the people to wait for better supplies of food and consumer goods to arrive in the shops before actively supporting *perestroika*. Among party functionaries, only the modern, open-minded and well-educated minority really supports Gorbachev's new course. He can count on the majority of the young generation and the intelligentsia—sci-

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entists, artists and journalists. But even so, under these circumstances Gorbachev needs to continue *glasnost* in order to promote his aims and to activate his supporters.

Never before has a Soviet leader been so outspoken about the shortcomings of the system. At the plenary session of the Central Committee at the end of January, Gorbachev maintained that Soviet ideology had, in many ways, stalled since the 1930s and 1940s, and he called on party members to abandon old doctrines and "modernize" ideology. Gorbachev's goal is twofold: to find an ideological justification for his planned reforms and to overcome widespread indifference to ideology. This "modernization" would begin by breaking certain taboos, discussing "unpleasant" problems which have been ignored, trying to subsume modern science into ideology and commencing with a more objective writing of Soviet history.

We can expect that economic reforms will be justified by a positive assessment of the NEP period and by an emphasis on certain of Lenin's statements, such as those supporting the establishment of cooperatives. A rehabilitation of Bukharin and Khrushchev has begun, as was evident in Gorbachev's address on the 70th anniversary of the revolution in November. Political reforms will be accompanied by an extensive criticism of Stalin's dictatorial rule and by increasing criticism of the Brezhnev era—again evident in Gorbachev's anniversary address. Foreign policy will not be dominated by the "struggle" between capitalism and socialism but by competition and even cooperation in such areas as disarmament, ecology, the Third World and the battle against international terrorism. In time this might even lead to a "reform communism"—unless, of course, the reform process is cut short.

The second ideological alternative is not Marxist-Leninist at all, but an authoritarian, Great Russian nationalism linked with nationalism among the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. The emergence of Russian nationalist groups known as *pamyat* or *otechestvo*, and recent civil disorders in Kazakhstan and in the Baltic republics imply a growing nationalism—both Russian and non-Russian. To judge from the *pamyat* groups, a Russian nationalist ideology would combine elements of extreme national chauvinism and anti-Semitism.

In this alternative, a Russian nationalist state would depend on the two traditional pillars of power—the army and the government—and its highest civic virtues would be authority and order. In foreign policy Russia would take a much harsher

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line toward the West, because of the nationalists' fundamental assessment of the West as economically, politically and culturally corrupt. A Russian nationalist government might cease to pursue a global foreign policy which involved it in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America, but it would undoubtedly pursue neo-tsarist foreign policy objectives, maintaining or increasing dominion over the countries contiguous with the Russian "empire": Eastern and Central Europe, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and parts of the Far East. Russia would be transformed from a global superpower to a continental, Eurasian power founded on tradition, authority and nationalism.

A third ideological alternative is also conceivable: a modernized Stalinism which would justify an abrupt shift to a harsher domestic and foreign policy. Neo-Stalinism is not now a dominant force, but we may be sure that it has its advocates in the government, KGB and army. The rehabilitation of Vyacheslav Molotov, positive appraisals of Stalin in the Soviet press in the summer of 1984 (under General Secretary Chernenko), and the request of certain World War II veterans to rename Volgograd "Stalingrad," are supported by a nostalgic portion of the populace that believes everything was better under Stalin, that the country needs order and strong leadership.

Should Gorbachev's reforms become bogged down, neo-Stalinists could insist on an abrupt change in policy. Economic difficulties would be blamed on the "traitors" Khrushchev, Brezhnev and especially Gorbachev. Stalin would be rehabilitated. There would be show trials, purges, vigilance campaigns and attempts, reminiscent of the 1930s, to motivate youth to rebuild the economy. Stalin's writings would be reprinted for political education; in foreign policy a harder line would be adopted, especially toward "capitalist" countries.

Which of the three alternatives discussed above—or perhaps others not mentioned here—will come to pass is a question that only the future can answer. The present crisis of Marxism-Leninism in the U.S.S.R. should not lead us to conclude, however, that ideology will not play a role in the country's future. In coming years the West will have to deal with strong ideological trends in the Soviet Union. The desire for an ideological force that moves the Soviet populace in one direction or another is not a thing of the past.

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Mikhail S. Gorbachev

DOCUMENT: THE REVOLUTION AND PERESTROIKA

It is 70 years since the unforgettable days of October 1917, those legendary days that started the count of the new epoch of social progress, of the real history of humankind.

The past—its heroism and drama—cannot fail to thrill our contemporaries. Our history is one, and it is irreversible. Whatever emotions it may evoke, it is our history, and we cherish it. Today we turn to those October days that shook the world. We look for and find in them both a dependable spiritual buttress and instructive lessons. We see again and again that the socialist option of the October Revolution has been correct.

Like Marx and Engels, Lenin was convinced that the defense force of the revolution would be a people's militia. But the concrete conditions prompted a different solution. The Civil War and the intervention from outside, imposed on the people, called for a new approach. A worker-peasant Red Army was formed by Lenin's decree. It was an army of a new type which covered itself with undying glory in the Civil War and in repulsing the foreign intervention. Those years brought severe trials for the newly established Soviet Republic. It had to settle the elementary and crucial question of whether socialism would or would not be.

From organizing production and consumption by methods of War Communism necessitated by war and dislocation, the party went over to more flexible, economically justified, "regular" instruments of influencing the social reality. The measures of the New Economic Policy [NEP] were directed to building socialism's material foundation.

These days, we turn ever more often to the last works of Lenin, to Lenin's New Economic Policy, and strive to extract from it all the valuable elements that we require today. Certainly, it would be a mistake to equate the New Economic Policy and what we are doing now at a fundamentally new level of development.

Today, there are none of those individual peasants in the country with whom to shape an alliance, which determined the most vital aims of the economic policy of the 1920s. But the New Economic Policy also had a more distant target. The task had been set of building the new society "not directly relying on enthusiasm," as Lenin wrote, "but aided by the enthusiasm engendered by the great revolution, and on the basis of personal interests, personal incentives and business principles . . . that is what experience, the objective course of the development of the revolution, has taught us."

Speaking of the creative potential of the New Economic Policy, we should evidently refer once more to the political and methodological wealth of ideas underlying the food tax. To be sure, we are interested not in its forms of those

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Editor's note: These are excerpts from Mikhail S. Gorbachev's address in Moscow on November 2, 1987, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. This version has been prepared by the editors of Foreign Affairs*; the English translation was distributed by the Soviet press agency, TASS.*

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days that had been meant to secure a bond between workers and peasants, but in the potentialities of the food tax idea in loosening the creative energy of the masses, enhancing the initiative of the individual, and removing the bureaucratic trammels that limited the operation of socialism's basic principle, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work."

When thinking of the time when "NEP Russia will become socialist Russia," Lenin could not, and never meant to, draw the picture of the future society in every detail.

But the ways and means of advancing to socialism through the building of a machine industry, through a broad establishment of cooperatives, through the enlistment of the working masses to a man in running the state, through organizing the work of the state apparatus on the principle of "better fewer, but better," and through the cultural development of the entire people, through the consolidation of the federation of free nations "without lies or bayonets"—this and this alone was to shape the face of the country as it attained a fundamentally new level of social order.

II

The period after Lenin, that is, the 1920s and the 1930s, occupied a special place in the history of the Soviet state. For decades, we have been returning to that time again and again. This is natural.

And if, at times, we scrutinize our history with a critical eye, we do so only because we want to obtain a better and fuller idea of the ways that lead to the future. It is essential to assess the past with a sense of historical responsibility and on the basis of the historical truth. This must be done, first because of the tremendous importance of those years for the destiny of our country, the destiny of socialism. Second, because those years are at the center of the everlasting discussions both in our country and abroad, where, along with a search for the truth, attempts are often made to discredit socialism as a new social system, as a realistic alternative to capitalism.

Lastly, we need truthful assessments of this and all the other periods of our history—especially now with perestroika in full gear. We need them not to settle political scores or, as they say, to let off steam, but to pay due credit to all the heroism in the past, and to draw lessons from mistakes and miscalculations.

And so, about the 1920s and 1930s after Lenin. Although the party and society had Lenin's conception of building socialism and Lenin's works of the post-revolution period to go by, the search for the way was not at all simple; it was marked by keen ideological struggle and political discussions. At their center were the basic problems of society's development, and above all the question of whether socialism could or could not be built in our country. Theoretical thought and practice cast about for the directions and forms in which to carry out socioeconomic transformations, and how to accomplish them on socialist lines in the concrete historical situation of the Soviet Union.

Above all, the country squarely faced the questions of industrialization and economic reconstruction without which building socialism and strengthening the defense capacity were unthinkable. This followed from Lenin's explicit directions, from his theoretical heritage. The question of socialist changes in the countryside, too, arose on the same plane and also according to Lenin's behests. And though, I repeat, the party had Lenin's guidelines on these issues, sharp debates erupted over them.

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It is evidently worthwhile to say that even before and after the revolution, in the first few years of socialist construction, not all party leaders by far shared Lenin's views on some of the most important problems. Besides, Lenin's recommendations could not encompass all the concrete issues concerning the building of the new society. Analyzing the ideological disputes of those times we should bear in mind that carrying out gigantic revolutionary transformations in a country such as Russia was then was in itself a most difficult undertaking.

In short, it was supremely difficult to get one's bearings and find the only correct course in that intricate and stormy situation. To a considerable extent, too, the character of the ideological struggle was complicated by personal rivalries in the party leadership.

The old differences that had existed back in Lenin's lifetime also made themselves felt in the new situation, and this in a very acute form. Lenin, as we know, had warned against this danger. In his "Letter to the Congress" he had stressed that "it is not a trifle, or it is a trifle which can assume decisive importance." And that was largely what had happened.

Their petit bourgeois nature took the upper hand in the case of some authoritative leaders. They took a factional stance. This agitated the party organizations, distracted them from vital affairs and interfered in their work. The leaders in question continued to provoke a split even after the vast majority in the party saw that their views were contrary to Lenin's ideas and plans, and that their proposals were erroneous and could push the country off the correct course.

III

This applies first of all to Leon Trotsky, who had, after Lenin's death, displayed excessive pretensions to top leadership in the party, thus fully confirming Lenin's opinion of him as an excessively self-assured politician who always vacillated and cheated. Trotsky and the Trotskyites negated the possibility of building socialism in conditions of capitalist encirclement. In foreign policy they gave priority to export of revolution, and in home policy to tightening the screws on the peasants, to the city exploiting the countryside, and to administrative and military fiat in running society.

Trotskyism was a political current whose ideologists took cover behind leftist pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric, and who in effect assumed a defeatist posture. This was essentially an attack on Leninism all down the line. The matter practically concerned the future of socialism in our country, the fate of the revolution. In the circumstances, it was essential to disprove Trotskyism before the whole people, and denude its antisocialist essence.

The situation was complicated by the fact that the Trotskyites were acting in common with the new opposition headed by Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev. Being aware that they constituted a minority, the opposition leaders had again and again saddled the party with discussions, counting on a split in its ranks. But in the final analysis, the party spoke out for the line of the Central Committee and against the opposition, which was soon ideologically and organizationally crushed.

In short, the party's leading nucleus, headed by Joseph Stalin, had safeguarded Leninism in an ideological struggle. It defined the strategy and tactics in the initial stage of socialist construction, with its political course being approved by most members of the party and most working people. An important part in

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defeating Trotskyism ideologically was played by Nikolai Bukharin, Feliks Dzerzhinsky, Sergei Kirov, Grigory Ordzhonikidze, Jan Rudzutak and others.

At the very end of the 1920s a sharp struggle ensued also over the ways of putting the peasantry on the socialist road. In substance, it revealed the different attitude of the majority in the Political Bureau and of the Bukharin group on how to apply the principles of the New Economic Policy at the new stage in the development of Soviet society. The concrete conditions of that time—both at home and internationally—necessitated a considerable increase in the rate of socialist construction.

Bukharin and his followers had, in their calculations and theoretical propositions, underrated the practical significance of the time factor in building socialism in the 1930s. In many ways, their posture reposed on dogmatic thinking and a nondialectical assessment of the concrete situation. Bukharin himself, and his followers, soon admitted their mistakes.

In this connection, it is not amiss to recall Lenin's opinion of Bukharin. "Bukharin," he said, "is not only a most valuable and major theorist of the party; he is also rightly considered the favorite of the whole party, but his theoretical views can be classified as fully Marxist only with great reserve, for there is something scholastic about him (he has never made a study of dialectics, and, I think, never fully understood it)."

The facts again confirmed that Lenin had been right.

As we see, the political discussions of that time reflected a difficult process in the party's development, marked by acute struggle over crucial problems of socialist construction. In that struggle, which had to be endured, there took shape the concept of industrialization and collectivization. Under the leadership of the party, of its Central Committee, a heavy industry, including engineering, a defense industry and a chemical industry abreast of the times, were built in short order practically from scratch, and the general electrification plan was completed.

The party charted an earlier unknown method of industrialization: to begin building a heavy industry at once, without reliance on external sources of finance, and without waiting years for capital to accumulate through the expansion of light industry. This was the only possible way in those conditions, though it was incredibly difficult for the country and the people. It was an innovative step in which the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses was taken into account as a component of economic growth. Industrialization raised the country to a fundamentally new level in one heave.

By the end of the 1930s the Soviet Union had moved to first place in Europe and second place in the world for industrial output, becoming a truly great industrial power. And looking at history with a sober eye, considering the aggregate of internal and international realities, one cannot help asking whether a course other than that suggested by the party could have been taken in those conditions. If we wish to be faithful to history and the truth of life, there can be only one answer: no other course could be taken.

In those conditions, with the threat of imperialist aggression building up visibly, the party was increasingly convinced that it was essential not just to cover but literally to race across the distance from the sledgehammer and wooden plough to an advanced industry in the shortest possible time, for without this the cause of the revolution would be inevitably destroyed.

At the same time, the period under review also saw some losses. They were

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in a definite sense connected with the successes I have just referred to. People had begun to believe in the universal effectiveness of rigid centralization, in that methods of command were the shortest and best way of resolving any and all problems. This had an effect on the attitude toward people, toward their conditions of life.

A party and government leadership system of administrative command emerged in the country, and red tape gained strength, even though Lenin had warned about its danger in his day. And a corresponding structure of administration and planning began to take shape.

In industry—given its scale at the time, when literally all the main components of the industrial edifice were conspicuous—such methods, such a system of management, generally produced results. However, an equally rigid centralization-and-command system was impermissible in tackling the problems of refashioning rural life.

It must be said frankly: at the new stage there was a deficit of the Leninist considerate attitude toward the interests of the working peasantry. Most important of all, there was an underestimation of the fact that the peasantry as a class had changed radically in the years since the revolution.

The principal figure now was the middle peasant. He had asserted himself as a farmer working the land he had received from the revolution and he had, over a whole decade, become convinced that Soviet government was his government too. He had become a staunch and dependable ally of the working class, an ally on a new basis, becoming convinced in practical terms that his life was increasingly taking a turn for the better.

And if there had been more consideration for objective economic laws and if more attention had been given to the social processes taking place in the village, if in general the attitude toward this vast mass of the working peasantry—most of whom had taken part in the revolution and had defended it from the White Guards and the forces of intervention—had been politically more judicious, if there had been a consistent line to promote the alliance with the middle peasantry against the kulak, the village moneybag, then there would not have been all those excesses that occurred in carrying out collectivization.

Today it is clear: in a tremendous undertaking, which affected the fate of the majority of the country's population, there was a departure from Lenin's policy toward the peasantry. This most important and very complex social process, in which a great deal depended on local conditions, was directed by predominantly administrative methods.

A conviction had arisen that all problems could be solved at a stroke, overnight. Whole regions and parts of the country began to compete: who would achieve complete collectivization more quickly. Arbitrary percentage targets were issued from above. Flagrant violations of the principles of collectivization occurred everywhere. Nor were excesses avoided in the struggle against the kulaks. The basically correct policy of fighting the kulaks was often interpreted so broadly that it swept in a considerable part of the middle peasantry too. Such is the reality of history.

But, comrades, if we assess the significance of collectivization as a whole in consolidating socialism in the countryside, it was in the final analysis a transformation of fundamental importance.

Collectivization implied a radical change in the entire mode of life of the preponderant part of the country's population to a socialist footing. It created

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the social base for modernizing the agrarian sector and re-gearing it along the lines of advanced farming techniques; it made possible a considerable rise in the productivity of labor, and it released a substantial share of manpower needed for other spheres of socialist construction. All this had historical effects.

To understand the situation of those years it must be borne in mind that the administrative-command system, which had begun to take shape in the process of industrialization and which had received a fresh impetus during collectivization, had told on the whole sociopolitical life of the country. Once established in the economy, it had spread to its superstructure, restricting the development of the democratic potential of socialism and holding back the progress of socialist democracy.

IV

But the aforesaid does not give a full picture of how complex that period was. What had happened? The time of ideological-political tests of the utmost gravity to the party was actually over. Millions of people had joined enthusiastically in the work of bringing about socialist transformations. The first successes were becoming apparent.

Yet at that time methods dictated by the period of the struggle with the hostile resistance of the exploiter classes were being mechanically transferred to the period of peaceful socialist construction, when conditions had changed cardinally. An atmosphere of intolerance, hostility and suspicion was created in the country.

As time went on, this political practice gained in scale and was backed up by the erroneous theory of an aggravation of the class struggle in the course of socialist construction. All this had a dire effect on the country's sociopolitical development and produced grim consequences. Quite obviously, it was the absence of a proper level of democratization in the Soviet society that made possible the personality cult, the violations of legality, the wanton repressive measures of the 1930s.

I am putting things bluntly. Those were real crimes stemming from an abuse of power. Many thousands of people inside and outside the party were subjected to wholesale repressive measures. Such, comrades, is the bitter truth. Serious damage was done to the cause of socialism and to the authority of the party. And we must say this bluntly. This is necessary to assert Lenin's ideal of socialism once and for all.

There is now much discussion about the role of Stalin in our history. His was an extremely contradictory personality. To remain faithful to historical truth we have to see both Stalin's incontestable contribution to the struggle for socialism, to the defense of its gains, the gross political errors, and the abuses committed by him and by those around him, for which our people paid a heavy price and which had grave consequences for the life of our society.

It is sometimes said that Stalin did not know of many instances of lawlessness. *Documents at our disposal show that this is not so. The guilt of Stalin and his* immediate entourage before the party and the people for the wholesale repressive measures and acts of lawlessness is enormous and unforgivable. This is a lesson for all generations.

Contrary to the assertions of our ideological opponents, the Stalin personality cult was certainly not inevitable. It was alien to the nature of socialism, represented a departure from its fundamental principles and, therefore, has no justification.

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At its 20th and 22nd Congresses, the party severely condemned the cult itself and its consequences. We now know that the political accusations and repressive measures against a number of party leaders and statesmen, against communists and nonparty people, against economic executives and military men, against scientists and cultural personalities, were a result of deliberate falsification. Many accusations were later, especially after the 20th Party Congress, withdrawn. Thousands of innocent victims were completely exonerated.

But the process of restoring justice was not seen through to the end and was actually suspended in the middle of the 1960s. Now, in line with a decision taken by the October 1987 plenary meeting of the Central Committee, we are having to return to this. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee has set up a commission for comprehensively examining new facts and documents pertaining to these matters and those known previously. Corresponding decisions will be taken on the basis of the commission's findings.

All this will also be reflected in a treatise on the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU], whose preparation is to be entrusted to a special commission of the Central Committee. This is something we have to do, the more so since even now there are still attempts to turn away from painful matters in our history, to hush them up, to make believe that nothing special happened.

We cannot agree to this. This would be disregard for the historical truth, disrespect for the memory of those who were innocent victims of lawless and arbitrary actions. Another reason why we cannot agree to this is that a truthful analysis must help us to solve today's problems of perestroika, or reorganization. That is why here too we have to be quite clear, concise and consistent.

An honest understanding of our enormous achievements as well as of past misfortunes, their full and true political evaluation, will provide real moral guidelines for the future. In drawing up a general balance sheet of the period of the 1920s and 1930s after Lenin, we can say that we have covered a difficult road, replete with contradictions and complexities, but a big and heroic road. Neither gross errors nor departures from the principles of socialism could divert our people, our country, from the road it embarked upon by the choice it made in 1917.

V

And all this was brought out forcefully in the grim trials of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.

In the West there is now much talk about the situation on the eve of the war. Truths are being laced with half-truths. This is being done especially zealously by those who are displeased with the results of World War II—political, territorial and social—by those who persist in scheming to amend those results. That is why they are interested in presenting the historical truth upside down, in garbling cause-and-effect relationships and falsifying the chronology of events.

In this context they are resorting to any lies to saddle the Soviet Union with the blame for World War II, the road to which was supposedly cleared by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Nonaggression Pact. This matter deserves being spoken about in somewhat greater detail.

Actually, it was by no means on September 1, 1939, that World War II became a tragic reality. Japan's seizure of northeast China (the Manchurian Incident of 1931–1932), Italy's attack on Ethiopia (in 1935) and on Albania (in the spring

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of 1939), the German-Italian intervention against Republican Spain (1936–1939) and Japan's armed invasion of north and then central China (in the summer of 1937)—these were the initial conflagrations of World War II.

It is a different matter that in those days the West still pretended that this did not concern it or did not concern it enough to come to the defense of the victims of aggression. Hatred of socialism, long-term designs and class selfishness prevented a sober assessment of the real dangers.

Even more: fascism was persistently being offered the mission of a strike force in an anti-communist crusade. After Ethiopia and China, Austria and Czechoslovakia were flung into the furnace of appeasement, the sword hung over Poland, over all the Baltic and Danube states, and propaganda was being conducted openly in favor of turning the Ukraine into a wheat field and livestock farm of the Third Reich.

Ultimately, the main thrusts of aggression were being channeled against the Soviet Union, and since the scheming to divide up our country had begun long before the war, it is not hard to see how limited our options were. It is said that the decision taken by the Soviet Union in concluding a nonaggression pact with Germany was not the best one. This may be so, if one is guided not by harsh reality, but by abstract conjectures torn out of their time frame.

In these circumstances, too, the issue was roughly the same as it had been at the time of the Brest[-Litovsk] peace: Was our country to be or not to be independent, was socialism on earth to be or not to be?

The U.S.S.R. made great efforts to build up a system of collective security and to avert a global slaughter. But the Soviet initiatives met with no response among the Western political leaders and politicians, who were coolly scheming how best to involve socialism in the flames of war and bring about its head-on collision with fascism.

Outcasts already by virtue of our socialist birth, we could under no circumstances be right from the imperialist point of view. As I said, the Western ruling circles, in an attempt to blot out their own sins, are trying to convince people that the Nazi attack on Poland and thereby the start of World War II was triggered by the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of August 23, 1939. As if there had been no Munich agreement with Hitler signed by Britain and France back in 1938, with the active connivance of the U.S., no Anschluss in Austria, no crucifixion of the Spanish Republic, no Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia and Klaipeda, and no conclusion of nonaggression pacts with Germany by London and Paris in 1938. By the way, such a pact was concluded by prewar Poland too. All this, as you see, fitted neatly into the structure of imperialist policy, was and is considered to be in the nature of things. It is known from documents that the date of Germany's attack on Poland ("not later than September 1") was fixed as early as April 3, 1939, that is, long before the Soviet-German pact.

In London, Paris and Washington it was known in minute detail how the preparations for the Polish campaign were really proceeding, just as it was known that the only barrier capable of stopping the Hitlerites could be conclusion of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet military alliance not later than August 1939.

These plans were also known to the leadership of our country, and that was why it sought to convince Britain and France of the need for collective measures. It also urged the Polish government of the time to cooperate in curbing aggression. But the Western powers had different designs: to beckon the U.S.S.R.

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with the promise of an alliance and thereby to prevent the conclusion of the nonaggression pact we had been offered, to deprive us of the chance to make better preparations for the inevitable attack by Hitler Germany on the U.S.S.R.

Nor can we forget that in August 1939 the Soviet Union faced a very real threat of war on two fronts: in the west with Germany and in the east with Japan, which had started a costly conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol. But life and death, scorning myths, went into their real orbits. A new chapter was beginning in contemporary history, a most grim and complex one. At that stage, however, we managed to stave off the collision with the enemy, an enemy who had left himself and his opponent but one choice: to triumph or to perish.

The Great Patriotic War brought out to the full the talent of outstanding military leaders who had emerged from the midst of the people: Georgi Zhukov, Konstantin Rokossovsky, Aleksander Vasilevsky, Ivan Konev and other distinguished marshals, generals and officers, those who commanded fronts and armies, corps, divisions and regiments, companies and platoons.

A factor in the achievement of victory was the tremendous political will, purposefulness and persistence, ability to organize and discipline people displayed in the war years by Joseph Stalin. But the brunt of the war was borne by the ordinary Soviet soldier—a great toiler of the people's own flesh and blood, valiant and devoted to his country. Every honor and eternal glory to him!

When the war ended, our ill-wishers predicted an economic decline in our country and its dropping out of world politics for a long time; they considered that it would take us half a century, if not more, to cope with the aftermath of the war. But within an extremely short period of time the Soviet people had rebuilt the war-ravaged towns and villages, and raised from their ruins factories and mills, collective and state farms, schools and colleges, and cultural institutions.

VI

But during this very same time—a time of new exploits by the people in the name of socialism—a contradiction between what our society had become and the old methods of leadership was making itself felt ever more appreciably.

Abuses of power and violations of socialist legality continued, the "Leningrad Case" and the "Doctors' Case" were fabricated. In short, there was a deficit of genuine respect for the people. People were devotedly working, studying, seeking new knowledge, accepting difficulties and shortages, but sensing that alarm and hope were building up in society, and all this gripped the public consciousness soon after Stalin's death.

In the middle of the 1950s, especially after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party [1956], a wind of change swept the country, the people's spirits rose, they took heart, became bolder and more confident. It required no small courage of the party and its leadership, headed by Nikita Khrushchev, to criticize the personality cult and its consequences, and to reestablish socialist legality.

The old stereotypes in domestic and foreign policy began to crumble. Attempts were made to break down the command-bureaucratic methods of administration established in the 1930s and the 1940s, to make socialism more dynamic, to emphasize humanitarian ideals and values, and to revive the creative spirit of Leninism in theory and practice.

The desire to change the priorities of economic development, to bring into play incentives related to a personal interest in work-results, keynoted the

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decisions of the September 1953 and July 1955 plenary meetings of the party Central Committee. More attention began to be devoted to the development of agriculture, housing, light industry, the sphere of consumption, and to everything related to satisfying human needs. In short, there were changes for the better in Soviet society and in international relations.

However, no small number of subjectivist errors were committed, and they handicapped socialism's advance to a new stage, moreover, doing much to discredit progressive initiatives. The fact is that fundamentally new problems of domestic and foreign policies, and of party development, were often being solved by voluntaristic methods, with the aid of the old political and economic mechanism. But the failures of the reforms undertaken in that period were mainly due to the fact that they were not backed up by a broad development of democratization processes.

At the October 1964 plenary meeting of the party Central Committee there was a change of the leadership of the party and the country, and decisions were taken to overcome voluntaristic tendencies and distortions in domestic and foreign policies. The party sought to achieve a certain stabilization in the policy, and to give it realistic features and thoroughness.

The March and September 1965 plenary meetings of the party Central Committee formulated new approaches to economic management. An economic reform, and big programs for developing new areas and promoting the productive forces, were worked out and began to be put into effect.

In the first few years this changed the situation in the country for the better. The economic and scientific potential was increasing, the defense capacity was being strengthened, the standard of living was rising. Many foreign policy moves enhanced the international prestige of our state. Strategic parity with the U.S. was achieved.

The country had at its disposal extensive resources for further accelerating its development. But to utilize these resources and put them to work, cardinal new changes were needed in society and, of course, the corresponding political will. There was a shortage of one and the other. And even much of what had been decided remained on paper, was left suspended in mid-air. The pace of our development was substantially retarded.

At the April 1985 plenary meeting of its Central Committee and at its 27th Congress the party frankly identified the causes of the situation that had arisen, laid bare the mechanism retarding our development and gave it a fundamental assessment.

It was stated that in the later years of the life and activities of Leonid Brezhnev the search for ways of further advancement had been largely hampered by an addiction to habitual formulas and schemes, which did not reflect the new realities. The gap between word and deed had widened.

Negative processes in the economy were gathering momentum and had, in effect, created a pre-crisis situation. Many aberrations had arisen in the social, spiritual and moral spheres, and they were distorting and deforming the principles of socialist justice, undermining the people's faith in it, and giving rise to social alienation and immorality in various forms. The growing discrepancy between the lofty principles of socialism and the everyday realities of life was becoming intolerable.

The healthy forces in the party and in society as a whole were becoming more and more acutely aware of the pressing need to overcome negative phenomena,

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to reverse the course of events to secure an acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development, and to bring about a moral purification and renewal of socialism.

It was in response to this extremely acute social need that the April 1985 plenary meeting of the Central Committee put forward the concept and strategy of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development, and the course aimed at a renewal of socialism. These were given more elaborate theoretical and political formulation in the decisions of the 27th Party Congress and subsequent plenary meetings of the Central Committee, and assumed final shape in the general policy of a revolutionary reorganization of all aspects of socialist society's life.

VII

Comrades, we have been led to the conclusion about the necessity for perestroika by pressing needs brooking no delay. But the more deeply we examined our problems and probed their meaning, the clearer it became that perestroika also has a broader sociopolitical and historical context. Perestroika implies not only eliminating the stagnation and conservatism of the preceding period, and correcting the mistakes committed, but also overcoming historically limited, outdated features of social organization and work methods.

Two key problems of the development of society determine the fate of perestroika. These are the democratization of all social life and a radical economic reform.

The purpose of the radical economic reform begun in the country is to assure, during the next two or three years, a transition from an overly centralized command system of management to a democratic system based mainly on economic methods and on an optimal combination of centralism and self-management. Today we must once again firmly say: the party will tolerate no departures from the adopted principles of the economic reform. All the changes planned must be and will be implemented in full.

The economic reform and perestroika in general forcefully advance to the forefront the human being. Social justice requires that we should give more attention to a person's individual abilities, and reward morally and materially those who work better and more, setting others an example.

Thirty months have elapsed since the April plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. What are our achievements? What juncture have we reached? The general conclusion made on this score at the plenary meeting the CPSU has just held is that we are at a turning point. By and large, we have passed through the first stage of our perestroika effort.

It would be a mistake to take no notice of a certain increase in the resistance of the conservative forces that see perestroika simply as a threat to their selfish interests and objectives. This resistance can be felt not only at management level but also in work collectives. Nor can one really doubt that the conservative forces will seize upon any difficulty in a bid to discredit perestroika and provoke dissatisfaction among the people. Even now there are those who prefer to keep ticking off the slip-ups instead of getting down to combating shortcomings and looking for new solutions.

Naturally, these people never say that they oppose perestroika. Rather, they would have us believe that they are fighting against its negative side effects, that

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they are guardians of the ideological principles that supposedly might be eroded by the increasing activity of the masses.

But, comrades, isn't it time to stop trying to scare us with all sorts of slip-ups? Of course negative side effects are inevitable in any undertaking, particularly if it is novel. But the consequences of marking time, of stagnation and indifference have a much greater impact and cost a lot more than the side effects that arise temporarily in the course of a creative effort to reshape the social fabric.

We should learn to spot, expose and neutralize the maneuvers of the opponents of perestroika—those who act to impede our advance and trip us up, who gloat over our difficulties and setbacks, who try to drag us back into the past.

Nor should we succumb to the pressure of the overly zealous and impatient—those who refuse to accept the objective logic of perestroika, who voice their disappointment with what they regard as a slow rate of change, who claim that this change does not yield the necessary results fast enough. It should be clear that one cannot leap over essential stages and try to accomplish everything at one go.

To sum up, comrades, perestroika will not succeed without a drastic invigoration of the activities of all party organizations. And so we must have a more businesslike and a more democratic attitude, we must improve organization and tighten discipline. Then we will be able to put perestroika into higher gear and impart a new impetus to socialism in its development.

VIII

During the few years when Lenin directed Soviet foreign policy, he not only worked out its underlying principles but also showed how they should be applied in a most unusual and abruptly changing situation. Indeed, contrary to initial expectations, the rupture of the "weakest link" in the chain of the capitalist system was not the "last, decisive battle" but the beginning of a long and complex process. It was a major achievement of the founder of the Soviet state that he discerned in time the actual prospects the victory in the Civil War opened before the new Russia.

He realized that the country had secured not merely a "breathing spell" but something much more important—"a new period, in which we have won the right to our fundamental international existence in the network of capitalist states." In a resolute step, Lenin suggested a policy of learning and mastering the art of long-term "existence side by side" with them. Countering leftist extremism, he argued that it was possible for countries with different social systems to coexist peacefully.

It took only 18 to 24 months in the wake of the Civil War to end the international political isolation of the state of workers and peasants. Treaties were concluded with neighboring countries and then, at Rapallo, with Germany. Britain, France, Italy, Sweden and other capitalist countries extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Republic.

The first steps were taken to build equitable relations with oriental countries—China, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. These were not simply the first victories of Lenin's foreign policy and diplomacy. They were a breakthrough into a fundamentally new quality of international affairs. The main thrust of our foreign policy has remained unchanged. We have every right to describe it as a Leninist policy of peace, mutually beneficial international cooperation and friendship among nations.

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Naturally, not all our subsequent foreign policy efforts were successful. We have had our share of setbacks. We did not make full use of all the opportunities that opened before us both before and after World War II. We failed to translate the enormous moral prestige with which the Soviet Union emerged from the war into effective efforts to consolidate the peace-loving, democratic forces and to stop those who orchestrated the cold war. We did not always respond adequately to imperialist provocations.

It is true that some things could have been tackled better and that we could have been more efficient. Nevertheless we can say on this memorable occasion that the overall thrust of our policy has remained in concert with the basic course worked out and charted by Lenin—consonant with the very nature of socialism, with its principled commitment to peace. This was overwhelmingly instrumental in averting the outbreak of a nuclear war and in preventing imperialism from winning the cold war.

Together with our allies, we defeated the imperialist strategy of "rolling back socialism." Imperialism had to curb its claims to world domination. The results of our peace-loving policy were what we could draw on at the new stage to devise fresh approaches in the spirit of the new political thinking.

Naturally, there have been changes in Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence. At first it was needed above all to create a modicum of external conditions for the construction of a new society in the country of the socialist revolution. Continuing the class-based policy of the victorious proletariat, peaceful coexistence later, particularly in the nuclear age, became a condition for the survival of the entire human race.

The April 1985 plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was a landmark in the development of Leninist thought along this line too. The new concept of foreign policy was presented in detail at the 27th Congress. As you know, this concept proceeds from the idea that for all the profound contradictions of the contemporary world, for all the radical differences among the countries that comprise it, it is interrelated, interdependent and integral.

The reasons for this include the internationalization of world economic ties, the comprehensive scope of the scientific and technological revolution, the essentially novel role played by the mass media, the state of the earth's resources, the common environmental danger, and the crying social problems of the developing world which affect us all.

The main reason, however, is the problem of human survival. This problem is now with us because the development of nuclear weapons and the threatening prospect of their use have called into question the very survival of the human race.

The October 1986 meeting in Reykjavik ranks among the events which have occurred since the new stage in international affairs began, which deserve to be mentioned on this occasion and which will go down in history. The Reykjavik meeting gave a practical boost to the new political thinking, enabled it to gain ground in diverse social and political quarters, and made international political contacts more fruitful.

The new thinking, with its regard for universal human values and emphasis on common sense and openness, is forging ahead on the international scene, destroying the stereotypes of anti-Sovietism and dispelling distrust of our initiatives and actions.

It is true that gauged against the scope of the tasks mankind will have to tackle

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to ensure its survival, very, very little has so far been accomplished. But the first signs of change are in evidence. This is borne out, among other things, by the understanding we have reached with the United States on concluding in the near future an agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles.

The conclusion of this agreement is very important in itself: it will, for the first time, eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons, be the first tangible step along the path of scrapping nuclear arsenals, and will show that it is in fact possible to advance in this direction without prejudice to anyone's interests. That is obviously a major success of the new way of thinking, a result of our readiness to search for mutually acceptable solutions while strictly safeguarding the principle of equal security.

However, the question concerning this agreement was largely settled back in Reykjavik, at my second meeting with the U.S. president. In this critical period the world expects the third and fourth Soviet-U.S. summits to produce more than merely an official acknowledgment of the decisions agreed upon a year ago, and more than merely a continuation of the discussion. The growing danger that weapons may be perfected to a point where they will become uncontrollable is urging us to waste no time.

That is why we will work unremittingly at these meetings for a palpable breakthrough, for concrete results in reducing strategic offensive armaments and barring weapons from outer space—the key to removing the nuclear threat. What, then, are the reasons for our optimism, for regarding comprehensive security as really attainable? This deserves to be discussed here in detail.

The new way of thinking has helped us generally to prove that a comprehensive system of international security in the concept of disarmament is needed and possible. In this connection, we should begin by posing some tough questions—of course, tackling them from Leninist positions and using Leninist methodology.

The first question relates to the nature of imperialism. We know that it is the major source of the war threat.

It goes without saying that external factors cannot change the nature of a social system. But, given the current stage of the world's development and the new level of its interdependence and integration, is it possible to influence that nature and block its more dangerous manifestations?

The second question is connected with the first one: Can capitalism get rid of militarism and function and develop in the economic sphere without it? Is it not a delusion on our part to invite the West to draw up and compare conversion programs for switching the economy to civilian production?

The third question: Can the capitalist system do without neocolonialism which is currently one of the factors essential to its survival? In other words, can this system function without the practices of inequitable trade with the Third World, fraught with unforeseeable consequences?

Another related question: How realistic is our hope that the awareness of the terrible threat that the world is facing—and we know that this awareness is making its way even into the higher echelons of the Western ruling elite—will be translated into practical policies? After all, however forceful the arguments of common sense, however well-developed the sense of responsibility, however powerful the instinct of self-preservation, there are still things which are determined by an economic and, consequently, a class-based self-interest. In other words, the question is whether capitalism can adapt itself to the conditions of a

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nuclear-free world without weapons, to the conditions of a new and equitable economic order, to the conditions in which the intellectual and moral values of the two world systems will be compared honestly.

But even posing these questions is enough to grasp the gravity of the task that lies ahead. We will see them answered in due time.

The postwar period has witnessed an in-depth modification of the contradictions that used to determine the principal trends in the world's economy and politics. I refer above all to the trends that inevitably led to wars, to world wars between capitalist countries themselves.

Today the situation is different. It is not only the lessons of the past war but also the fear of sapping its own strength in the face of socialism, by now a world system, that has prevented capitalism from allowing its "internal" contradictions to go to extremes.

Since an alliance between a socialist country and capitalist states proved possible in the past, when the threat of fascism arose, does this not suggest a lesson for the present, for today's world which faces the threat of nuclear catastrophe and the need to ensure safe nuclear power production and overcome the danger to the environment?

Ever since the war, the U.S. economy has been oriented and dependent on militarism which at first seemed even to stimulate it. But then this senseless and socially useless squandering of resources led to an astronomical national debt and to other problems and maladies. In the final analysis it has turned out that super-militarism increasingly aggravates the domestic situation and upsets the economies of other countries.

The recent panic on the New York Stock Exchange and on other stock exchanges across the world—a panic without precedent in almost 60 years—is a grave symptom and a grave warning.

There is another important point to be made. In the last few decades, development within the capitalist world proper has given rise to new forms of social contradictions and movements. Among them are movements to remove the nuclear threat, protect the environment, eliminate racial discrimination, rule out policies dividing society into the privileged and the underprivileged, and prevent the disaster threatening industrial areas that have fallen victim to present-day capitalist modernization.

These movements involve millions of people and are inspired and led by prominent figures in science and culture, people enjoying national and international prestige. Social democratic, socialist and labor parties and mass organizations similar to or connected with them continuously play an important role in the political processes in a number of countries, and the influence of some of them is increasing.

Thus, according to all economic, political and social indications everywhere in today's world, the thesis Lenin regarded as one of the most profound in Marxism is being vindicated: as the thoroughness of the historical action grows, the mass whose action it is will grow as well.

And this is always an unmistakable sign and the most powerful factor of social progress and, consequently, of peace. Hence the politicians' responsibility. For policy can only be effective if the novelty of the time is taken into account. Today the human factor figures on the political plane not as a remote and more or less spontaneous side effect of the life, activity and intentions of the masses. It directly invades world affairs. Unless this is realized, in other words unless the

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new thinking, one based on current realities and the people's will, is adopted, politics turn into an unpredictable improvisation, posing a risk both to one's own country and to other nations. Such politics have no lasting support.

Such are the reasons for our optimistic view of the future, of the prospects of creating an all-embracing system of international security.

This is the logic behind our stand on defense issues, too. As long as there is a danger of war and as long as the drive for social revanche forms the core of Western strategies and militarist programs, we shall continue to do everything necessary to maintain our defense capability at a level ruling out imperialism's military superiority over socialism.

Comrades, during these jubilee days, we duly commend the accomplishments of the world communist movement. The October Revolution, which has retained to this day its international momentum, is the source of the movement's viability.

The world communist movement grows and develops upon the soil of each of the countries concerned, but there is something that the image of a communist has in common, no matter what his nationality is, no matter what country he works in. It is loyalty to the idea of the best, communist society, loyalty to the working people—above all the working class, and struggle for their vital interests, for peace and democracy.

I feel this anniversary is the right occasion to mention the third Communist International. The truth about it has yet to be restored in full, and its authentic and complete history has yet to be written. For all the drawbacks and errors in activities and for all the bitterness the recollection of certain chapters in its history may evoke, the Communist International is part of our movement's great past.

Born of the October Revolution, the movement has turned into a school of internationalism and revolutionary brotherhood. And more—it has made internationalism an effective instrument furthering the interests of the working people and promoting the social progress of big and small nations.

The time of the Communist International, the Information Bureau, even the time of binding international conferences is over. But the world communist movement lives on. The communist parties are looking for their new place in the context of the profound changes unfolding as we are about to enter a new century. Their international movement is undergoing a renewal, united by respect for the similarly renewed principles of confidence, equality and sincere solidarity. The movement is open to dialogue, cooperation, interaction and alliance with any other revolutionary, democratic and progressive forces.

The CPSU has no doubts about the future of the communist movement as one that offers an alternative to capitalism and involves the most valiant and consistent fighters for peace, for their countries' independence and progress, for friendship among the world's peoples.

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CORRESPONDENCE

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

To the Editor:

Americans have good reason to be proud of the leadership our country has exercised in world affairs over the past 40 years. Before we finally and reluctantly accepted our responsibilities as the most powerful democratic nation, the world suffered the two most devastating wars in history. Since we became actively involved in world affairs, our alliances and assistance programs have preserved Free World security, encouraged democracy and development, and made the world a better place. Although the American people have been the chief beneficiary of these policies, no nation in history has ever used its power so constructively for the benefit of so many.

Today that leadership role is in serious jeopardy. We are confronted by a crisis that is perhaps the most urgent—and least recognized—foreign policy challenge to our nation. Readers of *Foreign Affairs* should understand that we are now facing:

—a third consecutive year of sharp cuts in our foreign affairs budget, forcing deep reductions in the assistance we provide to friends and allies to help protect their security and well-being as well as our own;

—serious erosion of the institutional capacity of the Department of State to conduct an effective foreign policy; and

—increasing congressional restrictions on the use of our rapidly diminishing resources.

The consequences are clear: we are denying ourselves the resources needed to safeguard our interests—containment of Soviet expansionism, support for democracy and our Western alliance partners, and maintenance of an international economic system that is the foundation of global growth and U.S. prosperity.

Ironically, this challenge to our policies arises at a time when we are achieving some remarkable foreign policy successes. Since 1981 we have restored our military capabilities, with predictably beneficial effects on our dealings with the Soviet Union. We have also strengthened ties with friends and allies, and we are witnessing a worldwide resurgence of support for democracy. We have supported impressive programs for improving standards of living in the developing world.

These are all major achievements. But at the very moment that we should be consolidating and building on these gains, the United States is mindlessly and almost without debate adopting a strategy of retreat. This is a self-inflicted wound. If we are to pursue our security, economic and humanitarian interests effectively, we have to be prepared for the long haul. We need adequate resources to assist friendly countries and support international organizations that serve our national security and economic objectives.

Since 1985 Congress has cut the international affairs budget by 24 percent, or $5.5 billion, from fiscal year 1985. The cut was ten percent in 1986, 12 percent in 1987 and four percent in the fiscal year that began in October. If these figures are adjusted for inflation and exchange-rate losses, the reduction from FY 1985 increases to 32 percent. Should the Gramm-

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Rudman-Hollings legislation require a sequestering of funds the reduction will be even greater.

These congressional budget cuts make it impossible for us to meet our commitments and pursue our security, economic and humanitarian interests around the world. Here are only a few examples:

NATO. Just as we are negotiating our military base agreements with Spain, we have had to slash aid to Spain by 73 percent. Assistance to Greece and Turkey is hundreds of millions of dollars below the level necessary to enable them to meet their NATO commitments. Assistance to Portugal is over $50 million below our "best efforts" commitment.

Central America. We are more than $500 million behind in economic assistance compared to recommendations of the Kissinger Commission.

Africa. Funding has been cut so severely that we can provide only $27 million of the $100 million in resources necessary for our initiative to support economic reform—just when many African countries are embracing free markets.

Unfortunately, I could go on and on. We are unable to meet our obligations to the multilateral development banks, which we count on to help developing countries address their serious debt problems and return to self-sustaining growth. We are not meeting our commitments to the United Nations and its important specialized agencies, at a time when we are seeking implementation of reform measures worked out with our encouragement to address the United Nations' institutional problems, and just as the Soviets are taking steps to make up what they owe.

All of this is directly relevant to all Americans. It means trade and jobs. About 40 percent of our exports go to developing countries; their ability to import depends on their economic growth. We calculate that for every billion dollars of exports, 26,000 jobs are created for Americans. One job in five in the manufacturing sector is tied to exports. So foreign affairs certainly is a bread-and-butter issue for all Americans.

The cuts also severely impair the capabilities of the State Department to conduct foreign relations effectively. In 1986 we had to close seven posts overseas—five in Western Europe, one in Canada and one in Latin America. In 1987 we proposed closing seven more. In 1988 we will have to close 13 more consulates and two embassies.

This is no time for the Congress to be hauling down the American flag around the world.

Moreover, as I told State Department employees recently, we will have to do our work with fewer people in Washington and less money. There is no choice; these are the effects of brutal budget cuts.

There is no question that we in the United States must address the serious federal budget imbalance. The State Department must play its part, and we have done so in the budget proposals made to Congress. But brutalizing our international affairs programs will not contribute significantly to deficit reduction. If we are to remain a world power, if we are to look out for our own national interests, we have adequate funding for foreign affairs and resolve our federal budget problems as well. Without adequate funds, what together we have worked so hard to achieve in the postwar world will wither. The costs of repairing that damage will far exceed the alleged "savings" that would come from reductions.

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Let me turn to another aspect of the foreign policy crisis: the seemingly inexorable encroachment of Congress into the conduct of foreign policy. We welcome a constructive dialogue with the legislative branch. But the trend toward increasing congressional restrictions is severely hampering the effective use of the inadequate assistance and institutional resources we still do have available.

In FY 1987 over one-half of our foreign assistance appropriation was earmarked, or reserved, by the Congress for particular countries; this amounted to $6.9 billion out of $13.1 billion. The full burden of accommodating budget cuts fell on those other countries—particularly in Africa and Latin America—for which funds were not earmarked. Military assistance to those countries was cut 63 percent from the president's request. For assistance financed from the Economic Support Fund appropriation the cut was 59 percent. In the crucial Middle East our programs in Israel and Egypt were protected by congressional earmarking of funds. Assistance to Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco, however, had to be cut by 35 percent in FY 1987. This weakened our efforts to check the spread of Soviet influence in the region.

Congressional restrictions take other forms. The readers of *Foreign Affairs* may have noted recent accounts of how the Senate passed in record time over 80 amendments to the State Department authorization bill. Neither the Senate version nor the earlier version passed by the House of Representatives provides sufficient funds to maintain even the current level of State Department operations; yet both versions impose new functions that greatly increase costs.

In short, Congress is now going beyond its appropriate role in trying to tell the executive branch how it should do its work. There must be a separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, but the former must have the scope to decide how to manage programs approved by the Congress.

Over the past 40 years the United States has made enormous progress in pursuing its national objectives abroad through a professional foreign affairs institution and effective policies that have had substantial bipartisan support. The future is promising for our interests—but only if we persevere. Some among us, however, seem to be tiring of the burden.

Increasingly, resource constraints and congressional restrictions are dictating an American withdrawal from world leadership which is contrary to our economic well-being and which threatens both our security and our national interests abroad. And ironically, this is occurring at a time when our adversaries are increasing their investment in foreign affairs activities and improving substantially the quality of their diplomacy.

Our challenge is to restore the resources needed to conduct a responsible foreign policy, and then to use them creatively. This is not a passing budgetary issue besetting only the present Administration. If we do not meet the foreign affairs resource crisis that we face, our government's capacity to pursue our essential foreign policy and national security interests will be crippled for years to come.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

A LIFE IN PEACE AND WAR. By Brian Urquhart. New York: Harper & Row, 1987, 390 pp. $25.00.

The life of a United Nations civil servant would not appear to be a tempting dish, but Urquhart's offers real sustenance, served in light and lively style. Placed near the top—as adviser and action officer to all five secretaries-general and working closely for many years with Ralph Bunche—he was involved in all the major crises and decisions in which the U.N. had a role, and made signal contributions of his own to its peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavors. His account of the Congo affair, a mixture of high policy and harrowing personal adventure on the scene, is especially good. Having been present from the beginnings in 1945 until his retirement in 1986, he is able to convey the moods within and toward the world organization that changed with the times: the early enthusiasm, the tensions of the years of high cold war, the new vistas of hope opened up by Hammarskjöld's brilliant accomplishments, the disillusion and sense of irrelevance brought on by the big powers' neglect and the shrill rhetoric of the Third World. He writes with candor and an occasional humorous twist about events and personalities, including the secretaries-general whom he served.

WAR IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. By Evan Luard. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, 468 pp.

The most ambitious treatise on war in English since Quincy Wright's *Study of War* appeared in 1942. The method is not philosophical or technical but historical, empirical and, in the author's phrase, sociological. He divides world history (the focus is mainly, but not only, on Europe) since medieval times into five ages: of dynasties (1400–1559), of religions (1559–1648), of sovereignty (1648–1789), of nationalism (1789–1917) and of ideology (1917–present). He then takes up, for each period, the key aspects of war as a social phenomenon (issues, motives, decisions, calculus of gains and costs, and beliefs), all from the standpoint of those making the vital choices for war or peace. It is all logical enough, perhaps too much so since, as the author concedes, many of these things are unmeasurable and one can inquire endlessly into the "causes" of war. Here the same wars and the same explanations keep turning up; thus, much of the text, for the reader, is *déjà lu*. The conclusions are well drawn, realistic and not wholly pessimistic.

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THE AGE OF TERRORISM. By Walter Laqueur. Boston: Little, Brown, 1987, 385 pp. $19.95.
THE NEVER-ENDING WAR: TERRORISM IN THE 80s. By Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne. New York: Facts on File, 1987, 356 pp. $18.95.
INVISIBLE ARMIES: TERRORISM INTO THE 1990s. By Stephen Segaller. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987, 311 pp. $17.95.

All three of these books, which together take us from the distant past into the 1990s, have considerable merit without presuming to have many answers, and without being in full agreement with one another. Laqueur's book, an extensive revision of his earlier work *Terrorism* (1977), is rich in historical background, full in coverage of events and coldly realistic. He believes there has been far too much mythology and loose thought on the subject; that Western governments have given it more attention than it deserves; and that endeavors by "experts" to define terrorism, to find its causes and patterns and to derive therefrom policies to counter it are largely wasted effort. In *The Never-Ending War*, two British journalists who have made a specialty of writing about terrorism attempt to put it all together in one comprehensive volume, complete with a "who's who of terror" and a chronology covering the years 1968–1986. Their book is crammed with facts, and is readable and informative, with some comment on causes and remedies, although there is, as they rightly say, no cure. Stephen Segaller also tries to get behind the current hysteria and probe into and understand the various terrorist types. He recognizes that terrorism is in most cases a political problem requiring more than a good intelligence service and effective police action. A veteran British observer, he is quite skeptical of the common American tendency to see the Soviet Union as the source and supporter of worldwide terrorism.

TROUBLESOME PEOPLE: THE WARRIORS OF PACIFISM. By Caroline Moorehead. Washington: Adler & Adler, 1987, 344 pp. $19.95.

The saga of the apostles and devotees of pacifism from the conscientious objectors of World War I to the ban-the-bomb marchers and the campers at Greenham Common today. More a series of portraits and sketches than a systematic history, it nevertheless succeeds in giving an account that is reasonably comprehensive and both sympathetic and objective. Mainly the book is about what took place in Britain, but for the period since 1945 there is more than cursory mention of the United States (the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam War protest), Germany (the rise of the Greens) and Japan (the legacy of Hiroshima). While the effects of pacifism on national policies and international relations have often been imperceptible, the questions of conscience and principle raised by these "troublesome" people remain.

TRAITORS AND HEROES. By Martin Garbus. New York: Atheneum, 1987, 305 pp. $19.95.

Martin Garbus is a crusader for human rights. As a lawyer for individual defendants or observer for international organizations he has been present at trials in South Africa, Chile and the Soviet Union, countries where legal processes are used as tools for the imposition of the will of those holding power and the suppression of dissidence; treason is as they define it. After describing his experiences in those countries he goes on to discuss the state

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of human rights in the United States and takes his stand as an absolutist on the bill of rights: freedom, uncompromised and uncompromising, for the individual. On foreign policy he is critical of all recent administrations (including Carter's) for insufficient support of human rights throughout the world.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Gregory F. Treverton

STRATEGY: THE LOGIC OF WAR AND PEACE. By Edward N. Luttwak. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, 283 pp. $20.00.

If Edward Luttwak does not always persuade, he always provokes. In this superb book, one that will become a classic of strategy, he does both. He may overstate the uniqueness of his theme—that strategy is "pervaded by a paradoxical logic of its own"; much of human activity is riddled with paradox, as immunologists know and those who wait in a long line of traffic for a brief glance at what caused the traffic jam can sense. However, his definition of five levels of strategy is enriching and his historical examples fascinating. Along the way, his case study of NATO demolishes proposals for defense-in-depth, casts doubt on those for deep strike, and demonstrates that he understands the paradoxical logic of NATO strategy and its connection to American nuclear force posture better than anyone else.

SUPERPOWER ARMS CONTROL: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT. Edited by Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987, 392 pp. $34.95 (paper, $14.95).
CALCULATED RISKS: A CENTURY OF ARMS CONTROL, WHY IT HAS FAILED AND HOW IT CAN BE MADE TO WORK. By Bruce D. Berkowitz. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987, 192 pp. $18.95.

Arms control is praised or damned but seldom is its history analyzed: that is the premise of both these books, and the conclusions of the two are broadly similar. The Carnesale-Haass volume, commissioned by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is more detailed in its analysis and uses the evidence of its cases to assess propositions frequently made about the effects of arms control. For instance, do arms control agreements lull the United States into spending less on defense? Not by the book's evidence—quite the contrary. Berkowitz's conclusions reflect what has become the conventional wisdom among moderate critics of arms control—that arms control should not carry too much of the freight of U.S.-Soviet relations, and that negotiations should not be carried out in the glare of publicity—but also demonstrate how far political reality diverges from that conventional wisdom, a fact that makes his policy prescription less than helpful.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND NUCLEAR BALANCE. By Richard K. Betts. Washington: Brookings, 1987, 240 pp. $28.95 (paper, $10.95).

Richard Betts' thoughtful work is also testimony to the notion that historical evidence can be brought to bear on strategic issues more often than it is. Building on the work of his former Brookings Institution colleagues, Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, he addresses the question of whether perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance have affected American behavior in crises. His conclusions are thought-provoking: there was

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no "golden age" of American nuclear invulnerability, for U.S. leaders in the 1950s and 1960s did not feel their country was invulnerable. Nevertheless, those leaders were prone to making nuclear threats even though they had not thought carefully about what they would do if the bluff were called.

MAKING WEAPONS, TALKING PEACE: A PHYSICIST'S ODYSSEY FROM HIROSHIMA TO GENEVA. By Herbert F. York. New York: Basic Books, 1987, 346 pp. $22.95.
FROM DETERRENCE TO DEFENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF STRATEGIC POLICY. By Michael Charlton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, 154 pp. $20.00 (paper, $8.95).

These very different books are both inside accounts of America's nuclear history. York's is a warm, engaging memoir of his life from graduate student with the Manhattan Project to arms control negotiator for the Carter Administration; he is charitable to foes and sprinkles his book with portraits of the famous scientists he knew, from John von Neumann to the Soviet physicist Peter Kapitza. Charlton's book, which grew out of a BBC series on SDI, portrays the history through the words of 23 eminent Americans and Europeans, from Robert McNamara's disillusion with strategic defense in the 1960s to Richard Perle's embrace of it in the 1980s.

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN STRATEGY. By David C. Hendrickson. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987, 210 pp. $34.95 (paper, $16.95).

These days Walter Lippmann's famous admonition, that a nation's commitments must be "related to its resources, and its resources adequate to its commitments," is most often deployed by conservatives in support of more defense spending. This provocative essay, however, sees "a pernicious tendency to deprecate our power and exaggerate our interests. The power most often deprecated resides in our air and naval forces . . . . " More intriguingly in light of recent events, the interests that are exaggerated are in the Persian Gulf; diminished American dependence on oil from that region should make possible a degree of disengagement, with large implications for force posture.

SPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. By Paul B. Stares. Washington: Brookings, 1987, 220 pp. $28.95 (paper, $10.95).

This is an informative survey, although its title is broader than its subject: it is really about military satellites and weapons designed to destroy them. Other than recognizing that the techniques for intercepting satellites and missiles are similar, it says little about space-based strategic defense. Its brief is a caution against a race in antisatellite weapons and in favor of arms control in space.

PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE REPORT AND PAPERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM. Edited by Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1987, 472 pp. $22.95 (paper).

It is striking, if not surprising, that so much attention is paid to the least likely use of nuclear weapons, war between the superpowers, and so little to the more likely disasters—nuclear wars in the Third World or nuclear terrorism. The work of this task force is a welcome attempt to address the last. Its warning is measured—there is no evidence that terrorist groups

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yet have the combination of will and ability to build nuclear devices—yet even a plausible nuclear hoax could be terrifying. And yet its recommendations amount to doing more of what we are already doing—more permissive action links (PALs) on nuclear weapons, especially sea-based ones, more safeguards and more efforts to discourage the use of weapons-grade materials in nuclear reactors. Several of the background papers are quirky or polemical, but most are helpful. Most readers will be surprised to learn that the U.S. already has Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NESTs) for possible use in dealing with nuclear terrorism.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. By Arthur Cyr. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 156 pp.
NEW CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND WESTERN DEFENCE. Edited by Ian Bellany and Tim Huxley. London: Frank Cass, 1987, 198 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, $29.50).

The columnist Meg Greenfield wrote in 1980: "I have been trying to think of a time when the Alliance was in array." That theme—the durability of NATO through disruption and differing interests—is the center of Cyr's brief historical essay. His material is not new, but his summary is readable and his reminder apt. The Bellany-Huxley volume, the result of a project at Lancaster University's Centre for the Study of Arms Control and International Security, addresses a recent "disruption"—the development of new conventional technology. Many of the chapters are specifically British in perspective, but several raise issues for the alliance as a whole. For instance, Phil Williams argues that some new technologies—conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missiles in particular—might enhance deterrence but could also make escalation more rapid if war occurred. Thus, they would not raise the nuclear threshold in Europe; they might lower it.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

PRODUCTION, POWER, AND WORLD ORDER: SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MAKING OF HISTORY. By Robert W. Cox. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, 500 pp. $45.00.

The sweeping title heralds an exceptional book that aims to understand "current historical change from the standpoint of a reciprocal relationship between power and production." Nation-states, the international economic and political system and a wide range of "social relations of production" come into the picture. Familiar ideas mix with the unfamiliar, and few readers will agree with everything that is put before them, either in the extensive historical sections or in the discussion of the 1970s. Considering his long experience at the International Labor Organization, it is not surprising that Professor Cox of York University in Toronto should be particularly strong on all matters relating to the organization of work and its political and economic consequences. He is also very interesting on the conditions under which one kind of world order has given way to another, and on the part states have played in shaping national economies. There are some weaknesses, but one has to withhold a final judgment on this

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original work since it is only the first of four volumes in a series (two of them by another author).

FACING THE FUTURE: GERMANY BREAKING NEW GROUND. By Lothar Späth. Berlin and New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986, 196 pp.

In a manner unusual for officeholders, the minister-president of the West German state of Baden-Württemberg delves deeply into the economic, social and political implications of creating an "information society." He sees Germany as lagging and argues in some detail for the kinds of changes he thinks necessary. They touch on almost everything, including labor relations, macroeconomic policies, education and infrastructure. Though a strong advocate of private enterprise, he sees a crucial and complex place for governments in these processes, which involve changes in values as well as structures.

PERSPECTIVES ON A U.S.-CANADIAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. Edited by Robert M. Stern, Philip H. Trezise and John Whalley. Washington: Brookings, 1987, 266 pp. $32.95 (paper, $12.95).

These papers, and brief comments on them, from a conference sponsored by the University of Michigan and the University of Western Ontario do a very good job of discussing many possible aspects of a free trade area between the United States and Canada. They give a good bit of attention to the effects on third countries and the international trading system as well.

FIXING FARM TRADE: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES. By Robert L. Paarlberg. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987, 159 pp. $16.95. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

International trade negotiations, in GATT and elsewhere, could do much to improve world agriculture, but one cannot feel very sure that will happen. The possibilities and the limits are well laid out in this clear and authoritative book. Using the best work in agricultural economics and a realistic political analysis, the author shows how present costs and distortions have to be dealt with by national policies, not least those of the United States.

MARSHALL PLAN DAYS. By Charles P. Kindleberger. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 273 pp. $34.95.

Of the 14 papers written over 40 years, only a few date from the time Professor Kindleberger worked on the Marshall Plan for the State Department, but this valuable collection is fortified by recollections, research and some interesting letters the author wrote from Europe in the 1940s. Naturally one becomes rather familiar with some of the author's ideas and turns of phrase, but the lively introductory notes to each paper not only provide a setting but relate it to others. There are sharp rebuttals of some latter-day criticism of the Marshall Plan, but Kindleberger is not one to indulge in nostalgia or claim that everything was done in the best of all possible ways.

ALLY VERSUS ALLY: AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE CRISIS. By Antony J. Blinken. New York: Praeger, 1987, 204 pp. $37.95 (paper, $12.95).

This lively account of the 1982 dispute between the United States and several of its European allies about support for the building of the Soviet

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pipeline to Western Europe is full of facts and well-digested data. It correctly links the episode to long-standing differences in attitudes toward trade with the U.S.S.R. and in the process naturally covers a good bit of familiar ground. An analysis demonstrating how little the United States achieved by its efforts opens the way for the conclusion that there will be increased East-West trade but great political advantage will not necessarily flow from it.

FOREIGN AID RECONSIDERED. By Roger C. Riddell. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1987, 309 pp. $35.00.

Should aid be given to poor countries because it is right to do so? Or should aid be ended because it keeps people from helping themselves and interferes with the economic forces that shape true development? Neither view rests on a convincing general case, as this well-reasoned book shows. Most people may not think it necessary to read nearly 300 pages to learn that "aid can be and frequently is a positive force in development," but they would be well advised to find out why this is a sounder and more meaningful judgment than the simpler statements they hear more often. Mr. Riddell of the Overseas Development Institute in London does a fine job of showing the limits of both factual data and critical arguments before making a few constructive suggestions of his own.

THE PEASANT BETRAYED: AGRICULTURE AND LAND REFORM IN THE THIRD WORLD. By John P. Powelson and Richard Stock. Boston: Oelgeschlager (in association with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy), 1987, 302 pp.

Professor Powelson has long been an independent-minded, close student of developing countries who tends to come up with documented analyses rather different from those of other people. This time, with the help of studies of 16 countries, he argues that land reform, often undertaken with the best intentions, has mostly been used to exploit peasants. They gain title to the land, but government offices retain control over farming and pricing systems, extract resources from the peasants and pass them to the government where they are often dissipated. The only solution, says Powelson, is for peasants to have enough power and technical know-how to bring about land reform on their own terms and not from the top down.

BEYOND RECRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-TAIWAN TRADE TENSIONS. By Jimmy W. Wheeler and Perry L. Wood. Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1987, 218 pp.

Heavily dependent on the American market and with a fuzzy political status, Taiwan needs to avoid the damage that would come from harsh American protectionist measures. Measures that would help and also strengthen the island's economy are discussed in this useful volume, which also gives sober advice to Americans on how to look at a country which, although it has a trade surplus like that of South Korea and Japan, is otherwise quite different. There is a helpful statistical appendix.

WORLD TRADE RIVALRY: TRADE EQUITY AND COMPETING INDUSTRIAL POLICIES. By William A. Lovett. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1987, 260 pp. $35.00.

The text for the most part is a wide-ranging survey of world economic problems. The concluding chapter is an extensive bill of particulars for

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American economic policy on a number of different (though related) subjects intended to increase competitiveness. The author, a professor of law and international economics at Tulane University, calls for lots of action. Although he does not want the United States to increase trade barriers drastically, he says it should end its "unilateral trade openness to become more like Europe and Japan"—but he is not altogether persuasive as to how this balance might be achieved.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN TRADE. By Helena Stalson. Washington: National Planning Association, 1987, 106 pp. $15.00 (paper).

"In a short space of time, the ancient practice of commercial piracy has become a major issue in international economic policy-making." This valuable monograph shows why that has happened and how the protection of patents, copyrights and trademarks has become an important objective of American foreign trade policy. There are good examinations of existing international arrangements and the discontents to which they give rise. The author's long experience in studying trade policy is reflected in the thoughtful and thorough weighing of multilateral versus bilateral approaches. A substantial bibliography adds to the usefulness of this excellent pioneering study.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

REMAKING JAPAN: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AS NEW DEAL. By Theodore Cohen. Edited by Herbert Passin. New York: Free Press, 1987, 533 pp. $27.50.

Theodore Cohen began his study of Japan as a college student in the 1930s, served in the OSS during World War II, and was head of the labor section of the U.S. occupation under General MacArthur, after which he remained in Japan as a businessman. This fine book, completed before his death in 1983, describes the development and implementation of American occupation policies, the Japanese reaction and the role of strong personalities, beginning with MacArthur himself. It is a memoir reinforced with extensive research and lifelong experience, an indispensable source for understanding the transformation of Japan during the occupation, a transformation which must rank among the more remarkable phenomena of modern history.

THE LONG PEACE: INQUIRIES INTO THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR. By John Lewis Gaddis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, 332 pp. $24.95.

A distinguished historian of post-1945 international relations presents eight substantial, thoroughly researched essays on the overall theme of the war the United States and the Soviet Union have managed to avoid with each other. Topics include why the United States did not use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union in the years of its superiority, how the U.S. tried to exploit divisions within the communist world, and the emergence of a mutually beneficial regime of satellite reconnaissance. Although

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much of the material has appeared in journals and conference proceedings, its accessible concentration in one volume is welcome.

CONTAINMENT: CONCEPT AND POLICY. Edited by Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1986, 2 vols.

This hefty collection of recollections and original articles is based on a symposium sponsored by the National Defense University and the Foreign Service Institute to mark the 40th anniversary of George Kennan's original formulation of the concept of "containment." It includes an introduction by Professor Gaddis, recollections by Kennan and others who were in government in 1946–47, and 28 essays on the history and future of containment from regional, functional and theoretical angles. Although some of the material is thin, the overall quality is excellent.

THE TWILIGHT STRUGGLE: TALES OF THE COLD WAR. By William Attwood. New York: Bessie/Harper & Row, 1987, 433 pp. $20.00.

Here is an enthralling, beautifully written, humorous and humane account of the author's travels over the world as journalist and diplomat since World War II. The title is misleading, or perhaps tongue in cheek, for the book is more about foolishness on both sides of the cold war than struggle. The chapters on Mr. Attwood's encounter with Fidel Castro and his ambassadorships to Guinea and Kenya are especially interesting.

CLOAK AND GOWN: SCHOLARS IN THE SECRET WAR, 1939–1961. By Robin W. Winks. New York: Morrow, 1987, 607 pp. $22.95.

A Yale historian describes how one university pitched in during World War II (in ways that would have been applauded then had they been widely known), and then tells of a small sample of Yale men in parts of the OSS, both frustrated and fulfilled. The only story truly carried forward to the era of the CIA is that of the pivotal James Angleton, in a chapter that is a balanced mini-book, and which should be, with the extensive and sophisticated end notes, the book's most useful contribution for students of intelligence. For the rest this is a well-done case study of both the OSS and the wartime relations between "cloak" and "gown," rather than a comprehensive assessment of either. A concluding chapter to draw morals and connect past to present is provocative but sketchy. William P. Bundy

ON THE RUN. By Philip Agee. New York: Lyle Stuart, 1987, 400 pp. $19.95.

The author is the best-known *bête noire* of the Central Intelligence Agency because of the exposures of CIA operations—and, worse, personnel—in his 1974 book *Inside The Company*, and his efforts since to discredit and destabilize the agency. This fascinating autobiography describes his difficulties with the U.S. and West European governments since he left the CIA and his support for nations and movements which, in his opinion, are victims of U.S. imperialism: e.g., Iran, Nicaragua and the Grenada of Maurice Bishop. The book is likely to raise blood pressure among members of the intelligence establishment—which is, of course, the intent.

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COVERT ACTION: THE LIMITS OF INTERVENTION IN THE POSTWAR WORLD. By Gregory F. Treverton. New York: Basic Books, 1987, 293 pp. $19.95.

This is a succinct, authoritative history and critique of the government's use of covert action to shape or overthrow foreign regimes. Mr. Treverton's interest in the subject began in 1975 when he served on the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee). His conclusion, based on deep knowledge of major actions (Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, Angola and others), is that covert action cannot be kept secret, usually has consequences far different from and less desirable than those intended, often ties the U.S. to clients who are not easily controlled, undermines the comparative advantage which the United States has as an open society, and is almost always a bad idea.

THE IRAN-CONTRA CONNECTION: SECRET TEAMS AND COVERT OPERATIONS IN THE REAGAN ERA. By Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott and Jane Hunter. Boston: South End Press, 1987, 324 pp. $30.00 (paper, $11.00).

This book uses the vacuum-cleaner approach: it sucks up every possible lead, every hint of connection, to construct a picture of the Iran-contra affair as part of a coordinated global system of covert action beyond the law. The authors are right in criticizing the Tower Commission for seeing the affair as primarily the outcome of Reagan's management style. They are right in noting that covert action often leads to abuses. But they weaken their own case through their failure to differentiate between strong evidence and weak.

THE ORIGINS OF THE IRANIAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE, 1941–1953. By Mark Hamilton Lytle. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987, 239 pp.

Recent events illustrate what can happen when Americans who make policy toward Iran are ignorant of history. The directly relevant past in Iranian-American relations begins not with the revolution of 1978–79, not even with the CIA's participation in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953, but with World War II when the U.S. government first sought to exert a large, protective influence (against both the Soviets and the British) over the country. Mr. Lytle tells the story in a compact, meticulous way. This is an important addition to the literature.

THE NIXON PRESIDENCY. Edited by Kenneth W. Thompson. Washington: University Press of America, 1987, 416 pp.

This is the sixth in a series of oral history volumes prepared by the White Burkett Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. Men who worked closely with Nixon recall the man and the presidency. Most agree that Nixon's intellect is extraordinary—"the highest of any person ever to serve in the Oval Office," said one adviser—but that he suffers from an incapacity to like other people and be liked in turn. The volume is thin in the area of foreign affairs because the principal participants did not accept invitations to be interviewed.

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REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO KISSINGER. By Michael Joseph Smith. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987, 256 pp. $30.00.

The subjects of this graceful, informative book are Max Weber (hitherto neglected in terms of his thinking about international relations), E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Henry Kissinger. Although these figures have all been widely read and often analyzed, Mr. Smith has written a fresh delineation of their differences and similarities while presenting a balanced criticism of the strengths and weaknesses of "realism" itself. The greatest difficulty for all "realists" has been in defining the "national interest" whose preservation, they all agree, must be the goal of foreign policy.

THREE FACES OF IMPERIALISM: BRITISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO ASIA AND AFRICA, 1870–1970. By Phillip Darby. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, 267 pp. $22.60.

This is a systematic comparison of the attitudes toward empire of the elites in Britain before 1939 and in the United States after 1945. The author examines ideas of strategic power, moral obligation and economic advantage. Although the structure is somewhat mechanical, the book is a valuable addition to the considerable literature on the subject.

AMERICA OUTSIDE THE WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By Louis René Beres. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1987, 172 pp. $19.95.

This critique of American foreign policy centers on what the author calls "the fatal limitations of obsessive anti-Sovietism"—a phenomenon which he believes flows from the failure of Americans to live and think as free individuals rather than as members of a crowd. Stimulating as philosophy, but not readily applicable as prescription for change.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY. Edited by John W. McDonald, Jr., and Diane B. Bendahmane. Washington: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, 1987, 89 pp. $2.75 (paper).

This little book explores the possibilities and occasional drawbacks of "track two" diplomacy—i.e., the use of unofficial intermediaries as a means of preparing for the resolution of conflict along the official "track one." There are case studies involving the Dominican Republic, the two Germanies, the two Koreas, and Egypt, the PLO and Israel.

PRIVATE DIPLOMACY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by David D. Newsom. Washington: University Press of America/Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1987, 150 pp. $22.50 (paper, $8.75).

This is a small book filled with sound, practical advice on the pitfalls and opportunities of nongovernmental contacts with the Soviet Union. Highly recommended for individuals and groups preparing to deal with Soviet counterparts.

THE FULBRIGHT EXPERIENCE, 1946–1986. Edited by Arthur Power Dudden and Russell R. Dynes. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1987, 345 pp. $29.95.

A volume of 47 informal, personal statements of what being a Fulbright scholar meant to the individual writers, a beaming celebration on the 40th

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anniversary of a remarkable program. There is little deep analysis but plenty of human interest and testimony to the diversity of Fulbrighters and their skills.

The Western Hemisphere

Linda S. Robinson

CONDEMNED TO REPETITION: THE UNITED STATES AND NICARAGUA. By Robert A. Pastor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, 392 pp. $24.95.

A good blow-by-blow account of policymaking toward Nicaragua during the Carter Administration, in which the author served as chief Latin Americanist on the National Security Council staff. Painful but salutary to read, this balanced, even detached examination of what went wrong is motivated by the desire to offer advice on how to avoid another such failure. The author underscores the United States' propensity to repeat errors by drawing many parallels between "losing Cuba" and "losing Nicaragua." But most interesting here are the particulars of the latter debacle: the attachment of President Carter (and some top advisers) to nonintervention despite the pleas of moderate Nicaraguans and Latin American leaders for early action to remove Somoza; the Administration's inattention at a crucial late phase (Iran, China and the Soviet Union were formidable competitors for attention); and finally, the U.S. officials who wanted firmer action earlier but lost the internal policy debate despite the fact that they were, in retrospect, right. As Pastor writes, regarding the decision not to press Somoza: "The lack of enthusiasm on the part of the two key people implementing U.S. policy [Vaky and Bowdler] should have served as a warning signal. . . . "

REAGAN VERSUS THE SANDINISTAS. Edited by Thomas W. Walker. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 337 pp. $30.00 (paper, $14.85).
NICARAGUA: THE PRICE OF INTERVENTION. By Peter Kornbluh. Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987, 287 pp. $8.95 (paper).

Both books document the Reagan Administration's anti-Sandinista policies in great detail: the first is more scholarly and covers a wider range of issues, including the Indians, religion, the diplomatic record, harassment of U.S. scholars and Sandinista supporters, and electronic media penetration of Nicaragua. William LeoGrande examines the vacillation of Congress. A polemical conclusion by Noam Chomsky is preceded by a balanced chapter by Sung Ho Kim which argues that, while Sandinista aid to the Salvadoran rebels violated nonintervention principles, U.S. intervention in Nicaragua's internal affairs is not warranted. Peter Kornbluh, an analyst at the National Security Archive, focuses on the covert network aiding the rebels, the U.S. military presence in Honduras, the role of countries bordering Nicaragua, and efforts to influence perceptions of Nicaragua. He makes use of some of the Iran-contra revelations (the Walker book was finished before the scandal broke). Both assessments are of course critical, but neither proposes alternative policies.

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FORGING PEACE: THE CHALLENGE OF CENTRAL AMERICA. By Richard Fagen. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 161 pp. $24.95 (paper, $7.95). Sponsored by Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA).

This book follows the 1984 PACCA book *Changing Course*, which argued against the military component of the Kissinger Commission's policy prescriptions. *Forging Peace* pursues the same line, presenting many statistics (most with sources) and a "two-gap" model showing little economic growth in Central America if current conflicts continue, but growth of three to four percent a year if there is peace. The latter scenario does not require more aid than present policies, but U.S. aid to El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica in the 1980s has amounted to over half of all aid to Latin America. The muscular prose is unnecessary; the statistics speak for themselves. While land and income distribution are still highly unequal, the author overlooks implementation of some land reform in El Salvador.

LIBERATION THEOLOGY. By Phillip Berryman. New York: Pantheon, 1987, 231 pp. $6.95 (paper).

It is conceivable, the author contends, that liberation theology is the initial phase of a shift in the history of Christianity that will be comparable to the Reformation; each a movement whose fate is bound up with the emergence on the world stage of those who have been excluded. "People do not simply happen to be poor; their poverty is largely a product of the way society is organized." Robert D. Crassweller

THE SELLING OF FIDEL CASTRO: THE MEDIA AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION. Edited by William E. Ratliff. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1987, 193 pp. $19.95 (paper, $12.95).

Six essays explore the curiosities of media fascination with Fidel Castro, a phenomenon the authors believe is accounted for in part by the fact that "Castro has an instinctive talent for personal and media manipulation." A useful preface forms a backdrop, putting Cuban realities into accurate perspective, so that they contrast all the more strangely with the sometimes mythic media treatment. Robert D. Crassweller

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

DESCENT TO SUEZ: FOREIGN OFFICE DIARIES, 1951–1956. By Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh. New York: Norton, 1987, 380 pp. $24.95.

The diaries of a British diplomat who, from 1951 to 1954, was the private secretary of Anthony Eden, then the foreign minister. A companion to John Colville's *The Fringes of Power*, Shuckburgh's account is perhaps more egotistical, but it is a readable and revealing source. Fascinating glimpses of international politics, of Churchill's whimsical impetuosity, of Eden's all-absorbing ambition to become his successor—all against the background of great crises from Indochina to Palestine. It describes a time of Britain's steady decline, inadequately perceived and acknowledged at the time; also a time of friction between the U.S. and the U.K., though President Eisenhower emerges here (as elsewhere) as a shrewd, active leader. There are startling details, such as Dulles' plans in 1954 for an Anglo-American

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military rescue operation in Indochina in order to replace the French. From 1954 to 1956 Shuckburgh was in charge of Middle Eastern questions, and his exasperation with Jewish pressure and Israeli politics was great. Suez was the culminating failure of British leadership in those years. A corrective of nostalgia: the "special relationship" was always troubled by what in British eyes seemed American arrogance and lack of deference, and the early 1950s had their share of folly and faulty leadership.

ANTHONY EDEN: A BIOGRAPHY. By Robert Rhodes James. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987, 665 pp. $22.95.

An outstanding biography of one of Britain's more intriguing modern figures. Rhodes James has produced a persuasive, readable and objective account, even though he had the support of the family. Eden's strange family history and his traumatic World War I experiences explain much of his character and his subsequent public record. Unfortunately for Eden, he came to be thought of as Churchill's heir, though his political origins put him closer to Baldwin and Chamberlain. The account of the long fencing match between Eden and Churchill over the latter's intended retirement is a gem. The reader will naturally be drawn to the lengthy narrative of the Suez crisis. Eden's dogged determination to pursue this ill-fated project is still puzzling despite the author's balanced explanation, which is that Eden's heroic performance in 1938 caused him to see the specter of Hitler in Nasser. One suspects he was also driven to reassert British power in an era of American ascendancy. There is a poignant portrait of Eden, tired, ill and defeated by the combined power of his political opponents: rivals in his own cabinet, the parliamentary opposition, and, finally, his ally, the United States, which in Rhodes James' view must bear a significant share of the blame.

William G. Hyland

LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ET LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE. By Françoise de la Serre. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987, 221 pp. Fr. 135.

A useful account of Britain's relations with the European Community from belated entry to pragmatic cooperation. A French political scientist who has written extensively on the subject gives a brief history, focusing principally on British politics and interests, placing them in the context of continental policies. An up-to-date summary, cautiously optimistic about Britain's continued and positive role.

ANEURIN BEVAN AND THE MIRAGE OF BRITISH SOCIALISM. By John Campbell. New York: Norton, 1987, 417 pp. $22.50.

The son of a Welsh miner (and, for a short time, a miner himself), Bevan became one of the great figures of Westminster, for a long time a hero of the socialist left and the favorite bogeyman of the Tories. A political biography of an attractive and able man, a fervent socialist and architect of the National Health Service, whose life, Campbell argues, "was essentially a failure" because he "misread the trend of history." But he left his mark on British politics; as an orator he was often thought to be Churchill's only equal.

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THE TWO GERMANIES SINCE 1945. By Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, 288 pp. $17.95.

A succinct, fair-minded account of the evolution of the two German states. A basic, comprehensive text, valuable for an understanding of a central and changing aspect of European politics.

DEMOCRACY, ITALIAN STYLE. By Joseph LaPalombara. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, 308 pp. $25.00.

A veteran analyst of Italian politics describes its workings and cultural setting, concluding that "Italian democracy is alive and thriving"—a contention that is no longer particularly startling. In this highly readable study, LaPalombara, a political scientist at Yale, delights in the paradoxes of Italian political life; the illusions and the realities, the causes of apparent perpetual crisis and of the disguised stability which has effected important changes and achievements in the postwar period. There are many subthemes: politics pervades Italian life, yet the populace has a dismissive, even contemptuous attitude toward politics—and 90 percent of the electorate goes to the polls. Italian democracy withstood political terrorism, which LaPalombara blames on its justification by intellectuals. Rich in detail, a pleasant and informative study.

DREAMS AND DELUSIONS: THE DRAMA OF GERMAN HISTORY. By Fritz Stern. New York: Knopf, 1987, 320 pp. $19.95.

Fritz Stern writes more beautifully with every passing year. This collection of essays, written over the past decade, revolves around the eternal "German question," and historians' efforts to grasp it. Stern writes with all the poignancy of one who loves German civilization deeply and is determined to fathom how it could have done such terrible violence to others, and to itself. His quest for understanding goes forward with ever-deepening insight, humanity and fine moral judgment. The biographical essays on Einstein, Haber and Reuter are particularly perceptive and moving, as are the essays on German Jewry and the temptations of National Socialism. The essays on postwar Germany are wise and interesting but inevitably less authoritative.

David P. Calleo

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE AND THE YEAR 2000. By Alexander Yanov. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 289 pp. $24.95.

If Gorbachev's reforms fail, says Alexander Yanov, as they will without outside help, Russia will go the way of "counter-reform" and become an oppressive, aggressive, fascist garrison-empire based on the ideology of anti-Western Russian nationalism. The rise of such a nationalist movement, the topic of his earlier *The Russian New Right*, is here placed in the context of the alternating trends of Russian history, and also, pertinently, in that of the continuing Western debate on how to deal with the U.S.S.R. Yanov is obviously intent on building his case and his own reputation and demonstrating the blindness of American officials and academics. But his writing is not just provocative; it is always stimulating, perhaps prophetic, and deserves a serious reading.

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THE SOVIET UNION UNDER GORBACHEV. Edited by Martin McCauley. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 259 pp. $39.95 (paper, $14.95).
THE SOVIET UNION UNDER GORBACHEV: PROSPECTS FOR REFORM. Edited by David A. Dyker. London: Croom Helm/New York: Methuen, 1987, 227 pp. $35.00.

The Soviet Union has not been "under Gorbachev" long enough for the keenest observers to be sure how much change the new leadership intends or how far it will succeed. These two similar but only partly overlapping endeavors, products of conferences held in England in 1986, review the major developments from Gorbachev's taking over as general secretary through the 27th Party Congress and its aftermath. The book edited by McCauley has a larger and more diverse team of authors and is broader in scope. The Dyker volume concentrates on the Soviet economy. Both display expert knowledge, exemplary objectivity, and a wariness of concluding too much too soon, given the formidable obstacles to real structural reform.

FROM BREZHNEV TO GORBACHEV: DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Hans-Joachim Veen. New York: Berg, 1987, 378 pp. (New York: St. Martin's, distributor, $45.00).
FROM BREZHNEV TO GORBACHEV: INFIGHTING IN THE KREMLIN. By Baruch A. Hazan. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 260 pp. $34.95.

The same title can serve quite different approaches to Soviet developments of the past few years. Hazan's book sticks closely to power politics at the top as the party and state made the transitions, first from Brezhnev to Andropov, then to Chernenko, then to Gorbachev. It is based on the public sources, which leave many questions unresolved, but it is still Sovietology at a fairly high level of competence. The volume edited by Veen is the product of a conference of German and American experts held in 1984, and it was published in German that year. This revised edition takes some account of more recent events, but most of the contributions speak of Chernenko's policies and prospects in the present tense. Discussing in turn the Soviet Union's economy, its culture and society, and its political power, the papers speak pointedly to the major issue of change and reform, although they are obviously dated and often too brief to get very far into the subject at hand.

SOVIET POWER: THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE. By James Sherr. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 280 pp. $32.50.

The greater part of this book dwells on the nature of Soviet power (military capabilities, economic resources, subordinate empire) and on the continuity of political aims and institutions. The treatment is coolly analytical, relatively hard-line, mindful of the Soviet stress on competition for power, and skeptical of portrayals of the U.S.S.R. as a flawed superpower or empire in decay. Standard stuff with no surprises. The same may be said about the second part of the book, which consists of lectures on related topics by a series of distinguished guests (among them Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Malcolm Mackintosh, and a number of well-qualified military authorities).

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SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Loren R. Graham. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, 565 pp. $45.00.

Having devoted years of thought and research to Soviet scientific literature, Graham presents his mature assessments and conclusions in this revised edition of *Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union* (1972), which adds new chapters on human behavior and, as before, covers specific branches of science: genetics, psychology, chemistry, quantum mechanics, relativity physics and others. In the Soviet Union, as the author recognizes, the hand of the state and official ideology is ever-present. Nevertheless, he takes very seriously indeed the theories of dialectical materialism, as Soviet scientists and philosophers in recent years have propounded and discussed them on a high intellectual level, a far cry from Stalin's time and the heyday of T. D. Lysenko.

ERODING EMPIRE: WESTERN RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE. By Lincoln Gordon and others. Washington: Brookings, 1987, 359 pp. $31.95 (paper, $11.95).

Far more than just another collection of papers on Eastern Europe, this is a carefully organized and well-presented study which covers both the developing situation in that region and the views, interests and policies of the West. The West, however, is not a monolith, and it is a great merit of the book that it describes separately the problems as seen from Bonn, Paris, London and Washington, and then seeks to define the essential interests common to all. Contributors include J. F. Brown, Pierre Hassner, Josef Joffe and Edwina Moreton. Lincoln Gordon, who guided the project, writes the key chapters on American and overall Western policy. To some the wisdom may seem conventional, but it is still wisdom, and that is the main point.

JUGOSLAWIEN IN STRATEGIE UND POLITIK DER ALLIERTEN 1940–1943. By Hans Knoll. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986, 671 pp. DM 148.

Historians concerned with Yugoslavia's role in World War II will find much of interest in this massive monograph on the policies of the three major Allied powers in the early years of the war. For the most part it is a study of British policy, solidly based on the archives of the Foreign Office and other agencies, with less attention to Soviet and U.S. policy; for the former the source material is not at hand, and Washington was not in the forefront at this time, generally deferring to the British in the Balkan area. The research is most thorough. The story unfolds day by day, and no fact, opinion or decision, relevant or irrelevant, escapes the author's notice.

THE POLISH DILEMMA: VIEWS FROM WITHIN. Edited by Lawrence S. Graham and Maria K. Ciechocinska. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 258 pp. $34.50.

Influential Polish economists, political scientists and sociologists, who have remained in the country, analyze Poland's crisis of the past decade and seek possible ways out. They write with remarkable candor and realism, considering the obvious constraints. Not a book of heroes and villains, of apologetics for the regime or for Solidarity, but a valuable combination of academic research and practical understanding of Polish society.

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FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS IN THE 1970s. By Vladimir Wozniuk. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1987, 176 pp. $12.95 (paper).

A brief, unexceptionable study, based largely on Soviet and East European press and radio material, that adds little in the way of information to the existing literature on the subject. The author offers some interesting thoughts, however, on the influence of Eurocommunism in Eastern Europe, especially Poland, and on the difficult choices confronting the Soviet Union in dealing with Poland's revolution from below and the disintegrating authority of the Polish Communist Party.

CONVERSATIONS WITH CZESLAW MILOSZ. By Ewa Czarnecka and Aleksander Fiut. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987, 352 pp. $27.95.

For those to whom *The Captive Mind* was one of the intellectual thrillers of their generation, this book provides a whole new and larger dimension to Milosz—the diffident but dedicated poet who attempts to explain how he writes (sometimes automatically), who loves his home in Lithuania and is preoccupied with themes of exile and return, in time as well as space, and who worries about the effect of the Nobel prize on his image! A haunting book, a haunting man. Lucy Despard

THE MEANING AND USES OF POLISH HISTORY. By Adam Bromke. Boulder (Colo.): East European Monographs, 1987, 244 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $20.00).

Adam Bromke is right in stressing the importance of history (fact and myth) as a central factor in Polish politics. The first part of his book is an extended essay on this theme, a personal statement in many respects and also a review of Poland's current dilemmas in the light of the past; here he takes the occasion to revert to an idea prominent in some of his earlier works, the alternation or cycle of idealism and realism. The second part of the book is an appendix containing pertinent Polish writings from before World War I (Roman Dmowski) to the present day (John Paul II).

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE WEST: THE DILEMMAS OF SECURITY. By Charles A. Kupchan. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 254 pp. $39.95 (paper, $14.95).

Starting from World War II and coming down to the current naval encounters, this study provides a good general introduction to the security problems of the Gulf. Old Middle East hands may well be bored with the lengthy recitation of the ups and downs of U.S. policy over four decades, but the book becomes more interesting when one comes to the so-called Carter Doctrine and the rapid deployment force after the momentous events of 1979 in Iran and Afghanistan. The author clearly recognizes and discusses the main dilemmas that have plagued all U.S. administrations: how to meet large and varied strategic requirements with limited military capabilities; how to fit strategy into the unpredictable political realities of the Middle East; and how to organize common Western policies in defense

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of common Western interests. Unfortunately, even intelligent discussion does not resolve these dilemmas.

ISRAEL, THE SUPERPOWERS, AND THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov. New York: Praeger, 1987, 328 pp. $39.95.

The story of Israel's war with the Arabs is the subject of so many books and articles that scholars are ever searching for new ways of telling it. This study concentrates on the constraints which the two superpowers have placed upon Israel's decisions in four wars from 1956 to 1973. Although the Soviet side is not neglected, the emphasis is on the patron-client relationship between the United States and Israel, in which there are constraints on both sides. Unique in so many ways, this relationship conforms to no general pattern of great-power small-power relations, but the lessons to be learned from its history can be enlightening to those fated to continue to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Or, leaving patterns and theories aside, the book can be read as straight diplomatic history, of which it is a fine example.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1987, 323 pp.

Another approach to the Arab-Israeli struggle is that of crisis management or, as this title indicates, conflict management, since the protracted conflict goes on between wars and crises. Ben-Dor and his colleagues make a very broad attack on the subject, one which enables each author to pursue his or her own special interest or area of expertise. There are chapters on concepts and theory, case studies of specific conflicts (including studies of the Iran-Iraq war and Libyan-Egyptian relations, welcome respites from Arab-Israeli affairs) and of the role of the superpowers, and speculation about the future. If peace is remote, peacekeeping and diplomacy remain indispensable, and on that score this book has much to offer.

SHI'ISM AND SOCIAL PROTEST. Edited by Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 321 pp. $40.00 (paper, $12.95).

With roots deep in centuries-old religious faith and in the modern urge of disinherited groups for social change, the political manifestations of Shi'ism are much more than fanatical outbursts of terrorism and violence. As this first-rate book shows, Shia activism must be taken very seriously indeed by Middle East governments (which are mainly Sunni in composition and support) and by outside powers. Is there a "Shia international" centered in Tehran, bent on sweeping through and transforming the Muslim world? In some respects, yes. But the expert authors of this volume generally find that within each country, including Iran, the ties of national identity remain strong and that Shia fundamentalism is more likely to take nationalist than universalist form.

AMAL AND THE SHI'A: STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF LEBANON. By Augustus Richard Norton. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987, 238 pp. $25.00 (paper, $10.95).

There is no understanding the events of the past decade in and around Lebanon without probing into the complexity of that country's sectarian

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policies and particularly the role of the Shia community, which has progressed from virtual powerlessness to central importance in a relatively brief span of time. The story of the largest and strongest Shia movement, Amal, and of its struggles with rival sects and with the PLO, competition with both traditional and radical Shia factions, and relations with Israel and Syria, is told here better than anywhere else. Colonel Norton, who teaches at West Point, served with the U.N. peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon and knows the area and its people well.

HOLY TERROR: INSIDE THE WORLD OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM. By Amir Taheri. Washington: Adler & Adler, 1987, 313 pp. $19.95.

Amir Taheri is a prominent Iranian journalist now in exile. His book offers deep insights into the modes of thought which drive Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers in waging their holy war at home and abroad. It is not a genuine ideology, he says, but a hodgepodge of medieval thought and of methods borrowed from fascism and communism. In any event the impact of the "Party of Allah" throughout the Islamic world has been extraordinary, and Taheri describes it with a wealth of fascinating detail and with definite opinions of his own. "Holy terror" has lived and prospered on violence, but, as he concludes, it has no answers to the real political and economic problems of today.

QADDAFI AND THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION. By David Blundy and Andrew Lycett. Boston: Little, Brown, 1987, 240 pp. $17.95.

THE MAKING OF A PARIAH STATE: THE ADVENTURIST POLICIES OF MUAMMAR QADDAFI. By Martin Sicker. New York: Praeger, 1987, 147 pp. $32.95.

The exploits of Qaddafi continue to attract writers in search of good copy and readers looking for excitement, although the resulting books have not had much to add by way of interpretation to what John Cooley covered in his *Libyan Sandstorm* (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982/83). The biography by Blundy and Lycett is not a full "life and times" and does not dig very deeply into the Libyan environment that produced Qaddafi. Where they clearly enjoy their task is in the investigation of Qaddafi's use of terrorism to confound or destroy his enemies, particularly the "stray dogs," his Libyan opponents living in foreign countries. *The Making of A Pariah State* is a kind of primer of Libyan history and politics, giving the essential facts in skeletal form and drawing the customary unflattering portrait of Qaddafi. The author, a former U.S. official, regards Qaddafi as a danger underestimated by the West and urges Washington openly to support an alternative leadership in Libya.

JOHN GARANG SPEAKS. Edited by Mansour Khalid. New York: Methuen, 1987, 147 pp. $13.95 (paper).

Speeches and letters of the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, which has engaged in armed resistance to the central government in Khartoum both before and since the revolution that deposed General Nimeiri in 1985. Garang makes the point again and again that he is fighting against the traditional power-brokers of northern Sudan, not for the secession of the south but for a united, democratic, federal Sudan. The book is an authoritative statement of the declared aims of a movement

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about which little is known in the outside world. For a critical analysis, one has to look elsewhere.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Ilpyong J. Kim. New York: Paragon House, 1987, 293 pp. $12.95 (paper). A PWPA book.

This is a stimulating collection of articles by leading American specialists on the triangular relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Steven Levine concludes that the Soviets take a somewhat more relaxed view than before of Sino-American relations because they see that the Chinese are genuinely preoccupied with their domestic modernization rather than intent on threatening Soviet interests via a military bloc with the U.S. He believes that this more relaxed Soviet attitude may marginally improve prospects of success in Soviet-American arms control negotiations. Lowell Dittmer argues that the U.S. must restore reasonably amicable relations with the U.S.S.R. if it is to gain any triangular advantage. R. J. Rummel argues that "by its implicit alliance with China the United States has conceded important control over its future . . . . The fate of American policy towards the Soviet Union and China now depends to an uncomfortable degree on continued deep Sino-Soviet hostility and the political and military status quo along China's borders." Tom Robinson proposes that the triangle is likely to evolve into a global balance of power system of a more benign sort.

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA: A SYMPOSIUM. New York and Washington: International Security Council, 1987, 164 pp., $4.00 (paper).

This volume is the result of a meeting in Beijing in March 1987 between a group of American security specialists, led by Eugene Rostow, and the Beijing Institute for Strategic Studies, a Chinese think tank sponsored by the Ministry of Defense and consisting largely of retired Chinese military officers. The most interesting part of the dialogue was the extremely cautious Chinese approach to Gorbachev's new Vladivostok initiatives. The Chinese participants argued that Soviet strategic objectives in Asia remain unchanged and that the current Soviet "readjustment" merely introduces greater flexibility into Moscow's approach. The Chinese pointed out that the Soviet Union continues to build up its military strength in Asia—particularly its naval strength—and that Soviet ships and planes have "time and again conducted reconnaissance along the Chinese border and on China's coastal regions." Although seminars of this type are held frequently, the results are often unpublished. The International Security Council, which cosponsored the meeting, is to be congratulated for making the Chinese and American papers available to an American audience.

CHINA BRIEFING, 1987. Edited by John S. Major and Anthony J. Kane. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (in cooperation with the China Council of The Asia Society), 1987, 197 pp. $29.85 (paper, $13.85).

For a readable, authoritative annual survey of Chinese developments, this small volume has few rivals. Of particular interest in this issue is Harlan Jencks' discussion of the Chinese defense industry.

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SIBERIA AND THE SOVIET FAR EAST. Edited by Rodger Swearingen. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1987, 298 pp. $32.95 (paper, $16.95).

This collection of essays points up the essential dilemma Gorbachev faces in Siberia—whether to continue stressing "guns over growth." In order to balance China, Japan and the United States while projecting Soviet military power in the Pacific, Brezhnev militarized Siberia. As a result, economic development was deferred. In capital, infrastructure and labor force, there continues to be a huge gap between what is needed and what is available for Siberian development. For the Soviet Union to change its policy and stress Siberian economic development there would have to be a substantial reduction of tensions with China, Japan and the United States and some fundamental changes in Soviet policy toward the entire Pacific region. The book contains a good deal of solid information on Siberia.

THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG: TOWARD 1997 AND BEYOND. Edited by Hungdah Chiu, Y. C. Jao and Yuan-Li Wu. Westport (Conn.): Quorum/Greenwood Press, 1987, 262 pp. $45.00.

Written by eight specialists, this is the most comprehensive study yet of the future of Hong Kong. It contains a wealth of information and analysis and, on balance, is rather pessimistic.

VIETNAM AND THE SOVIET UNION: ANATOMY OF AN ALLIANCE. By Douglas Pike. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 271 pp. $29.85.

This is the first complete, scholarly history of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. Pike concludes that Vietnam has entered into a marriage of convenience with Moscow but will eventually have to make peace with China. China "is simply too large and too near to permit Vietnam the luxury of treating it as a permanent enemy."

ARMS CONTROL IN ASIA. Edited by Gerald Segal. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 182 pp. $37.50.

This is a pioneering study of a neglected topic. Some of the authors contend that Asian governments have come to recognize the role of arms control in limiting the region's conflicts; others are skeptical. Gower Rizvi, in analyzing the India-Pakistan rivalry, observes that although the arms buildup on both sides has contributed to increasing tensions, negotiating an arms control agreement in the absence of a meaningful resolution of the political problems would be an exercise in futility. The same point might be made about the other regional rivalries discussed in the book. The essays are all of high quality, but there is an exceptionally perceptive and informative chapter by the editor, Gerald Segal, on Sino-Soviet military relations.

INSIDE THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION: THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY AND ITS STRUGGLE FOR POWER. By William Chapman. New York: Norton, 1987, 288 pp. $18.95.

An enterprising journalist has put together all the bits and pieces about the Communist New People's Army and offers the first complete account of this revolutionary movement, which is active in 62 of the country's 73 provinces and has approximately 20,000 full-time armed guerrillas, as well as a mass base of about a million. Chapman argues that the new Philippine establishment under President Aquino is poorly informed about the Com-

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munists and the leftist movement more generally. The image in Manila of an NPA guerrilla is still largely that of a University of Philippines dropout hustling an assortment of dumb peasants. The reality is that NPA leadership positions are increasingly filled by men and women with little formal education whose young adulthood has been spent fighting and organizing and whose roots in the countryside are deep. Chapman also presents evidence that the NPA—because of its interest in obtaining more sophisticated arms—is reassessing its previous hostility to the Soviet Union and is now prepared to accept Soviet assistance. He also sees some evidence that Moscow is displaying "a growing interest in the Philippine radicals."

EMBATTLED KOREA: THE RIVALRY FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. By Ralph N. Clough. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 401 pp. $29.95.

The author has written an indispensable book on the complex issue of Korea which addresses both the domestic and external causes of instability. He has also outlined a realistic long-term U.S. strategy to help bring about cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the two superpowers.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE MILITARY IN AFRICAN POLITICS. Edited by John W. Harbeson. New York: Praeger, 1987, 208 pp. $35.95.

This excellent collection takes a fresh look at an important area, badly in need of updating. Pushing ahead from previous discussions of why the military came to power and how it relates to civilian technocrats, the authors look at how the military has ruled and, in the most interesting instances, what sorts of political institutions it has created. (The book mentions hardly at all, though, the military's economic dominion.) Extended case studies provide illuminating glimpses of the regimes (mostly left-wing except Nigeria's) which have most inventively institutionalized power and/or resolved political conflict, including those of Benin, Congo and Ethiopia.

SOUTH AFRICA IN CRISIS. Edited by Jesmond Blumenfeld. London: Croom Helm/New York: Methuen (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1987, 207 pp. $45.00.

Convened under the auspices of Chatham House, a group of British scholars takes a look at South Africa today. Considering the economic effects of sanctions, the reach of reform, the white oligarchy, the black opposition and trade unions, the security forces, constitutional alternatives and foreign policy, they voice what has become the prevailing liberal interpretation of South Africa's situation: time has probably run out on peaceful outcomes, but while we have breath left, we must go on talking about them.

SQUANDERING EDEN: AFRICA AT THE EDGE. By Mort Rosenblum and Doug Williamson. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987, 326 pp. $19.95.

An American journalist working in tandem with a South African environmental scientist paints a vast panorama of the environmental depreda-

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tions inflicted on Africa by its own people and by outsiders, largely in the quest for modernization. Traversing the continent north to south and east to west, they learn from the African people about how diminishing natural resources affect their lives, and how their lives affect the lands they depend on for survival.

MULTINATIONALS, THE STATE, AND CONTROL OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY. By Thomas J. Biersteker. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, 344 pp. $45.00 (paper, $12.50).

In this thorough study of a major policy shift in black Africa's largest economy, the author scrutinizes the several phases of the "Nigerianization" of foreign enterprise. What emerges from his account is an impressive effort in policymaking, whose implementation, however, largely failed to achieve the increased control which was ostensibly its major goal. What Nigerianization did accomplish instead was a far-reaching redistribution of resources within Nigeria, and particularly a great increase in the state's economic role. Despite the important achievements of this major study, its lack of any real assessment of what the lengthy and costly process of nationalization meant to Nigeria's economic development—in terms either of productivity or learning—is disappointing.

AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE. By Olusegun Obasanjo. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987, 51 pp. $10.00.

Former Nigerian head of state General Obasanjo aptly entitles his Russell C. Leffingwell lectures at the Council on Foreign Relations *Africa in Perspective: Myths and Realities*. His broad review, of critical issues involving African governance, debt, trade, arms and technology, and South Africa, does not break new ground. General Obasanjo understands that change must come from within African countries, and he correctly understands the importance of intra-African links as well as Africa's ties to the world. This short book can be read for its provocative suggestions for solutions which take into account specific African needs, including South African realities.

Henry S. Bienen

AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS. Edited by Stephen Wright and Janice N. Brownfoot. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Sheridan House, 1987, 214 pp. $35.00.

A group of mostly British scholars takes a look at a subject largely ignored in the wake of Africa's deepening economic crisis and the consequent attenuation of African activity in international forums. What emerges most clearly: stronger links between African nations would offer some hope of growing political and economic leverage, but hope for closer regional ties is increasingly dimmed by African introversion.

Note

This quarter's *Source Material* will appear in the next issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

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